Xi’s Global Security Initiative in the time of Putin’s war

19 July 2022

Amid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s “best friend” Xi Jinping proposed a new ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI) at this year’s Boao Forum for Asia. While China’s position on Russia’s war has been unclear, Beijing’s support for Moscow has become increasingly evident. Among others, Xi voiced his support for Putin in a phone call he held with the Russian leader on his own 69th birthday, and reiterated this position at the BRICS Summit in June. The Global Security Initiative further underlines Beijing’s support for Russia, while at the same time presenting China as a ‘responsible great power’ willing to propose solutions for international issues. As hypocritical as it sounds, Western governments can only challenge China’s latest proposal if they finally agree to be more self-critical about their own double standards.

The Global Security Initiative — what is new about it?

Xi first proposed the GSI at this year’s Boao Forum for Asia in April 2022. In his speech, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary used the same few terms that observers of Chinese government rhetoric are so familiar with: ‘sovereignty’, ‘non-interference’, ‘win-win cooperation’, the ‘purposes and principles of the UN Charter’, ‘rejecting double standards’, and, of course, Xi’s flagship idea of building a ‘community of a shared future for mankind’. The GSI also includes the vision of “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security”, which is also known as the New Security Concept for Asia. In fact, much of the GSI evokes the New Security Concept, which was first promoted in the 1990s under Jiang Zemin. The Concept highlighted mutual benefit, mutual trust, equality, and coordination, and focused on leaving behind ‘Cold War mentality’ and ‘zero-sum thinking’ — terms Chinese leaders now refer to in their descriptions of the current situation and in promoting the new Global Security Initiative.

Considering that Western states will not be able to prevent other countries from supporting the Global Security Initiative, they should at least use this new Chinese proposal as a wake-up call.

So, what is new about the GSI? In two words: not much. However, a few new emphases can be traced. Perhaps most noteworthy is the concept of ‘indivisible security’, which means that “the security of any state is inseparable from others in its region”. As Ovigwe Eguegu writes, the ‘indivisible security’ principle was first set out in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and was, therefore, born in a Cold War context. However, numerous states and organisations have referred to the principle ever since, including the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which has stressed the specific indivisibility of Asia’s security since 1999. While not new to China, the idea seems to be gaining prominence in China’s foreign policy rhetoric as part of the GSI and plays a more important role than it did in other plans, such as the New Security Concept or the Community of Common Destiny.

Chinese narratives on an international scale

Putin emphasised the concept of ‘indivisible security’ shortly before his invasion of Ukraine in February. According to the Russian president, NATO’s eastward expansion threatened the very concept of ‘indivisible security’; in other words, Russia’s invasion really is the West’s fault. Xi Jinping shares this sentiment, as elucidated in his statement at the BRICS summit last month that “some countries are trying to expand military alliances to seek absolute security […] at the expense of others’ rights and interests”. While at this point, no one knows what Xi’s plans for China’s ‘reunification’ are, the Chinese leader’s new emphasis on ‘indivisible security’ could be useful for justifying potential unlawful aggression against Taiwan in the future.

Besides being used to justify past, and potentially future, breaches of international law, the GSI also serves as a new rhetorical concept that can show the world that China is ready to propose globally applicable standards for international relations. As usual, these are juxtaposed to existing Western approaches and practices. According to Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, “China has made vigorous efforts to advance reform of the global governance system, reject fake multilateralism, fake rules, fake human rights, and fake democracy, and defend the stability of the international order and international fairness and justice” — no need to mention who does engage in ‘fake’ multilateralism, rules, human rights, and democracy. Similarly, “dialogue, partnership, and win-win results” are said to replace other countries’ confrontation, alliances, and zero-sum thinking.

One specific area in which the Chinese leadership sets itself apart from the West is the question of sanctions. In the past few weeks, Beijing has communicated this more and more assertively. In his recent speech elaborating the GIS, Le Yucheng noted that “the US and other Western countries have launched over 10,000 sanctions on China, Russia and other countries” and that US sanctions have allegedly targeted one in ten countries. These sanctions — not Putin’s military aggression — are responsible for the global crises in food and energy supply. Xi reiterated this at the BRICS summit, claiming that “[t]hose using their leading position in the international financial and monetary system to impose sanctions recklessly […] make people across the world suffer”. We can expect that at least the recipients of the “over 10,000 sanctions” will welcome the new ‘security initiative’ presented in opposition to Western practices.

Lessons to learn from the latest Chinese proposal

Except for some new emphases, the GSI’s meaning remains vague and ambiguous, and can be easily adjusted according to external (or internal) changes, in line with China’s overall policy style. If its meaning is neither clear nor conveys anything innovative, why should we even care about Xi’s latest foreign policy proposal? First, as we have seen, the speeches and arguments underlying the GSI make China’s rhetorical support of Putin and his actions in Ukraine evident. Second, the new proposal — in combination with the Global Development Initiative — highlights once more China’s ambition of being perceived as a global leader able to propose ‘solutions’ to international problems. Third, irrespective of its actual content, the GSI should be taken seriously as a concept that will supposedly be welcomed by numerous state leaders across the world.

Besides Russia, countries as diverse as Indonesia, Nicaragua, Syria, Uruguay, and Pakistan officially endorsed the GSI as early as May 2022. Of course, it is ironic that China proposes norms and principles like sovereignty and territorial integrity while supporting a leader like Putin, who is committing the crime of aggression against a sovereign country, and ignoring rulings that dismiss its own claims to the South China Sea. However, as hypocritical as it is, this will not change other countries’ endorsement of the concept. In fact, many observers have pointed to Western states’ hypocrisy and double standards regarding Ukraine and other crises. As Nosmot Gbadamosi writes: “perceived patronising and neocolonial discourse used to condemn African countries’ nonalignment only pushes countries closer to China and the Gulf and benefits authoritarian leaders who use those arguments to stay in power”.

Many people in Africa perceive China as more honest than Western governments who promise things they do not keep. Therefore, China’s GSI — while known to be similarly hypocritical — may still be received warmly, for reasons such as its consistent emphasis on non-interference. Considering that Western states will not be able to prevent other countries from supporting the GSI, they should at least use this new Chinese proposal as a wake-up call. Given that an actor is much more credible in pointing out another’s hypocrisy if willing to deal with its own double standards, Western states should be more willing to scrutinise their own human rights failings. Only in this way can they increase their reliability and start devising credible alternatives to China’s Global Security Initiative.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Eva Seiwert is a Research Associate at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg and Associate Research Fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Her research focuses on China’s international relations, with a particular interest in China-Central Asia and China-Russia relations.

Eva is an Associate Editor at 9DASHLINE. Image credit: Wikipedia.