Nepal-India-China trilateral cooperation
Nepal-India-China trilateral cooperation
WRITTEN BY DINESH BHATTARAI
11 May 2020
Nepal's relations with its two mega neighbours-India and China - are of prime importance and a priority for Nepal’s national security and wellbeing. Nepal shares an open, and nonregulated border 1880 kms in length with India from south, east, and west while the mighty Himalayas separate Nepal from China on the north.
The contrast between Nepal and the countries to its north and south could not be more different. China and India together constitute 36% of the world's population. Nepal by contrast constitutes just 0.00041% of the global population. Nepal is 23 times smaller than India and 68 times smaller than China physically. Meanwhile Nepal’s nearest seaports are 1,127 kilometers away in India, and 3,100 kilometers away in China. Beijing is 3000 kms and New Delhi is 900 kms away from Kathmandu.
The Nepal-India-China trilateral
Nepal’s relations with India are deep-rooted, intimate, multifaceted, and unique in character and scope. The two countries share a close cultural proximity. No aspect of national life is left untouched by Nepal-India relations. Perhaps no other two independent, sovereign countries interact in such a comprehensive manner at as many levels on a daily basis as do Nepal and India.
Nepal-India relations are governed by a number of treaties and agreements. India has been at the forefront of providing assistance to Nepal. A number of cross-border infrastructure projects including the construction of a new electrified railway line connecting the border city of Raxaul in India to Kathmandu are in agenda. A cross-country petroleum pipeline has come into operation, the first in the South Asian region. India calls these projects game changers.
Nepal is one of China’s 14 neighbours. The age-old links between Nepal and China were formalized in 1955 through the establishment of diplomatic relations. Since then, Nepal-China relations have grown and diversified covering a wide-range of cooperative areas.
The global reach of China's economic clout is reflected in their improved infrastructures and modernized defenses, as well as in the dramatic growth of their geopolitical ambitions which is evident in China’s enlarged political, strategic and diplomatic footprints. The launching of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) consisting of two components—the “overland economic belt” and the “Maritime Silk Road”—has been described by President Xi Jinping as the “project of the century.”
The BRI connects more than 60 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe (including Nepal) and involves 60% of the world's population, 35% of world trade, and 30% of global GDP. It is being interpreted as a ‘new theory of international relations’ and ‘Chinese version of the world order.’ In May 2017, Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the framework agreement for the BRI, including among others the creation of border economic zones, their expansion, and build China-Nepal transit road network agreements. The two nations have pledged to “strengthen cooperation under the BRI and build the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network.”
Tibet, which borders Nepal, remains Beijing’s core security concern. It is of critical importance to maintaining China’s “stability, development, security.” This makes Nepal figure prominently in the foreign policy discussions of China and India, as well as Western countries, including the United States. Due to the few thousand Tibetan refugees who are sheltered in Nepal, China sees Nepal as the transit for separatist forces active under the influence of various external forces who want “to further the cause of their own social and value systems and national interests.” Nepal has consistently maintained the One China policy, meaning Nepali soil will not be allowed to be used against China. There is a rare consensus in foreign policy in Nepal about its One China policy. Tibetans are advised to live in peace but refrain from any activities hostile to China.
The presence of nationals of any countries in Nepal that are hostile to China remains a matter of deep concerns to Beijing. In 2018, the President of the U.S. signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) into law. The language of the act references Tibet in terms of supporting “activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and Nepal.” During his visit to Nepal in October of last year, the president of China issued a warning saying, “anyone attempting to split China in any part of the country will end in crushed bodies and shattered bones.”
The Tripartite relationship
Nepal, India and China are seats of ancient civilizations. They possess huge potentials and broad space for mutually beneficial cooperation. A cultural corridor can be created to connect cultural sites focusing on Buddhism. Among the several commonalities that they also share are rivers and waterways fed by a single geographical water tower. Nepal has historically been a transit point, entrepot for trade with Tibet and India, but has huge deficits in infrastructures.
