After AUKUS comes the deluge
After AUKUS comes the deluge
WRITTEN BY JEREMY MAXIE
7 October 2021
France has been deeply shocked by Australia’s decision to cancel its deal to procure twelve French diesel-electric powered submarines and the concurrent announcement of AUKUS, a trilateral defence and security agreement that would see Australia acquire at least eight nuclear-powered submarines built in cooperation with the US and UK. While Paris should have been consulted with greater transparency, it would have almost certainly tried to scuttle the deal and a diplomatic crisis would still have ensued thereby opening the door to Beijing’s interference. However, the strategic lesson for France is not one of betrayal and deceit but the harsh reality that its third-way strategy along a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” has run aground.
Misalignment
For both France and the United States, the submarine deals are integral to a set of trilateral relationships that each considers critical to its wider Indo-Pacific strategy. Broadly speaking, the US sees itself as a status quo power leading a coalition of like-minded states to counterbalance China’s revisionist quest for regional hegemony, while France sees itself as a mediating power offering a third-way between the Sino-US rivalry. It is therefore unsurprising that Paris responded vehemently with allegations of betrayal by its allies and being shut out of this regional partnership with its strategic role unwanted by the clubby Anglosphere. It recalled its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra, pressured Brussels to delay talks on the EU-Australia free trade agreement, sounded the alarm for European strategic autonomy, and showcased its deepening strategic partnership with India.
Then came the phone call between US President Joseph Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron. As close as Paris will get to an official apology, it provided an offramp and a path forward. Macron decided that the French Ambassador would return to Washington while Biden acknowledged the importance of France’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific as well as a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes to transatlantic security and compliments NATO. More importantly, Biden and Macron agreed to open in-depth consultations to rebuild trust and work toward common objectives.
Given the shifting regional balance of power and the trajectory of China’s remarkable military and naval modernisation, the optimal strategy for Paris to secure and advance its particular regional interests is to more closely align with the US, thereby indirectly preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia.
Now comes the hard part. In the weeks and months ahead, Paris and Washington must seek to re-establish trust and try to more closely align their common interests and grand strategies. Hopefully, Washington will succeed in persuading Paris that its strategic role in the Indo-Pacific remains both valued and sought. So too will Paris hopefully accept AUKUS as a fait accompli that is better begrudgingly accepted than vehemently opposed as it will strengthen Indo-Pacific deterrence and security and is therefore still broadly aligned with French interests.
Beyond submarines
Faced with an uncertain restructuring of the international order and a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific, Paris appears to have realised that its sustained military and naval presence in its vast exclusive economic zone stretching “from Djibouti to Polynesia” was insufficient to protect its regional interests. France, therefore, viewed its deal with Australia as a critical node in the so-called “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis”, an emerging trilateral strategic partnership with India and Australia which aims to expand defence cooperation, interoperability, and reciprocal access. Cultivating defence and security ties with Japan, France envisioned expanding and replicating this model of minilaterals throughout the region. Through an emerging middle-power coalition, France endeavours to shore up its regional strategic posture and position itself as a mediating power offering a “third path” between the US and China. Paris assumed that this strategy would make it a partner of choice for countries that are seeking to avoid choosing sides.
As for AUKUS, it tightens a set of already close and longstanding relationships in a way that signals Washington’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific and reaffirms its long-term commitment to Australian security while providing the UK with the opportunity to put its “tilt toward the Indo Pacific'' into practice. As intended, it will significantly increase Australia's power projection and deterrence capabilities in line with Canberra’s strategy of taking on a more active and forward-leaning role in maintaining a favourable regional balance of power.
Beyond the sharing of nuclear submarine technology and build-out supporting industry and infrastructure, AUKUS will deepen and expand trilateral cooperation on a broad range of advanced defence technologies including artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and quantum computing. The deal is accompanied by related developments that envision a boost in rotational deployments as well as combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance capabilities that will result in an enhanced force posture and deeper alliance integration.
Aside from expected howls from China and grumblings by Malaysia and Indonesia, AUKUS has been received with varying degrees of support by several US security partners in Asia including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In contrast to French rhetoric, AUKUS is not a new security alignment as all three parties are already enmeshed in an existing web of longstanding security and defence relationships. Neither does AUKUS expressly or implicitly preclude France’s continued security cooperation in the region or signal that such cooperation is unwanted. While France and Australia are not treaty allies and do not have mutual defence obligations, the wider parameters of their “enhanced strategic partnership agreement” remains in place.
What is to be done?
First, Paris needs to bifurcate the commercial aspects of its submarine deal with Australia (for which there are legal and financial remedies) from the strategic. Forced by these new circumstances and shifting global dynamics, Paris must then reassess its Indo-Pacific strategy and how it perceives its regional role. Rather than doubling down on a flawed concept, Paris should adopt a realistic strategy that more closely aligns with the US to directly counterbalance China’s bid for regional hegemony in Asia. This means that Paris must also reassess its China policy as well as its role in shaping EU foreign policy toward China and the Indo-Pacific.
To do this Paris will first need to overcome its strong national allergy, rooted in Gaullism and French exceptionalism, to being too closely allied with Washington despite being its oldest ally. France can do this by compartmentalising its quest for greater European strategic autonomy within the context of transatlantic relations from the unforgiving geopolitical realities of the Indo-Pacific. Second, Paris must be clear that its ability to ensure the sovereignty and security of its territories and EEZ in the Indo-Pacific is highly contingent upon the success of a US-led coalition in maintaining a favourable balance of power in East Asia and Southeast Asia.
France needs to put away its third-way illusions since most potential regional suitors are either US treaty allies or security partners, while its preferred strategic partners (India, Japan, and Australia) are Quad members with the US. None of these countries is likely to downgrade or forgo their security and defence ties with Washington to align more closely with Paris, as the US is the indispensable security anchor in Asia. Given the shifting regional balance of power and the trajectory of China’s remarkable military and naval modernisation, the optimal strategy for Paris to secure and advance its particular regional interests is to more closely align with the US, thereby indirectly preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia. Anything else is the politics of grandeur.
Should Beijing succeed in its move for Asian hegemony and Washington’s countermoves fail, China will be much more strongly positioned to imperil French interests from Djibouti to Polynesia to the Seine as it would greatly strengthen China’s capability to project power (militarily, diplomatically, economically) across the Indo-Pacific region and coerce France more generally. Paris would be left with few options but accommodation and deference toward Beijing as the price for stubbornly pursuing an unrealisable third-way strategy and an elusive strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. Macron decides, Richelieu is watching.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jeremy Maxie is an independent researcher and consultant focusing on energy, geopolitics, geoeconomics, and political risk. He is currently based in San Jose, CA and has a JD from Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Image credit: Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet.