Italy and the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy
Italy and the
Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy
WRITTEN BY DR GABRIELE ABBONDANZA
9 November 2023
The Indo-Pacific has rapidly become the geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre of the world. Home to approximately two-thirds of the global population, gross domestic product, and maritime trade, it also harbours some of the world’s most significant existing or potential flashpoints (Taiwan, East and South China Seas, and the Korean Peninsula), as well as three prominent choke points which are crucial for global maritime trade (the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca).
It is, therefore, unsurprising that a growing number of states and institutions have gradually focused on this macro-region, chiefly comprising the US and its allies, and Indo-Pacific nations themselves. Europe joined this debate late, although it has attempted to make up for lost time over the past five years. A recent special issue with the International Political Science Review (IPSR) — the first of its kind — has shed light on this developing branch of European foreign policy. It showed that this common effort is driven not only by France, the UK, Germany, the EU, and other countries with formal policies but also by other significant players which do not have formal strategies yet, thus displaying an emerging European approach to the Indo-Pacific.
Italy, in particular, is a prominent example of an influential country with substantial relations with — and interests in — this region which has yet to produce an Indo-Pacific strategy. The first-ever academic research on this subject, as well as some notable developments such as a new Indo-Pacific committee within the Italian parliament and new naval deployments to this region, demonstrate that Rome is rapidly developing its approach to the Indo-Pacific through economic, strategic, and normative means, and it might delineate and publish an official Indo-Pacific strategy in the short- to mid-term.
Italy’s quiet pivot to the Indo-Pacific
Despite a quieter approach compared to France, the UK, and Germany, and notwithstanding common notions of its Mediterranean-focused foreign policy (especially in the so-called ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’, or Mediterraneo Allargato, which extends to the Indian Ocean), Italy has gradually pivoted to the Indo-Pacific over the past 15 years, and more decidedly so in the past five years.
All things considered, it seems evident that Italy is ready to develop and issue a formal Indo-Pacific strategy that considers national, European, and Indo-Pacific interests as vital components of a strategic whole.
In economic terms, a trade assessment with United Nations data shows that Rome has increased its exchanges with the region’s ten largest trading nations by about 16 per cent over the last 10 years. Even more remarkably, it has increased its defence procurement by almost 45 per cent in the same timeframe — chiefly thanks to the export of warships, aircraft, armoured vehicles, and sensors, according to SIPRI data.
From a strategic perspective, Italy has emphasised its active support of the rules-based order and international law more plainly than some European partners already possessing official Indo-Pacific strategies. For example, it deployed its Carabiniere frigate for an Indo-Pacific tour in 2017, it has joined and led several European and NATO missions in the Indian Ocean (the western Indo-Pacific) throughout the years, and it just ended the Indo-Pacific mission of its Morosini offshore patrol vessel (OPV), which also exercised freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and joined multilateral exercises with Indo-Pacific partners, among other examples. Moreover, the possible deployment of the Cavour carrier strike group in 2024 is currently under discussion.
Normatively and diplomatically, Rome has gradually stepped up its bilateral and regional relations over the past few years. Guided by key principles such as the primacy of international law, common prosperity, and multilateralism, it has concluded a noticeable number of development and strategic partnerships with key Indo-Pacific states and institutions.
In chronological order, these include China (in 2004, when Beijing was not yet openly challenging the international order), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), Vietnam, South Korea, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an Italian-Indian-Japanese trilateral, Japan (boosted by the Global Combat Air Programme), and India (with a specific leadership role within India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative).
Italy’s potential Indo-Pacific strategy
It is, therefore, clear that, despite the absence of a formal policy, Rome has increasingly engaged with the Indo-Pacific through high-level economic, security, and normative-diplomatic initiatives. After all, Italy remains the world’s eighth largest economy and the seventh largest manufacturing nation while retaining top-ten soft and hard power capabilities and membership to key international fora (the EU, G7, G20, NATO Quint, and many others). Additionally, its economy displays remarkable complementarity with many Indo-Pacific ones, which adds to the mutual benefits resulting from closer ties.
In light of this, Italy has finally started to engage in public discussions concerning an official strategy for the Indo-Pacific, which is necessary for three main reasons. First, such a document would encapsulate and streamline the country’s recent efforts, thus strengthening current and future endeavours. Second, it would signal its cooperative and multilateral approach to both allies and regional partners. And third, it would serve as a strategic compass for future governments, irrespective of their political affiliation or foreign policy priorities, thus cementing the country’s Indo-Pacific posture.
Additionally, the Italian parliament, specifically its Chamber of Deputies, recently formed a permanent Indo-Pacific committee. Conceived and chaired by The Hon. Paolo Formentini (Lega party), and supported by representatives of other political parties, such as The Hon. Lia Quartapelle Procopio (Democratic Party), its goal is to advise the parliament on the subject of a potential national strategy.
In the inaugural testimony of this parliamentary committee, I recommended the formulation of an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy based not only on the country’s national interests but also those of its European and North American allies and Indo-Pacific partners. In particular, I emphasised the importance of key concepts such as the primacy of international law, a multilateral and cooperative approach, the promotion of regional stability, respect for the region’s many and diverse viewpoints, ASEAN’s centrality, the tackling of shared challenges, and common prosperity, among others.
This parliamentary testimony also outlined a risk-benefit analysis, with the risks chiefly being the potential “strategic distraction” due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, neither of which have managed to curb Rome’s Indo-Pacific engagement so far. Conversely, benefits are the tangible economic, strategic, and normative-diplomatic developments that, however, remain underdeveloped and would, therefore, benefit from a formal strategy protracted through time. The analysis concluded that the advantages of an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy outweigh the risks.
The parliament’s Indo-Pacific committee is currently in the process of inviting additional experts from various fields, who will all contribute to the production of a formal recommendation to be presented to the parliament in June 2024. During the coming months, other related initiatives will take place, including a public event hosted on 21 November 2023 by the Italian Senate, thanks to the institutional hospitality of Sen. Francesco Giacobbe, in which experts from other institutions will join me in further emphasising the importance of Italy’s relations with the Indo-Pacific.
All things considered, it seems evident that Italy is ready to develop and issue a formal Indo-Pacific strategy that considers national, European, and Indo-Pacific interests as vital components of a strategic whole. These interests stem from acknowledging that common challenges, shared goals, and untapped cooperation potential are impressive and keep growing. Moreover, the necessity of a formal strategy is warranted by the three points mentioned earlier.
Finally, and even though the time is ripe for such a strategy, it ought to be emphasised that whether Rome will finally issue an Italian strategy for the Indo-Pacific is not solely dependent on the formal advice of the Indo-Pacific committee, however important that is. It is also a matter of political expediency since the establishment of this policy is ultimately the government’s prerogative. As the Italian administration now faces significant domestic and international challenges, there cannot be any certainty in terms of timing. The premises are remarkably favourable, but only time will tell when Italy will embark on this crucial path like many of its allies and Indo-Pacific partners.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Gabriele Abbondanza is an international relations expert at the University of Madrid (UCM, Spain), the University of Sydney (USYD, Australia), and the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI, Italy). Further information is available here. Image credit: Flickr/Ministero Difesa.