As connectivity among China, Nepal and India mainly depends on roads, aviation, and shipping, China has proposed to build a “China -Nepal-India Economic Corridor,” under the BRI. Indian experts read Beijing's overtures to include India into the China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor as nothing more than an attempt "to allay suspicions from New Delhi." An Indian government spokesperson has made it clear that while India shares the “international community’s desire for enhancing physical connectivity,” it wants connectivity projects to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity as “no country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Reports emerged from an informal summit meeting between India and China in Wuhan in 2018 about the concept of “China-India Plus" cooperation to advance regional connectivity. The Chinese foreign minister, after the second informal summit in India 2019, said: “The two leaders also agreed to expand ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation, push forward facilitation of regional inter-connectivity, and work with other related parties to strike the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as early as possible.” China’s desire to take India on board is a recognition that Beijing needs India at its side for successful implementation of projects, including the BRI. Nepal has expressed itself in favour of trilateral cooperation, but not the ‘two-plus one’ model, whose details are yet to be fleshed out. Nepal wants any partnerships to be based on equality. A two-plus one model is perceived as bypassing Nepal’s ability and competence to deal independently with India and China and fix its priorities on its own.
China and Nepal signed 20 agreements to boost connectivity, trade, economic assistance, and security relations in October of last year raising eyebrows in New Delhi. The projects included, among others, the construction of a tunnel designed to shorten the distance between Kathmandu and the Chinese border. They lifted bilateral relations to a new height through a China-Nepal strategic partnership of cooperation featuring ever-lasting friendship for development and prosperity. The Chinese President vowed to “help Nepal realize its dream of becoming a land-linked country from a land-locked one.” This was perceived as a crucial point in “Nepal’s geopolitical drift out of India’s orbit.”
India prefers a bilateral to trilateral or regional approach. A set of complex and interlocking challenges including the traditional mindsets stare at the development of the triangular relationship compounded by geostrategic competition between China and India, interplay of global powers in the region, physical and geographical difficulties including the fragile Himalayan ecosystem. There is a tendency to get uncomfortable and suspicious with either two of the three coming closer. China and India came together in May 2015 “agreeing to open a route” to enhance their border areas cooperation through Nepal’s Lipu-Lekh territory without its knowledge and engagement. Nepal protested, to no effect.
The development of hydropower, agriculture, tourism, and service sectors is important to all three to their transformational journey. Also, Nepal, India, and China should start working together on nontraditional security issues such as climate change, transnational crimes, pandemics that carry threats of socio-economic and political consequences to proceed to more complex issues.
Conclusion
The resurgence of China and India as major powers in the world brings immense opportunities and new dynamics and complexities to Nepal’s doorsteps. China, India, and the United States are likely to have an enduring centrality in any global order in a post-COVID19 pandemic world characterized by growing interdependence, and 'heightened strategic ambiguity and fear.’
As Nepal’s neighbours will be at the center of global attention, there are likely geopolitical maneuvers and counter maneuvers in its territory. Nepal has to perform a tight rope walk through the crowded intersections navigating through complex competing interests and conflicting concerns of these and other powers. None other than a Nepali knows best where the strategic shoes pinch. Nepal judges every issue on its merits without ‘fear or favour’ and forms national position.
There is no question of Nepal choosing between India and China. It would impose an unbearably heavy burden and unacceptable costs to Nepal’s dignity, security, and economy. Nepal expects its neighbours, friends, and well-wishers to understand and appreciate this complexity and help it chose a rational policy paradigm for the future.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dinesh Bhattari is the former ambassador of Nepal to the United Nations and the former foreign affairs adviser to the Prime Minister of Nepal. He is currently a member of the faculty at the Institute of Crisis Management Studies, Tribhuvan University, Nepal. Image credit: Ministry of External Affairs (India)/Flickr.