South Korea eyes Europe for its future

7 July 2022

South Korea’s new president, Yoon Suk-yeol, landed in Madrid in June for his debut on the world stage. It was the first time — and, perhaps, not the last — that a South Korean head of state attended a NATO summit. Identifying Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”, NATO’s new Strategic Concept enhances Europe’s deterrence and defence capabilities. It also raised concerns about China’s intent “to subvert the rule-based international order”. In response, NATO delineated its security purview in space, cyber, maritime, and energy domains. Meanwhile, the presence of other Indo-Pacific powers at the summit — South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand — underlined Europe’s extended interests vis-à-vis China.

Unsurprisingly, media mouthpieces for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reproached that “NATO’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific is akin to letting a wolf into our home” and that South Korea “will pay the inevitable price for its decision to damage strategic trust with China”. In his speech at the NATO meeting, Yoon reportedly censured “a movement that denies the universal values that we’ve been protecting”. Yet, the emerging schism between South Korea and China goes beyond the rhetorical divide over human rights and differing values-based orders.

Yoon’s broad smile and numerous handshakes with European heads of state augurs a tectonic shift for both South Korea and China that transcends ideological gaps. Contrary to South Korea’s traditional orbit around the United States and China, Yoon’s itinerary during the NATO summit at the Spanish capital indicated an amalgamation of European and East Asian security interests that defies geography. Yoon’s European policy signals his clear intention to embed South Korea more firmly into the Western bloc and, more meaningfully, to undermine the authoritarian influences of China and Russia. More importantly, the trip showcased South Korea’s belief that its future lies with Europe.

Seoul’s changing policy

Before Yoon’s inauguration this May, South Korea had typically toed the Chinese line due to their inseparable economic ties and China’s influence over North Korea. China takes in the lion’s share of exports from South Korea, while its tourists are considered the lifeline of many Korean businesses. Plus, North Korea lends an ear to China. In 2008, the former South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, and Hu Jintao, the former General Secretary of the CCP, elevated their diplomatic status and partnership from “comprehensive” to “strategic” — the level accorded by China to its most trusted allies, such as Russia and Pakistan. Their successors, Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping, respectively, fleshed out this new status in 2013, with the Joint Statement for the Future and Action Plan, which expanded cooperation into security, social, and cultural realms.

South Korea, whose external engagement has so far revolved around the intractable security stances of the US and China, can surely hedge its security interests by embracing Europe.

Then, Park reached a new diplomatic zenith by sitting one seat away from Xi — with only Russian President Vladimir Putin in between — at the 2015 Victory Over Japan Day celebration in Beijing. Nevertheless, her successor, Moon Jae-in, enraged China by hauling the United States’ THAAD missile defence system into Korean territory due to overwhelming security threats from North Korea. Still, Moon reassured Xi with three promises, the so-called ‘Three Nos’: no additional deployment of the THAAD, no participation in the US missile defence umbrella, and no tripartite military alliance between South Korea, Japan, and the US.

Yoon, however, has long resented South Korea’s minor status and regional meekness from having to tiptoe around China. Yoon faults his predecessor for having pursued a parochial foreign policy dedicated to improving inter-Korean relations at the expense of Seoul’s global responsibilities. The way Moon shied away from issues that have soured the Washington-Beijing relationship (which catered more to China than to South Korea’s “longtime ally, the United States”) is also reprehensible in his eyes. Less than two months into his presidency, Yoon has entirely reversed Moon’s economic and military straddling between the US and China.

In May, his joint statement with US President Joe Biden detailed further deployment of “strategic US military assets” to South Korea. Yoon also signed up to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity scheme spearheaded by the US, to compete against China in terms of trade, supply chain, and technology. A month later, defence ministers from South Korea, Japan, and the US agreed in Singapore to strengthen their trilateral security cooperation — including information sharing and combined exercises, which China viscerally opposes for their potential to upset the regional security balance. Yoon’s diplomatic foray into Europe occurred amid this charged background. It signifies not only the widening wedge between South Korea and China but also South Korea’s thorough pivot towards Europe and its gradual decoupling from China.

