The tech test: New Zealand’s independence in a connected world
the tech test:
new zealand’s independence in a connected world
WRITTEN BY PHUONG NGUYEN
23 January 2026
New Zealand’s digital evolution is forcing a reassessment of what its long-held “independent foreign policy” really means. For decades, that independence signalled distance from Anglo-American alignment, most famously seen in the nuclear-free stance, when Wellington asserted its own policy even at the expense of traditional alliances. But since Wellington blocked Huawei from its 5G network, its digital trajectory, from cloud infrastructure to AI governance, has revealed a pattern of strategic alignment with the Western-led technology order.
In today’s geopolitics, every cloud region, 5G contract, and AI framework signals a political orientation. New Zealand’s digital choices show both how far its independence extends and where it begins to give way.
5G and the politics of trust
In November 2018, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) rejected the proposal of Spark, New Zealand’s largest carrier, to use Huawei equipment in its new 5G network, citing “a significant network security risk”. GCSB Minister Andrew Little emphasised that the decision was based on technology risk, rather than the company’s country of origin. He pointed to the distinctive architecture of 5G, noting that unlike 3G and 4G, “every component of the 5G network means every part of the network can be accessed”. At the same time, Little declined to disclose the specific security concerns involved, citing classified information. Domestic media and experts suggested that security concerns were heightened by Huawei’s close ties to China’s ruling Communist Party, amid fears that critical information could potentially be transmitted back to Beijing.
One week before the decision, the Wall Street Journal reported that the US was urging allied governments and companies to avoid Huawei equipment. The decision aligned New Zealand with other Five Eyes members, most of whom had already banned or restricted Huawei. However, Wellington denied acting under pressure from allies in the Five Eyes spy network. What followed was a clear strategic pivot. Major local carriers including Spark, One NZ, and 2degrees replaced Huawei with European suppliers Nokia and Ericsson. In May 2023, the government allocated the 3.5 GHz spectrum to the same three companies under conditions designed to expand rural 5G, ensuring nationwide rollout without Chinese technology. By 2024, all major 5G rollouts were sourced from European vendors, effectively excluding China from New Zealand’s next-generation network.
The era of digital independence is closing fast. From 5G to AI, the Indo-Pacific is fragmenting into competing ecosystems centred on Washington and Beijing.
Rather than a narrow technical dispute, the Huawei decision reflected how 5G had come to be treated as strategic infrastructure. Choosing a vendor ultimately became a question of trust. While Huawei’s equipment was cheaper and attractive to operators seeking competition and lower consumer prices, Wellington judged that those commercial benefits did not outweigh the potential security and strategic costs. This approach reflects techno-nationalism in practice, where technology policy is inseparable from national security and geopolitical alignment.
Cloud power and the new digital dependence
If 5G was the litmus, the cloud is the certificate. Between 2024 and 2025, both Amazon Web Services (AWS) (investing over NZD 7.5 billion) and Microsoft launched domestic data-centre regions in New Zealand. These hubs will host public-sector data and underpin the government’s Cloud-First policy, keeping data onshore and governed by New Zealand law. Yet cloud localisation does not undo dependency; it institutionalises it within Western ecosystems. Although the data may reside within national borders, the infrastructure, software, and legal obligations are governed by foreign-owned cloud platforms that are subject to other states’ laws. For example, US providers can be compelled to hand over data under the US CLOUD Act regardless of where it is stored, and New Zealand government guidance recognises such jurisdictional risks as part of cloud procurement risk assessments. This means New Zealand’s operational sovereignty is mediated through external legal regimes as well as corporate capacities, rather than exercised exclusively by the state itself.
Digital policy in New Zealand makes this outcome conditional rather than accidental by shaping who can, and cannot, participate in its cloud ecosystem. The government’s procurement guidelines specify “trusted” providers, implicitly excluding Chinese and Russian firms. There is no Huawei Cloud or Alibaba Cloud presence in New Zealand, not because of open-market failure, but because policy and security frameworks make such participation impossible. This reflects a wider Western pattern. In the US, officials have warned that Chinese cloud services pose national security risks, citing concerns that Beijing could access sensitive data stored on Chinese-owned platforms. In Europe, major Chinese cloud services have expanded their footprint, but face growing political and regulatory scrutiny as governments reassess digital dependence on China.
