Stemming the tide: The strength of Pacific regionalism

20 June 2022

June 2022 signalled the renewal of Pacific regionalism. Leaders of the Pacific Island countries repaired disputes over regional leadership and inclusion, while at the same time asserting their individual and collective agency. The cumulative effect has been to breathe life back into what appeared to be a foundering regionalism.

Challenges to Pacific regionalism

The challenges to Pacific regionalism have been multifaceted for the past couple of years. First came competition and complaints over succession planning for the role of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretary-General. The inability to meet face-to-face amidst COVID hampered the ability to work through the issues. In February 2021, the Micronesian states (Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru) expressed anger at what they argued was a broken promise — namely that the next Secretary-General of the PIF would be from Micronesia. Henry Puna, former prime minister from the Cook Islands, a Polynesian state, won. As a result, the Micronesian states embarked on the process to leave the PIF. Quietly, however, behind-the-scenes events were taking place to heal the leadership dispute and deliver an agreement in early June that would resolve the PIF leadership troubles. Puna will complete his three-year term in 2024 as Secretary-General, the next Secretary-General will come from Micronesia, and afterwards, the role will rotate between the three subregions, Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia.

For the Pacific Islands, bilateral deals with the PRC may chip away at the regional consensus over time, but in turn, Beijing’s energy will inevitably spark new challenges to regionalism.

A different kind of challenge erupted following reports that China and the Solomon Islands would conclude a security agreement. The agreement with Beijing would provide police and other security personnel at the request of the government in Honiara to protect peace and security. Several aspects of the agreement attracted attention. First, the agreement replicated many of the same tasks already covered by the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Solomon Islands Concerning the Basis for the Deployment of Police, Armed Forces, and other Personnel to Solomon Islands, which came into force in 2018. Second, the leaked agreement between Honiara and Beijing contained a clause preventing its publication. Third, the agreement loosely implied that the Solomons would play host to basing Chinese forces. No mention of a base was explicitly made, but visiting police and other security forces must live, train, and manage activities somewhere. Emerging from the base story was a diplomatic effort under the leadership of Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. In late May, he undertook a ten-country tour of the Pacific with the objective of landing Beijing’s Common Development Vision — a security and trade pact.

Pushback against Beijing came from two camps. First, David Panuelo, president of the Federated States of Micronesia, sent a letter to the ten Pacific countries to engage with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), describing the Common Development Agenda as a “smokescreen for a larger agenda”. His letter clearly signalled that Beijing’s interest was largely one of control of traditional and non-traditional security among the Pacific Islands. Similarly, Henry Puna, PIF Secretary-General, noted that China being a PIF dialogue partner carried certain expectations, "the chief among which, is to nurture a relationship that is respectful of our shared values, built on joint collaboration and partnership, works with and through our regional mechanisms and progresses mutually agreed priorities". Politely, Puna sent Wang packing.

Superpower rivalry and the Pacific

Taken together, Pacific regionalism is alive and well, but it will surely be tested again. Driving those tests will be the strategic competition between the US and the PRC. The PRC’s foray into the Pacific with their Common Development Vision seems ill-considered and poorly managed. The Chinese proposal was not presented as something to be negotiated, but rather as a plan to be adopted. Beijing does not appear to have laid the groundwork ahead of Wang Yi’s trip. It surely ran counter to the talanoa — also known as the Pacific Way — of transparent and inclusive dialogue. But Beijing is not the only country that stumbles. Palau’s president, Surangel S. Whipps Jr., quipped that all countries should “care about us for real and not for a day”. The Pacific Way rests upon taking time to develop strong relationships and trust.

The challenge, of course, is that Beijing is not taking its time. They have rapidly expanded the People’s Liberation Army Navy, adding another 65 ships by 2025 bringing the total to 420. The Pacific is a major geographical location for the strategically important Second Island Chain, running from Japan’s Bonin Island southward through Micronesia, Palau, and then on towards Papua New Guinea. In light of recent reports that the PRC claims to have “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction” over the Straits of Taiwan, countering a PRC move on Taiwan would require supply lines running across the Pacific through the Second Island Chain. Efforts by Beijing to erode the US position in the Second Island Chain, be it through the growth of their navy or offers of regional security agreements, threaten Washington’s place in the Pacific.

However, when it comes to handling the Pacific Way, Washington may not be much better. The negotiation for funding of the Compacts of Free Association with Palau, Marshall Islands, and FSM has been making glacial progress. The Biden administration’s appointment of Special Envoy Joseph Yun is an important step forward, as are plans for opening an embassy in the Solomon Islands. But if Beijing seems to be in a hurry, Washington seems to be having trouble revving its engines. The net result is that Washington appears languid in reply. The result of the diplomatic mismatch is that Beijing will be back with development money and new ideas. It has growing bilateral relationships with countries like Vanuatu and Samoa, in addition to the security agreement with the Solomon Islands. For the Pacific Islands, bilateral deals with the PRC may chip away at the regional consensus over time, but in turn, Beijing’s energy will inevitably spark new challenges to regionalism. Thus far, Pacific leaders have proven themselves to be steely, if not polite, interlocutors. Let’s hope they can keep it up.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Alan Tidwell is a Professor of the Practice and Director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Image credit: Flickr/US Department of State.