How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific
How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY DR THOMAS WILKINS
30 November 2023
Besides France, the UK is the only European country with the necessary global reach to project power into the Indo-Pacific. While Paris makes great play of its Indian and Pacific Ocean overseas territories, affording it the status of a ‘resident power’, London emphasises its formidable array of partnerships and minilateral engagements within the region. While France promulgated a formal “Indo-Pacific Strategy” document in 2018, Britain has not followed suit; however, elements of an informal “Indo-Pacific strategy” are contained within the 2021 Integrated Review (IR) and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IRR). France’s ability to leverage its Indo-Pacific Strategy in tandem with the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific gives it a further advantage and greater prominence. From this vantage point, France’s role in the Indo-Pacific has attracted significant attention. Yet, despite its detachment from the EU, Britain is still well-equipped to make significant contributions to regional security and has both the resources and relationships to potentially make a difference.
Britain’s controversial and acrimonious departure from the EU in 2020 spurred efforts among policy-makers to redefine the role of the country, originally under the mantra of “Global Britain”. Given the residual ambition and ability to play a global role, attention quickly turned to the Indo-Pacific region as a stage on which the UK was determined to make a (re-)appearance. With the IR enunciating Britain’s official strategic outlook on the Indo-Pacific, British aims in the region are clearly defined. Succinctly, these boil down to three overlapping objectives. The first is to tap into the region’s economic potential to stimulate economic growth and prosperity at home. The second is to contribute towards maintaining security and strategic stability in a region fraught with geopolitical risk since any crisis there will have global repercussions. The third is to reinforce the concept of a “liberal international order” by underwriting the international law and norms and supporting democratic regimes in the region.
British levers of power
It is well understood that Britain is no longer the global superpower of yesteryear. However, it still retains significant national power resources and capabilities to exert influence in the Indo-Pacific. The strategic aims to be implemented are relatively well-aligned with the assets it has available, and London has no intent to reshape the balance of power, which will be decided by the most consequential local actors. Britain aims to apply a mix of its “hard” and “soft” power assets as part of an “integrated” approach that includes emphasis on national “resiliency”. With a GDP of USD 3.13 trillion and a defence budget of USD 68 billion, anchored in a strong Science and Technology base, the UK remains a major power. These power resources, however, are concentrated in northern Europe and therefore difficult to bring to bear in full further afield. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy has still demonstrated the ability to deploy a Carrier Strike Group in Indo-Pacific waters in 2021 and may do so again in the mid-future. In the interim, its standing presence is much more modest, with the local stationing of offshore patrol vessels, plus regular participation in multilateral military exercises. Britain is also a significant economic actor in the region, with many FTAs, considerable FDI inflow, and financial networks, and it disperses a substantial amount of Official Development Assistance. These national resources and capabilities, whilst not comparable to those available to countries like the US, China, Japan, and India, do afford it the ability to exercise some influence, and to be considered a valuable ‘over the horizon’ partner to regional states.
“Networks and grids”
British officials have repeatedly made clear that the country has no intention to play a fully independent role in the Indo-Pacific but rather engage with and support regional allies and partners. This is where what UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly calls “networks and grids” comes into service as one of the key props of London’s regional ambitions. Britain’s engagement with close allies and partners, plus its involvement in key minilateral and multilateral institutions in the region, potentially puts it ahead of France in terms of its overall regional impact.
Despite dangers closer to home and straitened finances, London does appear to be committed to the region, even if the implementation of some aspects of its new strategic approach remains patchy.
As a firm ally of the US, London is in general alignment with Washington’s aim to create a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ order that promotes international law and norms, free and fair trade, economic connectivity and prosperity, and counteracts coercive activities that undermine the status quo. Amongst its many close security partners, its bilateral strategic partnerships with Canberra, Tokyo, and Singapore stand out. The UK participates in the Australian-hosted TALISMAN SABRE military exercises and maintains a wide array of defence consultations and exchanges with Canberra. The UK-Japan Strategic Partnership, formed in 2020, has accelerated rapidly with multiple defence agreements and bilateral military exercises in place. Singapore hosts the British Defence Singapore Support Unit, as well as serving as a hub for British development finance.
What greatly enhances these bilateral connections is the UK’s membership of related “minilateral” institutions. In the case of Australia and the US, the Trilateral AUKUS Partnership destined to supply Australia and the UK with next-generation nuclear-powered submarines and related collaboration on Critical and Emerging Technologies is perhaps emblematic of Britain’s leveraging of regional partnerships. This is accompanied by the agreement to work on next-generation warplanes with Japan (and Italy) under the Global Combat Aircraft Programme. The UK also works with both countries and others through the development-focused minilateral Partnership for the Blue Pacific. The defence connection with Singapore and Australia is also manifest in the long-standing Five Power Defence Arrangements, along with New Zealand and Malaysia. These minilaterals draw together a range of strong bilateral relationships as well as magnify them. In addition to being a member of practically every global multilateral institution, including a UN Permanent Security Council and Five Eyes member, London has a place at the table as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the Pacific Islands Forum, and seeks accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement toward Transpacific Partnership.
Working against the grain of those in the EU who might seek to ostracise a Brexit-Britain, other European states, in recognition of the UK’s value as a partner in the Indo-Pacific, are keen to cooperate in achieving their own aims in the region. For example, Italy is also a member of the Global Combat Aircraft Programme and is currently forging its own “Indo-Pacific strategy”, and France is exploring the option of co-deploying Carrier Strike Groups in the future.
A sustainable approach?
As the Sunak government seeks to reposition itself in a more contested and volatile security landscape, it has undertaken to play a meaningful role in supporting regional order in the Indo-Pacific through a variety of means. Notwithstanding its obvious focus on the northern European security situation, where Russia is its primary ‘threat’, and ongoing economic constraints, Britain’s engagement is largely welcomed by both its regional partners and other European co-travellers including France, Germany, Italy, and the EU itself. The UK cannot shape the regional balance alone, but its contributions to a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ order are widely, if not universally (China), appreciated.
When Britain’s current economic woes are factored in, the challenge for the UK will be in materially delivering on its promise that the Indo-Pacific “Tilt” is indeed a “permanent” policy shift. Despite dangers closer to home and straitened finances, London does appear to be committed to the region, even if the implementation of some aspects of its new strategic approach remains patchy. To overcome limited attention and resource constraints Britain will have to seek out opportunities for collaboration with European and regional partners to capitalise on its much-touted “networks and grids”.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Nor do they represent the official positions of the institutions with which the author is affiliated.
Author biography
Dr Thomas Wilkins is an Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Sydney and a Visiting Scholar at the National Graduate Institute of Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. He is affiliated as a Non-Resident Senior Fellow with the Pacific Forum, Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Japan Institute for International Affairs. He was previously a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan and received his Doctorate from the University of Birmingham, UK. His research interests include Alliances/alignments and regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, Australian and Japanese security policy, and “Middle Power” theory. Image credit: Flickr/ Official US Navy.