France in the Pacific: What it's been up to, and why it's good for America

20 September 2021

In the controversy surrounding the recent three-way Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) deal to provide Australia with nuclear submarine technology — at the price of enraging France by breaking an over $60 billion deal to sell Australia French submarines, there has been a tendency to overlook the value of the French role in the Indo-Pacific both for Australia and the US. Only time will tell how severely the current diplomatic crisis will affect French policy, but it should be clear that alienating France makes poor sense. It was in the interest of America, Australia, and even the United Kingdom to keep France on their side and work to strengthen their relationship with it. Maybe Australia will get better submarines in the end, but one must wonder if at the very least the entire affair might have been managed differently.

Yes, France is an Indo-Pacific power

The first issue that must be addressed is France’s relevance in the Indo-Pacific. We think of France as an exclusively European power, but thanks to the remnants of its colonial past — what the French themselves sometimes refer to cynically as the “confetti of empire”, France can legitimately view itself as a Pacific and Indian Ocean power. It has several territories in the Indo-Pacific, which are home to 1.6 million French citizens and give France vast maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that add up to 9 million square kilometres. France also maintains a permanent military force of 7,000 men and women, which is unique for a European nation. These include, according to the French Armed Forces Ministry, 2,000 soldiers and five vessels dedicated to the “Southern Indian Ocean Zone”, 1,660 troops and four vessels assigned to the New Caledonia “Zone of Responsibility”, and 1,180 troops and three vessels assigned to the French Polynesia zone. France also routinely sends ships and aircraft into French and international waters in the two oceans to show the flag, often in the form of its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its escorts or one of France’s large Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.

Spurning France the way they have with the AUKUS deal, Australia, the US, and the UK have shut out an ally eager to enhance its role in Indo-Pacific security and did so in a manner that almost entirely coincided with American and Australian interests.

However, in the past decade, and especially under French President Emmanuel Macron, Paris has been loudly emphasising its identity as an “Indo-Pacific” nation as it reaches out to other Indo-Pacific powers to build bilateral and multilateral relationships. French diplomats have been busy inking deals with numerous countries such as India and Indonesia intended to foster commercial relations as well as defence and security cooperation, or both combined in the form of arms sales. In 2018, Macron invoked the rise of a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis”, and France upgraded its relationship with Australia and Japan as well as India, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. The 2016 submarine deal with Australia was a triumph for Macron’s predecessor, and the two countries recently had been reaching agreements related to access to Australian bases. France also has been active in regional multilateral institutions and forums. French participation in the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) — a naval coalition organised to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea, which has been described as the “hidden gem” of Indo-Pacific security cooperation — is particularly noteworthy. Overall, there has been a clear uptick in French military activity. As Le Monde pointed out, if the number of troops deployed to the region has not increased in two years, the “rhythm of exercises, missions, and diplomatic exchanges” has “clearly intensified”.

The French government laid out its motives in official publications such as the 2019 French Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. These include defending a “rules-based international order” (which the White House recently cited as the motive for the AUKUS agreement), preserving and promoting commercial relationships with Indo-Pacific nations, and protecting sea lanes that are critical for global commerce. France sees these things threatened by nuclear proliferation, piracy, terrorism, and anything that threatens the international order writ large. Finally, Paris has a strong interest in protecting and growing its already massive trade with Indo-Pacific countries, where it finds growing markets for French goods and services, not to mention high-end French armaments such as Rafale fighters and submarines. Weapons sales of this nature go a long way toward sustaining France’s defence industries, which Paris regards as necessary for maintaining its strategic autonomy.

Indeed, Australian and American observers may fail to recognise that the submarine deal between France and Australia was always, for France, about more than just jobs: it was about keeping particularly strategic French defence industries alive, strategic here referring to things vital to the nation’s survival and its ability to act independently on the world stage. More specifically, this refers to nuclear weapons and the missiles, planes, and ships required to deploy them, which also implies nuclear propulsion. This is a strategic priority for France and something that has differentiated it from Great Britain, which has been comfortable relying on American suppliers for key components of its nuclear capabilities, for example. In fact, in 1958, the UK and the US signed a nuclear technology sharing agreement, the fruit of which includes much of the technology at the heart of the UK’s current nuclear warheads as well as the missiles and submarines that launch them. Roughly around the same time, France famously went the other direction, insisting on being able to do such vital things by itself if only because post-war Paris thought it reckless to rely upon the United States to guarantee its security in the nuclear age. The fact that making one’s own stuff also means jobs is icing on the cake.

French views on China

At the top of France’s list of threats to the international order in the Indo-Pacific are China’s apparent ambition to challenge American dominance in the Pacific and its threat to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. French views on China are therefore not fundamentally different from those of the United States. It should also be noted that whereas during the Cold War France presented itself as representing a third way between the United States and the Soviet Union, Macron has made it clear that this time France stands with America. It would be “unacceptable”, Macron stated, “to claim to be at the same distance from the US as from China”, largely because France and America share values, whereas France and China do not. Technically, Macron was speaking of the European Union’s position, not France’s, but his remarks contrast sharply with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments stressing the distance between the EU and the US on China. In other words, Macron’s was a French point of view rather than a generic European one. He was speaking for France.

Nonetheless, there is a meaningful difference in how France approaches China, or at least how France talks about China. French diplomacy focuses less on challenging China than on strengthening bilateral and multilateral ties among all those who are concerned by China, all in the name of generic causes such as defending the freedom of the seas and the “rules-based order”, or combatting piracy and proliferation. France may see China as the largest threat in the region to freedom of the seas and the rules-based international order, but the French prefer to avoid saying so out loud. As Macron explained in February, he wants to avoid a scenario in which the European Union and the international community joins “all together against China”. This, he explained, had the highest possible potential for conflict and would be “counterproductive” because it “will push China to increase its regional strategy” while pushing it to “diminish its cooperation” on other issues of global concern.

Convergence

The French approach suits a broad spectrum of countries, which gives it an advantage compared to the United States. France’s emphasis on “shared values” resonates with some, while others are simply afraid of China and wish to protect international trade. For Australia and Japan, France’s close relationship with the US was a prerequisite for closer relations with France. They staked their security on the US and appreciated the fact that Paris and Washington DC had grown markedly closer in defence and security matters, meaning it was never a choice between France and the United States. For many others, what mattered more was France’s distance from the US, however small it might be in practice. Partnering with France was a way to align with the US without allying with it; it even provides a measure of plausible deniability.

India is a case in point. A report published by the French Senate in 2020 noted that India’s long commitment to “non-alignment” during the Cold War meant it kept a distance from the US while being attracted to France because of France’s policy of positioning itself as a third way between the two super-powers. However, Indian and American interests have converged in recent years. This can be seen in India’s purchase of American weaponry, the signing of bilateral defence agreements, and India’s participation in military exercises. Nonetheless, India “did not wish to enter into a constraining alliance with the United States” and “the Indians do not wish to embrace American policy toward China”. This preference to assert independence, the report suggests, is a reason behind India’s decision to purchase a Russian air-defence system. In this context, France, with its high-tech weapons and a China policy that’s close to America’s but not identical, is a perfect partner for India. It also helps that Australia — another choice partner for France — is becoming increasingly valuable in India’s estimation. The bottom line for France, according to the report, is that India’s ‘ripeness’ for partnering with France represents a major opportunity for France, not least because of the huge economic opportunities India offers. Moreover, France’s willingness to let India produce French defence items in India accords well with India’s desire to increase its own defence-industrial base.

Interest in an alternative source of high-end Western weapons is no doubt helping to fuel the boom in French arms sales to Indo-Pacific countries in recent years: buying France’s high-tech weapons is a good way to diversify one’s sources for such items while avoiding the political baggage associated with American, Chinese, or Russian arms. The fact that French weapons are not subject to American International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is also a plus.

France also presumes that its military muscle makes it appealing to Indo-Pacific countries, and Paris likes to telegraph that it has both the will and the ability to use force in the region. French participation this May in the ARC21 amphibious exercise involving US, Australian, and Japanese military assets is a good example. This also helps explain why France took the unusual step of announcing that its nuclear attack submarine Émeraude had visited the South China Sea this winter, whereas normally such information is kept secret. Hugo Decis, a naval expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies who watches French naval activities in the Indo-Pacific, also noted in emails to the author how unusual it was for France to send a nuclear attack submarine “east of Malacca”, in close cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia, and into the South China Sea. He speculated that this might be a “taste of what’s next for the French Navy in the Indo-Pacific”, i.e. operations "east of Malacca and in close cooperation with allies and partners”, which contrasted with more typical deployments to the area. This summer, partly to demonstrate additional capabilities, France deployed Rafale fighter jets and supporting aircraft to French territories in the Pacific. At the end of June, the same aircraft flew to Hawaii and participated in training exercises with US aircraft before returning via the US mainland. The French made a point of stopping in Langley, Virginia to commemorate the 240th anniversary of the Franco-American victory over the British at Yorktown nearby.

Shutting out an ally

France has clearly been determined to be a major player in the Indo-Pacific, where it benefits from military muscle and a convergence of interests with a wide range of partners. France also stands to make a great deal of money from the commercial relations and arms sales that go with improved relations while also enhancing its global profile. France has also been trying deftly to exploit its own careful positioning vis-à-vis the United States while working to ensure that it has a voice in whatever happens in the region, and enough freedom of manoeuvre to act in ways that it sees fit.

Spurning France the way they have with the AUKUS deal, Australia, the US, and the UK have shut out an ally eager to enhance its role in Indo-Pacific security and did so in a manner that almost entirely coincided with American and Australian interests. If anything, both countries should see further French integration into Indo-Pacific security arrangements as a priority. France, after all, aside from its hard power, can complement the US diplomatically by presenting itself as the not-quite-America American ally, and can also involve the European Union, which matters a great deal to trade relations with China given the size of the European economy. As for the UK, it is not at all clear how it gains from the AUKUS deal other than boosting its own sense of relevance. The fact of the matter is that after Brexit the UK needs to mind its relations with France more than ever, especially if London has any concern for security in and around the European continent.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Michael Shurkin is Director of Global Programs at 14 North Strategies, an Africa-based consultancy, and the founder the president of Shurbros Global Strategies. He has previously served as a CIA political analyst and spent over a decade at the RAND Corporation as a Senior Political Scientist. He has a PhD in history from Yale University and a BA from Stanford University, and he studied at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, in Paris, France. Image credit: Flickr/Face of the World.