France in the Indo-Pacific: Not so ambivalent after all
France in the
Indo-Pacific: not so ambivalent after all
WRITTEN BY GESINE WEBER
10 May 2023
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments on Europe’s role in the US-China competition and on Taiwan have sparked harsh criticism both among experts and policy-makers and have raised questions regarding the country’s position in the Indo-Pacific. France has consolidated its approach to the Indo-Pacific in the last years, assumed leadership among EU member states, and actively engaged with regional partners. Macron’s comments do not change this, but they make it harder for France to communicate its position vis-à-vis the US and among European allies. France has the strategic assets and political willingness to provide real leadership among EU member states in the Indo-Pacific. However, the President should refrain from sending mixed messages to avoid undermining his country’s role.
The Indo-Pacific as a political priority
It is no surprise that Paris is dedicating significant attention to the Indo-Pacific: 93 per cent of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone and more than two million French citizens — 1.65 million in the French overseas territories — are located in the region. Additionally, more than 7,000 soldiers are posted there permanently and 30 per cent of Europe’s trade with Asia passes through the Indo-Pacific. Among EU member states, France has assumed a leading role in the Indo-Pacific in the last years: not only was France the first country to adopt national guidelines on the region in 2018, but it also actively pushed for a common European strategy, which resulted in the publication of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021.
Similarly, the Indo-Pacific ranked high among the priorities of the French presidency of the Council of the EU. In February 2022, just a few days before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific — which will see its second iteration in May in Stockholm — brought together EU member states with partners from East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, as well as from the Gulf, South Africa, and East Africa. On the national level, France has significantly invested in forging stronger bilateral relationships with countries in the region. Not only has it traditionally been the closest EU partner to India, but Paris has also more actively engaged in bilateral and trilateral initiatives with regional powers such as Japan or Australia over the last year.
If France wants to seize the opportunity for asserting leadership among Europeans on the Indo-Pacific, it will also be up to the President to preach what the country already practices.
Given the prioritisation of the region in French foreign policy, the conclusion of the Australia-UK-US security deal (AUKUS) in 2021 — just one day before the publication of the EU guidelines — caused a strategic earthquake in Paris. Perceived as a “stab in the back”, AUKUS did not only blow up a major Franco-Australian submarine deal but it was also perceived as an exclusion of France from enhanced cooperation in the region in favour of an ‘anglophone club’. While France has focused on mending its relationship with Australia, AUKUS has undoubtedly left its marks in the French diplomatic sphere. In Paris, AUKUS was perceived as “yet another transatlantic crisis” and as a confirmation of a US policy that puts Washington’s interests in the region first, no matter the repercussions.
The limits of the concept of a puissance d’équilibre
This transatlantic angle makes it particularly delicate for France to navigate its own approach in the Indo-Pacific. Since France’s foreign policy concepts are often misunderstood in Washington, President Macron’s statements — which are sometimes more confusing than clarifying — do nothing to improve the situation.
One concept Paris particularly values is its role as a “puissance d’équilibre” (a “balancing power” or a “power of the balance”) in global affairs and particularly in the Indo-Pacific. France regularly underlines that this does not imply equidistance between the US and China and that France stands up to its commitments as an ally. However, Paris also insists that France, and more broadly Europeans, should refrain from blindly following US policy on China and the region. The underlying logic of the French approach is Paris’ aversion to the emergence of blocs. As a middle power in international affairs and given the close European ties with China, choosing sides and completely decoupling from China would most likely be detrimental for France, just like for many other European states. Furthermore, there is concern that a logic of blocs could exacerbate tensions and turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Puissance d’équilibre, so the reasoning goes, could offer a third way and contribute to mitigating the effects of US-China competition. However, although the theory seems sensible on paper, it sparks major challenges in practice, particularly when Macron says that it would be a worst-case scenario to become followers of “an American rhythm and a Chinese over-reaction”. Even though Macron corrected his words and confirmed France’s commitment to coordination with the US just a few days later, the damage was done: French diplomats had to reassure partners behind the scenes, and questions regarding France’s reliability as a partner in the region made international headlines.
Given France’s extensive engagement in the region — and keeping in mind that a French warship patrolled the Strait of Taiwan when Macron made his remarks — it is paradoxical that the country had to reaffirm its commitment to the region. Yet, in some cases, words seem to speak louder than actions, and that was precisely Macron’s problem in early April.
From a broader perspective, this situation could be an indication of upcoming tensions on the European level. While the topic of China has always divided Europeans, agreeing on an approach to the Indo-Pacific had been less challenging: even if the EU guidelines lagged behind French aspirations, member states were able to agree on prioritising cooperation on issues such as economy and trade, connectivity, and climate change while keeping the security and defence angle relatively unspecific. However, Russia’s war on Ukraine and its implications for the global order, as well as China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, have led other EU member states to call for closer European alignment with the US. While EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has explicitly called for a European approach to China and the Indo-Pacific, there is little doubt that the Commission’s approach of “de-risking” is more hawkish than current suggestions from Paris. It remains to be seen whether Paris will be able to shape the EU’s approach to the region as it did in the past.
Moving ahead: diversifying partnerships and flexible engagement
While the EU is a key element of France’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, it is not the only way for Paris to implement its priorities. Multilateralism and flexible engagement with willing and able partners — two principles that have been at the core of French foreign policy for decades — are also likely to shape its engagement in the Indo-Pacific over the next years. In line with French foreign policy, the updated Revue Stratégique (Strategic Review), published in 2022, also emphasises the importance of the region. The French foreign policy expert Antoine Bondaz regularly describes France’s Indo-Pacific role as a “puissance d’initiatives” (a power of the initiatives) which includes both broader multilateral initiatives with regional actors and international partners, as well as smaller formats. Indeed, minilateralism — cooperation in small-group formats, most of the time without a rigid institutional framework — has become an increasingly important pillar of France’s policy in the Indo-Pacific. France’s trilateral initiatives with India and Australia as well as the Japan-France-Australia exercise La Perouse are examples.
Closer to France’s border, another natural partner is the United Kingdom: London shares France’s view of the geopolitical situation in the region and its implications for Europeans, and both countries have already closely coordinated their deployments in the Indo-Pacific in the past. Furthermore, London’s strategy in the region relies, just as the French one, heavily on bilateral partnerships and cooperation in formats of coalitions of the willing. As the two most capable European countries, and based on the positive signalling after the Franco-British summit in March, the Indo-Pacific could become an important theatre for Franco-British co-leadership on challenges for international security.
How Macron’s communication strategy evolves over the next years remains to be seen. The “Macron method” of pitching ambitious ideas or statements that allow testing the reaction of partners may force Europeans to have the necessary debates on their strategies, but it also comes at the cost of French credibility. The Indo-Pacific is a foreign policy area where France has followed a highly coherent strategy over the last few years, and where there is a real potential for French leadership among EU member states. While the concept of being a puissance d’équilibre has sometimes been problematic particularly for the US, Washington (like other EU member states) recognises the crucial role France has played in pushing Europeans to centre the region in their geopolitical thinking. Overall, the French strategy has been anything but ambivalent over the last few years. This is why Macron’s communication on this topic was so problematic, and why it has to change. If France wants to seize the opportunity for asserting leadership among Europeans on the Indo-Pacific, it will also be up to the President to preach what the country already practices.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Gesine Weber is a Fellow in the Geostrategy Hub of the German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Paris, where she works on European security and defence, as well as foreign and security policy of the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK). She is also a PhD candidate at the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, and a frequent commentator in national and international media, including BBC, Deutsche Welle, and France 24. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons.