Debunking China’s myth making over Galwan
Debunking China’s myth making over Galwan
WRITTEN BY ROHAN KHATTAR SINGH
25 June 2020
On 20 June this year the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement where Beijing laid claims to the Galwan Valley and the Galwan River, a tributary of the Indus River. The statement claimed that the Galwan Valley is situated on China’s side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This claim was rejected by the Indian side. The statement came shortly after violent clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers on the banks of the Galwan River reportedly leading to heavy casualties on both sides. This is the first record of the Chinese government laying claims to the Galwan Valley and instituting an aggressive posture towards the LAC. Such claims and statements are catalysts for future conflict that have long incubated between the two nations.
This is not the first time China has used statecraft to lay claims to territory it intends to seize. China has indulged in ‘Salami Slicing’ tactics in other parts of Asia, notably in the region’s maritime domains. Beijing undertakes and justifies these takeovers with two sociological factors, history and ethnicity. While they are not directly used by Beijing to perform its salami slicing they are in fact used as tools to whip up nationalist hysteria among its majority Han population. For this, a certain level of myth creation is necessary for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) due to the relationship between historical and ethnic linkages and territory.
How myth making works
Myth making for the Chinese relies on historical claims of territory which were either occupied, vassals or trade routes of traditional Han Chinese. For the CCP the critical element within these claims are those that emphasise that the historic dynasties who once ruled China were essentially ethnic Han. The most pertinent example of this is China’s claim to territorial waters in the South China Sea - based on the Nine Dash Line.
China is currently operating as an external occupying force in Ladakh and the ties between the Han Chinese and Ladakh proper are (with close examination of the facts), non-existent in terms of the region’s history, ethnicity, religion and language.
In 2015, Chinese Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai commented, “The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China” citing its historical use by Han, Ming and Qing dynasties. Though mired in controversy the map of the nine dashes is credited to General Zheng He of the Ming dynasty, a dynasty ruled by the Han ethnicity that in turn ruled China from the 14th to 17th century. The CCP also dictates that since the Tang and Ming Dynasties had administrative power over Tibet, the Han Chinese should therefore also enjoy authority over it thereby creating both historic justification and legitimization for their actions.
For China to convince its majority Han population towards aggressive nationalist actions, inciting ties to historical claims and myths is a necessity of government policy. The recent claims that China has made regarding the rights to the Galwan Valley however deviate from China’s traditional myth making techniques.
Myth-checking China
The Galwan Valley derives its name from Ghulam Rassul Galwan, a Ladakhi born in 1878 in Leh who was a porter for the British Army when India was governed under the British Raj. The Galwan Valley got its name due to Galwan’s successful expeditions into Tibet and Xinjiang allowing the British to improve their cartographic knowledge of Ladakh, including areas that are currently under Chinese occupation, or the Aksai Chin glacier.
The Galwan Valley lies in Ladakh proper, a region that derives its historical origins from the Dardis who were ostensibly nomads. Ladakh came under the formal control of the Kushan Empire in the 1st century which introduced Buddhism to Ladakh and as the Kushan Empire spread to Tibet. The first Han Chinese to reach Ladakh were Fa Hien and Hiuen Tsang in the 5th and 7th century respectively, after Ladakh had a long relationship with the kingdoms of the Indus Valley. Following repeated raids by Central-Asian Muslim rulers, the Namgyal Dynasty took control of Ladakh at the beginning of 10th century where they continued to reign until the 17th century. Under the Namgyal Dynasty, Buddhist identity blossomed and symbolism through Bodhi language and Buddhist practices flourished.
The Namgyal Empire was followed by the rule of the Dogras under the Dogra ruler Maharaja Gulab Singh, who began his campaign from Jammu and conquered Ladakh in 1834. The Dogra Empire didn’t stop at Ladakh however and quickly captured Gilgit-Baltistan in 1840. Under the leadership of an ambitious General Zorawar Singh, the Dogra Empire eventually spread to Lhasa.
The modern day Jammu and Kashmir Rifles of the Indian Army still displays artefacts that the Dogra warriors brought back from Tibet, including a captured flag of the Imperial Chinese Army. The Dogra Empire however collapsed as the British Empire began to expand its power but which led to the cartographic naming of topographic markers in Ladakh (such as the Galwan Valley) and much of Tibet.
After the British Empire abandoned the subcontinent, independent India took administrative control over Ladakh, until China began encroaching on Indian territory in 1959 to construct a highway linking Chinese occupied Lhasa to Xinjiang. These tensions eventually led to the1962 Border War between India and China where India lost territory to China in Ladakh which ultimately led to the creation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which lies in proximity to the Galwan River.
Showing China the mirror
It should be clear by now, China’s current claims on the Galwan Valley owe more to its salami slicing strategy than to international law. Historically, China has never had access to, or control of, Ladakh. Claims of historical ties interlinked with Han ethnicity are not credible enough for these claims to be honoured but they are enough to help boost nationalist sentiment within China. For most of its history, the Ladakh region has always been associated with the empires and rulers of the Indus Valley, today that ruler sits in New Delhi. China is currently operating as an external occupying force in Ladakh and the ties between the Han Chinese and Ladakh proper are (with close examination of the facts), non-existent in terms of the region’s history, ethnicity, religion and language.
Debunking Chinese myth-making marks the beginning of an important process of pushing back against China’s recent pattern of assertiveness. The Galwan Valley doesn’t match the requirements of historical and ethnic ties to justify the claims of the CCP. For Beijing to generate nationalistic fervour behind the occupation of the Galwan Valley it will have to force together the historical and ethnic ties of the Ladakh region with the Han community, something which has been non-existent and is bound to draw criticism from the Han Chinese.
While calls for historic and ethnic ties have always been justification for China’s salami slicing tactics in other theatres in the Indo-Pacific, occupying the Galwan Valley may also be seen as China looking to obtain access to Galwan’s valuable river waters. Finally, gaining tactical ground over India or provoking it in the hope of retaliatory action could be used to further incite nationalism within China’s majority Han community.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Rohan Khattar Singh is a Research Assistant at The International Scholar and focuses on security studies, military studies, South Asia and Ethnic Studies. Image credit: Jeevan Singla/Flickr.