China-India ties: the futility of the middle path
China-India ties: the futility of the middle path
WRITTEN BY CHETAN RANA
25 June 2020
China’s aggression at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has surprised many, seemingly, including the Government of India. As it stands, India has reportedly lost 20 soldiers while the conflict has become further complicated due to poor accountability and opacity in the conduct of the current government. The Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, after the All India Parties Meet organised on June 19, claimed that no part of the territory has been lost. However, the Chinese are now claiming the Galwan Valley as a part of their territory and have accused India of unilateral escalation. These claims are farcical at best but may reflect the changing reality on the ground. This incident comes as a blow to the personal diplomatic efforts of Modi. He initiated the informal summit at Wuhan and has been an active proponent for an ‘inclusive’ Indo-Pacific.
The ‘middle path’
India, like many other states in the region, has been reluctant to pursue a balancing strategy against China due to the stark asymmetry in capabilities. Yet, states in the region have been coming together with the United States, to address the threat of an increasingly aggressive and an assertive China regionally.
The United States with first the “Pivot to Asia” during the Obama administration and later the Indo-Pacific Strategy under Trump has sought to contain China through closer collaboration with Indo-Pacific states and key democracies. This involves regular Freedom of Navigation Patrols (FONOPs) in the Western Pacific ocean and diplomatic groupings like the Quad. The 2018 decision to rename the US Pacific Command to that of Indo-Pacific Command underlines India and South Asia’s growing centrality to American strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
India should strive to achieve a favourable status quo with Beijing. Even though diplomatic efforts have made little progress till now, India has had diplomatic successes in recent past by way of the Doklam standoff and therefore this should point the way forward.
However, India’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific, outlined by Modi in a speech at Shangri-La Dialogue, imagines a ‘free’, ‘open’, and an ‘inclusive’ Indo-Pacific. India has even suggested for an enlarged Quad to include all stakeholders in the region. Even ASEAN’s outlook for the Indo-Pacific seeks to emphasise the issue of inclusivity, even in the context of the tensions in the South China Sea. The middle path of appeasing and reassuring China is being pursued by both India and ASEAN to avoid antagonising Beijing and being drawn into its crosshairs, both metaphorical and literal. There have always been doubts about whether China under Xi Jinping fully buys into the ‘inclusive’ narrative. If past statements by Chinese leaders and government outlets are anything to go by, Beijing sees closer bilateral ties between regional actors and the United States as an exercise to contain it.
There are obviously costs for pursuing the middle path with China and states are reluctant to increase defence and military cooperation amongst themselves and with Washington. Attempts not to appear hostile merely leaves such countries more vulnerable to Chinese hostilities. The recent incident at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) only highlights the futility of pursuing a middle path designed to not antagonise China.
A new path for India
Across the region there have been calls for closer relationships with the United States. Unfortunately as much as the United States has a stake in maintaining its hegemony in the international system, recent history with the Trump administration appears to show it cannot be considered a truly reliable ally. It has been seen to retreat from traditional alliances more firmly set than those with emerging partners, and the current president fosters high levels of unpredictability ahead of the presidential election in November. It would be unwise for India to present itself as excessively belligerent (due to the current Galwan crisis) and instead it should consider charting a new path with realistic assumptions of its neighbour and pursue a strategy based on balancing and multilateralism.
In the short term, India should strive to achieve a favourable status quo with Beijing. Even though diplomatic efforts have made little progress till now, India has had diplomatic successes in recent past by way of the Doklam standoff and therefore this should point the way forward. War-mongering fuelled by a jingoistic media on both sides has nothing substantive to offer, moreover, the episodic boycott of Chinese goods by the public has no real consequence for China’s economy (contrary to what popular media might suggest).
In the medium term, India needs to increase the cost of escalation for China. It should increase its naval presence in the region, especially around the strategic chokepoints of Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Makassar. It should also pursue an active defence partnership with South China Sea states - many of which have overlapping interests with India such as Vietnam.
In the long term, a real challenge to China can only come through a comprehensive regional coalition. Thus far this has failed to emerge due to the steep economic dependence of many states on China. India, Japan, Australia, and Indonesia need to present themselves as alternatives to Chinese economic dependence for the region’s smaller economies.
For India, this would mean a need to revolutionise its domestic economy and build infrastructure to integrate it with the region of South Asia. The Indian economy was noted to be struggling long before the COVID-19 crisis hit which in turn has only served to amplify these difficulties. The manufacturing sector has long constrained India’s engagement in the region with military and defence developments requiring a robust economic base. Therefore, the long term success for India is deeply entrenched in its need for structural economic change - and ultimately growth.
China has proved that it doesn’t care for the sophisticated and calculated diplomatic efforts of other states. Its escalation at LAC reflects its capacity to bully any state in the region and should give rise to concern in policy corridors. It has shown the fragility and limitations of the middle path and the onus is now on states like India to reorient themselves in the face of a bellicose China.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chetan Rana is a final year Masters in Politics (with specialisation in International Studies) student at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. While currently a research intern with Dr. Manali Kumar his interests include Security studies, India’s foreign policy and the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: Ministry of External Affairs/Flickr.