India’s partnership with Vietnam in the South China Sea
India’s partnership with Vietnam in the South China Sea
WRITTEN BY CHETAN RANA
7 May 2020
India shares a long, and for the most part cordial diplomatic history with Vietnam. High-level visits between both sides have been a feature of the relationship since the times of Nehru and Ho Chi Minh.
During the wars in Indochina starting in the 1950s, India was a notable and vocal proponent of Vietnam’s independence and decolonisation with New Delhi favouring the unification of Vietnam in the face of partition along Cold War lines. For many Vietnamese India is remembered as one of the few non-communist states in the world to support North Vietnam and to support Ho Chi Minh's cause when the United States waged war in Vietnam.
India even backed Vietnamese intervention in the Cambodian conflict that oversaw the overthrow of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime,recognising the Heng Semrin government against the sentiment shared by the majority of the international community who continued to recognise the rump state of Democratic Kampuchea. This action was one of the main reasons that India remained alienated from ASEAN during the Cold War.
With this as context, Vietnam has been influential in facilitating India’s wider engagement with Southeast Asia after the end of Cold War. The government in Hanoi has been described as ‘a pillar’ of the Look/Act East policy. Through Vietnam’s influence and facilitation, India has gradually stepped up its institutional, economic, and strategic engagement with ASEAN and with East Asia more broadly at a scale not witnessed before 1991.
The emergence of China and its challenge to US military hegemony has seen the rise of the Indo-Pacific as the foremost geopolitical arena for great power competition today. As power politics shifts from continental Europe and the Atlantic to the waters of the Indo-Pacific, key stakeholders like India and Vietnam must now claim their stakes and forge partnerships to realise the economic potential in the region, as well their own security.
The asymmetrical distribution of capacities mandates that states in the region preferably hedge against China instead of bandwagoning or hard-balancing against it. Hedging allows policy flexibility and states can use a combination of limited bandwagoning, binding engagement, and soft or indirect balancing.
India’s trail to the South China Sea
The South China Sea is one of the most important regions of the Indo-Pacific. According to UNCTAD, 70% by value and 80% by volume of global trade passes through the South China Sea each year, while 55% of India’s trade traverses its disputed waters.
Vietnam and China have longstanding overlapping claims over the EEZs and different islands, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In statements on the South China Sea India supports freedom of navigation, overflight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, specifically UNCLOS. Similar sentiments have been expressed in the Joint Communique between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of India (September 2014). States in the region have, in varying capacities, challenged China’s aggressive posture.
Trade and closer diplomatic ties with Vietnam has seen India increasingly exposed to the South China Sea as a forum of Sino-Vietnamese tensions.
The trade has also grown steadily. For 2018-19, the bilateral trade stood at 13.69 Billion USD, marking a 12.81% annual growth. India’s ONGC Videsh and Essar Oil have secured oil exploration projects in Vietnam’s EEZ in the South China sea. The Inter-Governmental Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy signed in December 2016 between India and Vietnam would help in establishing a strong foundation for further cooperation in civil nuclear energy. Both nations have also started direct flights in 2019 to improve connectivity.
The upgrade from the joint declaration on Strategic Partnership of 2007 to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016 has strengthened defence and security ties between India and Vietnam. The countries have participated together in multilateral maritime exercises. India has also trained Vietnamese naval personnel and is providing 12 high-speed patrol vessels for the Vietnam Border Guard Force.
This project is a part of India’s $500 million line of credit extended to Vietnam for defence purchases. India has also pushed the sales of Pinaka, Akash and Brahmos cruise missiles. In the near future, India will also provide maintenance and repair services for the Vietnamese MiGs procured from Russia and train Vietnamese pilots for Sukhoi aircraft, as well as naval officers to operate Vietnam’s Kilo-class submarines.
Hurdles and the way forward for India in Southeast Asia
Despite a seemingly harmonious picture between India and Vietnam, the relationship has barely achieved its potential. The persistent delays in connectivity programmes across Indochina and India’s refusal to join the Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership (RCEP) have significantly paralysed the growth of trade and commerce. Domestic factors (primarily manufacturing sector) determine the sluggish pace of India’s economic engagement in the region. Vietnam likewise has been reluctant to utilise the lines of credit worth $500 million offered by the Modi government.
Further, India has played a careful diplomatic game in its push for the sale of the Brahmos missile to Vietnam. Both the states have been careful to not project the weapons purchase as an act of balancing against China. Moreover, an ‘inclusive Indo-Pacific’ has been the cornerstone of both state’s regional policies and has been reiterated in public.
India must step up its engagement bilaterally with Vietnam, as well as utilise the multilateral options of ASEAN mechanisms and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. India needs to act on its Act East Policy. At this point, there are serious concerns if the strategies of other powers in the region like Japan’s Strategic Diamond, the United States’ Rebalancing, and China’s salami slicing tactics may crowd out India and the Act East Policy entirely, thus India should move to increase ties with Vietnam as a way of maintaining a role in the regio.
Both countries need to maintain and facilitate ASEAN centrality on the issue of the South China Sea. The recent silence from Southeast Asian states over the Chinese attack on Vietnamese boats reinstates the need for Vietnam to augment its defence capacity, for which India can play a key role. If Beijing continues its assertive push in the South China Sea Vietnam may have to switch from hedging to balancing options, especially in the case of military escalation from China and the deterioration of economic ties. India again has the capacity to aid Vietnam.
The example of joint oil exploration between India and Vietnam in the South China Sea saw both governments resist Chinese diplomatic pressure, reflects the power of the bilateral relationship. Both states should now look to collectively increase capacity, in the event that one day both sides will need to hedge against Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chetan Rana is a final year Masters in Politics (with specialisation in International Studies) student at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a research intern with Dr. Manali Kumar. His interests include Security studies, India’s foreign policy, politics in South Asia, and South East Asia. Image credit: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0/ Wikipedia Commons.