The United States and China: Two alternative visions of regional order
The United States and China: two alternative visions of regional order
WRITTEN BY DR MATTEO DIAN
1 May 2023
The great power competition between the United States and China is at the heart of contemporary international politics. Washington and Beijing promote two different models of regional order in Asia based on a specific understanding of the geography of the region, as well as different interpretations of the key strategic and normative pillars of the international order.
The Indo-Pacific model is based on liberal values, cooperation between the large maritime democracies of the region, and the consolidation of American-led alliances. China’s regional project is the cornerstone of the global ‘Community of Common Destiny’. It envisages a region characterised by Beijing’s leadership, the primacy of sovereignty and non-interference, as well as a decline of US-led military alliances (which are considered an expression of a ‘Cold War mentality’).
The ability to promote and consolidate an ‘order’, either regionally or globally, is not a simple reflection of the material resources that a great power has. Instead, it reflects the ability to ‘make the system work’ by promoting cooperative mechanisms that limit violence and instability. Consent and legitimacy are therefore essential as they facilitate cooperation and decrease the need to use coercion.
The Indo-Pacific model for regional order
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy was introduced in late 2017 and articulated in the following years by the Trump administration. This strategy, inspired by ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept elaborated by the Japanese leadership during the Abe era, presented several elements of continuity with previous US approaches to the region, as well as some innovations. Among the former were the intention to reaffirm the US’ hegemonic role in the region, the will to consolidate US-led alliances, the emphasis on the role of free trade, multilateralism, territorial integrity, and international rule of law. The geographical boundaries of the region, further expanded from the previous concept of Asia Pacific, and a clearly competitive approach towards China, were the most significant breaks from the past.
Key concepts underpinning the FOIP were more in line with a liberal internationalist tradition than with Trump’s ‘America First’ populism. This allowed the Biden administration to retain the FOIP concept, while introducing some significant elements of discontinuity, such as a clearer emphasis on cooperation between democracies.
Both US allies and non-aligned partners are deepening their security relationship with Washington as their main insurance policy against increasingly frequent Chinese coercion.
The FOIP includes a very specific vision of the status and the role of great and middle powers. The US’ hegemonic role is considered the cornerstone of the regional order and its stability. Preserving both the US’ material superiority and its capacity to shape the normative pillars of the regional order are therefore considered fundamental prerequisites for implementing the FOIP. This has several relevant consequences.
First, direct and indirect threats to this position are perceived as menacing the US-led international order and to the US’ interests. Second, this implies a specific position for China. Beijing is recognised as a great power but not as a legitimate contributor to the regional order. Despite its economic and military resources, China’s behaviour and its political system lead to a denial of its status of legitimate ‘order maker’ in the region.
Thirdly, the FOIP generates expectations for US allies and partners. Major allies, such as Japan and Australia, but also India, have been elevated to the rank of active supporters of the regional order, as highlighted by initiatives such as the Quad. This has several effects. First, US-led alliances continue to be the cornerstone of the US-led regional order.
Second, the process of the evolution of alliances is expected to continue, if not accelerate, raising expectations for these countries’ contributions to regional security. However, although Washington and Tokyo see China as a revisionist power and aim to form a coalition led by the region’s democracies to consolidate the existing order, many other regional partners (such as Singapore and Indonesia) partially recognise the legitimacy of China’s growing role and fear that the American vision will generate excessive competition in the region.
While the FOIP has the merit of offering a comprehensive strategic and normative framework for the US’ engagement in the region, it also has several limitations. The lack of a coherent and effective economic pillar, the dissonance between US and regional perceptions of China, and the necessity to find a compromise between regional preference towards sovereignty and non-interference over liberal values are the most significant limitations.
China’s model of order
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has abandoned its low-profile approach inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s dictum “hide and bide”. Instead, Beijing has started promoting its own model of regional and global order, with alternative leadership, values, and norms to the US-led liberal order.
Geographically, the Chinese model envisages a Sino-centric region limited to the East by the Pacific Ocean and the first chain of islands, but extending to the West including Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. In this context, China sees itself as a regional leader and great power with equal status to the US at the global level, as well as a leader of the ‘Global South’.
The most significant expression of this geographic model is the country’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has sought to connect China to Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia through massive infrastructure investments.
China promotes the centrality of principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, and the primacy of development over individual rights. Each state should be free to pursue its own ‘national road’ to modernity and to reject Western ideological influences.
The idea of a ‘Community of Common Destiny’ is key to China’s model of order. This idea, which has a markedly neo-Confucian origin, underlines the Chinese role in building an inclusive, just, and harmonious order, which is open to political diversity, and based on non-interference and centrality of development.
These concepts have also inspired China’s recent Global Security Initiative (GSI). The GSI proposes an alternative model of order, based on ideas of a common, global, cooperative, and sustainable security. This entails strong criticism of the US-led alliance system, which China considers a product of a ‘Cold War mentality’ that leads to the creation of opposing political-military and ideological blocs.
At the regional level, China’s model constitutes an articulated and coherent project of order, but it is also marked by several substantial limitations. The emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, as well as on development, are often welcome in a vast and politically heterogeneous region, where anti-colonial grievances are widespread. Moreover, China has become a fundamental economic engine for the region.
Nevertheless, most regional states recognise that the US-led system of alliances contributes to local stability, enabling economic development and integration. Furthermore, China has increasingly resorted to economic (such as with Australia) and political-military coercion (such as in the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes).
Resorting to coercion undermines Beijing’s attempt to promote itself as a possible benign regional leader and weakens the legitimacy of a blueprint for regional order based on the respect of sovereignty. Finally, some elements of the ideological repertoire recently deployed by Beijing, including the ‘Community of Common Destiny’, tend to portray a very asymmetric and vertical relationship between China and other Asian states. This might further weaken the acceptability of China’s alternative model.
How the region is responding
In the region, responses to the competition between these two models of order vary greatly. Japan and Australia are the most active supporters of the FOIP. Several ASEAN members, and, to a certain extent South Korea, tend to occupy an intermediate position. They do not see China as a fully revisionist power, accepting its role as a legitimate contributor to the future order, and maintaining deep economic connections with it. At the same time, both US allies and non-aligned partners are deepening their security relationship with Washington as their main insurance policy against increasingly frequent Chinese coercion.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Matteo Dian is an Associate Professor of History and International Relations of East Asia at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna. His latest books are La Cina, gli Stati Uniti e il Futuro dell’Ordine Internazionale (2021) and Reluctant Remilitarization, The transformation of defence policy and armed forces in Japan, Germany and Italy (with Francesco Moro e Fabrizio Coticchia, 2023). His research focuses on US-China relations, security in East Asia, Japanese and Chinese foreign policies. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
He will be a speaker at the Centro Studi Sulla Cina Contemporanea Summer School’s "The Rise of China in a Turbulent World - Alternative Perspectives” to be held in Reggio Emilia from 24-29 July 2023.
The program and information on how to register is available here.