US-China relations: Biden’s first 100 Days
US-China relations: Biden’s first
100 Days
WRITTEN BY BEVERLEY LOKE
29 April 2021
A President’s first 100 days generally set the tone for the presidency and allows assessments to be made on policy ambitions, accomplishments, and future trajectories. As President Biden marks his 100th day in office, it is worth assessing how he has fared on US-China relations. This great power relationship, arguably the world’s most consequential, has been fraught with tensions and has recently been at its lowest point in decades.
Biden inherited an increasingly complicated and turbulent US-China relationship, driven partly by the challenges presented by a rising China and partly by the erratic policies adopted by his predecessor. To be sure, the Trump administration’s approach towards China reflected a bipartisan consensus on the flawed liberal logic guiding previous US engagement and the resulting necessity for a policy of strategic competition with China. But its execution was problematic on many fronts, including an overwhelming focus on a trade war that largely failed to deliver in its objectives, prioritising a COVID-19 blame game that foreclosed any possibility for joint pandemic stewardship, and pursuing an overly antagonistic and unilateral approach that alienated America’s key allies.
Biden’s scorecard
In his first foreign policy speech, Biden referred to China as America’s “most serious competitor”. This was a clear indication that strategic competition is here to stay, albeit with three key tactical distinctions: to ‘build back better’ and outcompete China; engage allies to counter China’s advancing authoritarianism and multidomain aggression; and cooperate with Beijing if it serves American interests.
As the only major economy to avoid contraction last year, many countries may lean in further as they look to China to boost their pandemic economic recovery.
On that front, Biden ends his first 100 days with an impressive scorecard. He has unveiled a $2.3 trillion infrastructure plan to boost America’s economy and compete with China more effectively. His administration has hit the ground running to fulfil Biden’s campaign promise to lead an international effort to “pressure, isolate and punish China” by rallying its Asian and European allies to counter Beijing’s coercive trade and security practices, creeping technological influence, and human rights abuses. Hosting the first-ever leaders-level Quad summit also signalled Biden's commitment to a value-oriented foreign policy and prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific. And the meeting between the US and Chinese climate envoys in Shanghai resulted in a pledged commitment to climate change cooperation.
On the whole, Biden has demonstrated consistency between discourse and deeds. His achievements in renewing America’s global role and rejuvenating a liberal rules-based order undergirded by Washington’s leadership have not been trivial. Yet, while he has cultivated a position for the US to better manage the China challenge from ‘a position of strength’, the wider state of Sino-American relations remains less rosy.
On coalitions and collaborations
Two key takeaways from Biden’s 100 days presidential milestone are especially noteworthy. First, the Biden administration is clearly seeking to establish broader coalitions to counter Beijing’s challenges to the rules-based order. As Anthony Blinken’s NATO speech laid out, however, US allies will not be forced to choose sides between the US and China. This rightly recognises the complex and varied relationships that American allies have with China. Even Japan, one of America’s closest treaty allies, has to navigate the China challenge alongside geographical proximity and economic interdependence. As a recent editorial in The Asahi Shimbun stated, Japan “cannot protect its own peace and security by simply serving as a part of Washington’s strategy”.
But Blinken’s observation that China lacks America's unique asset — “the alliance, the cooperation among like-minded countries” — underestimates the fact that China is also engaging in coalition-building. In rhetoric, Beijing opposes cliques and club politics. In reality, though, it is seeking greater centrality in world affairs by expanding its influence and shoring up its legitimacy to provide diplomatic cover against US-led encirclement. Its coalition-building is more diffuse and is manifested in a variety of strategies: reaffirming the Sino-Russian relationship; strengthening partnerships in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; driving wedge strategies with US allies; and enticing with BRI economic incentives. As the only major economy to avoid contraction last year, many countries may lean in further as they look to China to boost their pandemic economic recovery. Beijing’s discourses of justice, inclusivity, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation — reiterated most recently in Xi Jinping’s remarks at the 2021 Boao Forum — also find receptive audiences around the world.
Second, even though the Biden administration has articulated that its relationship with China will be “competitive where it should be, collaborative where it can be, adversarial where it must be”, the competitive and adversarial elements currently far outweigh the collaborative. This has detrimental consequences. According to the latest Gallup Poll, 45 per cent of Americans say that China is America’s greatest enemy, more than double the percentage last year. A recent Pew Research Centre survey also throws up a troubling statistic: 55 per cent of respondents support limiting Chinese students studying in the US. On the Chinese side, Beijing is fully aware that strategic competition will endure. It is, however, approaching the US-China relationship with greater confidence and in greater defence of its core interests. In this context, it is unsurprising that Yang Jiechi’s remarks at the Alaska meeting, particularly his comment that the US “does not have the qualification to…speak to China from a position of strength”, found strong domestic approval on Weibo.
The Biden administration should take more concrete steps to collaborate on shared interests such as climate change, COVID-19, and nuclear non-proliferation. There is a fundamental difference between pursuing a hardline approach and a self-defeating one. The latter constructs the other in binary terms, fuels groupthink, closes off joint opportunities and leads to a downward spiral in US-China relations. A more nuanced approach to America’s China policy will help to temper the overly competitive aspects of US-China relations.
US-China relations moving forward
As I have argued elsewhere, the politics of hegemonic ordering between the US and China will intensify and is best characterised by overlapping coalitions and selective collaborations. This is a multifaceted relationship and will undoubtedly be challenging to navigate. Moving forward, Washington and Beijing need to more effectively demonstrate that they are willing to rein in narratives and policies that provoke rather than promote a constructive relationship with each other. In these early days of the Biden administration, both sides need to seize the opportunities to recalibrate the course of US-China relations or risk a Trump-like free fall.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Beverley Loke is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, UK. Image credit: Flickr/TheWhiteHouse.