AI governance and the Liberal Digital Order
Wellington’s approach to AI follows the pattern. The national AI Strategy, released in July 2025, openly anchors domestic policy in the OECD AI Principles, the same framework guiding other liberal democracies. These principles promote the development and use of AI that is innovative, trustworthy, and respects human rights and democratic values, while avoiding state-centric control or data-localisation mandates common in authoritarian systems.
New Zealand also leverages multilateral tech bodies to shape global rules. It is a founding member of the Digital Nations: a club of advanced digital-governments (including Estonia, South Korea, Canada, UK, Uruguay, etc.) dedicated to sharing open-source tools and best practices. New Zealand gains voice and legitimacy in shaping global technology norms by promoting open standards, data interoperability, and privacy regimes through these venues. It also plays an active role in APEC’s cross-border data frameworks and Five Eyes cybersecurity cooperation, ensuring that its standards remain interoperable with Western partners.
Managing dependence without losing independence
New Zealand’s digital evolution serves as a litmus test for its foreign-policy narrative. Successive governments have championed an “independent foreign policy”, tracing its roots to the 1980s nuclear-free stance, the commitment to a Pacific-led regional approach, and the belief that Wellington acts on principles rather than solely on alliance obligations. Yet, its digital record tells a more nuanced story. Its regulatory language mirrors European and North American models, its cloud and telecom infrastructure is financed and operated by Western firms, and its AI ethics and cybersecurity standards are co-written with liberal democracies.
Interoperability — long central to New Zealand’s defence and intelligence posture — now also shapes its digital choices. The same logic that binds Wellington to the Five Eyes extends into technology integration, data governance, and network architecture. Operating seamlessly with allies requires common platforms, compatible software, synchronised cybersecurity standards, and AI-enabled systems that can “speak the same language”.
Against this backdrop, Chinese vendors may offer lower costs, but New Zealand has prioritised architectures that can be audited, integrated with allied networks, and certified under shared standards. Working with “trusted” partners brings clear benefits: investment, interoperability, and stronger cybersecurity. Yet, these partnerships also tie New Zealand’s digital future to the stability and goodwill of its chosen ecosystem. As switching costs increase, political or economic realignment becomes much harder once data infrastructure, AI pipelines, and cloud dependencies are embedded within a single architecture.
If Wellington accepts that this alignment is the current default, then the challenge becomes how to manage dependence so that it does not become a vulnerability. This requires a multi-pronged approach. First, trusted partnerships must be diversified: New Zealand should deepen technical and strategic ties beyond its traditional allies, engaging Japan and South Korea to distribute risk across multiple democracies and legal regimes. Second, investing in domestic capability is crucial. Targeted R&D and sovereign enclaves in areas like cybersecurity, critical data infrastructure, and applied AI for public goods can reduce switching costs and limit supply-chain exposure. Third, procurement must be conditioned on verifiable resilience: vendors should be allowed participation only when transparency, third-party auditability, and technical robustness can be independently certified, rather than relying on categorical geographic exclusions. Finally, New Zealand can exercise influence in multilateral norm-building, leveraging forums such as Digital Nations, the OECD, and APEC to shape interoperable standards that protect small-states’ operational interests, ensuring rules reflect the realities of smaller states, not just great powers. These measures do not replace alliance; rather, they transform alignment from a passive dependency into a source of strategic leverage.
The era of digital independence is closing fast. From 5G to AI, the Indo-Pacific is fragmenting into competing ecosystems centred on Washington and Beijing. Power in the region is increasingly exercised through who builds, owns, and governs the technology. Every connection is now a strategic choice, and New Zealand has already made its own. Its digital future will depend less on how loudly it proclaims independence and more on how smartly it manages dependence.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Phuong Nguyen is a Master’s candidate in International Relations at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington. Her research focuses on International Political Economy, exploring the intersection of technology, power, and economic interdependence in the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: Google Gemini.