Fortifying relations with Europe

During a press briefing in Madrid, Choi Sang-mok, Yoon’s senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, pointed to China’s economic slowdown and its Dual Circulation strategy as reasons for South Korea to find alternative trade partners. The CCP-designed strategy refers to an economic model intended to buffer external volatility by promoting domestic demand and exporting high-technology goods. “So,” Choi stated, “the era of an export boom with China we have been enjoying for the past 20 years is seeing its end”. This is how South Korea’s “sales diplomacy” around Europe began. ‘Team Korea’ and Yoon himself made sales pitches at bilateral talks to plug Korea’s high-end technology, ranging from nuclear energy to defence. The dramatic reconstruction of Europe’s energy and defence posturing of late has made for an eager audience.

Europe seeks to slash its reliance on Russian fossil fuels, while simultaneously increasing the proportion of renewables in total energy consumption to 45 per cent by 2030. It also faces the challenge of better arming Eastern European nations fearing future Russian aggression. Yoon’s entourage distributed “a lot of brochures about [the] independently developed APR1400 model”, pointing to Korea’s capability to construct nuclear plants “at the cheapest, safest and fastest time”. In their bilateral meeting, Yoon and French President Emmanuel Macron pledged cooperation in nuclear energy safety and competitiveness. South Korea’s minister for trade, industry and energy, Lee Chang-yang, toured Poland and the Czech Republic to support the Korean bid to build nuclear reactors for the two countries. In asides at the NATO summit, Poland and South Korea discussed ways for the latter to export weapons to Eastern Europe.

As the third-largest military donor to Ukraine, Poland has expressed interest in South Korean munitions. Yoon also asked his Polish counterpart to support around 300 Korean companies operating in Poland. Following the Russian annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, Poland, Estonia, Finland, and Norway purchased South Korea’s self-propelled howitzer, the K9. This time, too, “there were many countries that were interested in defence,” said Yoon on his flight back to Seoul. Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine, therefore, will further strengthen South Korea’s economic and strategic ties with Europe.

The role of the private sector

South Korea’s private sector has also chipped in the national effort to forge indispensable links between the two economies. In mid-June, Samsung Electronics’ vice chairman, Lee Jae-yong, organised a two-week trip to Europe to secure cooperation in critical technologies, such as semiconductors, AI, and bio sectors. Meanwhile, another Samsung subsidiary, Samsung Heavy Industries, secured orders worth around USD 3 billion to build liquefied natural gas carriers. It is the result of the anticipated demand for Qatari gas and new ships to transport it, as Europe looks to reach carbon neutrality without Russian energy.

With the world’s best solar cell manufacturing capacity, Hanwha has rapidly expanded its participation in solar energy projects in Spain and France. Another conglomerate, Lotte Group, announced in June a plan for its Hungarian plant to double the production of anode foil (a crucial component in battery-making), to assert its presence in the European electric vehicle market. At the 2022 Battery Show EU, which took place at the same time as the NATO summit, Doosan Corporation showcased the world’s first Patterned Flat Cable, an automotive cable that considerably cuts the weight and volume of copper wires for lower battery costs and longer driving distances.

Thanks to the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, introduced in 2011 and fully implemented in 2015, the EU is now the third-largest export market for South Korea, while the latter represents the ninth-largest export destination for European goods. In addition, the EU is the largest foreign direct investor in South Korea. Given the accelerated pace at which the two are aligning themselves in vital sectors, their mutually vested interests and incentives will only intensify. The melding of strategic interests has also spilled into the virtual and aerial domains. In June, the French Embassy in Seoul hosted a conference to pave the way for future collaboration in supercomputing that would enable remarkable breakthroughs in such complicated fields as healthcare, astrophysics, and AI.

In May, South Korea became the first Asian member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre, a multinational cybersecurity hub for joint research and cyber defence exercises. The EU and South Korea have already established annual cybersecurity dialogues for effective cooperation at multiple inter-agency levels. Acknowledging the importance of satellite technology in securing reliable information for security, South Korea’s government agencies and France’s defence giant, Thales, have extensively worked together on civilian- and military-purpose satellites.

From a ‘pond’ to the Atlantic

An adage describes the Korean Peninsula as ‘a shrimp among whales’, tossed around the great power politics between China, Russia, Japan, and the US. But in a fight between whales, it is the shrimp whose back breaks. While Europe recognises the cross-continental nature of modern conflicts and security threats, South Korea simultaneously seeks to diversify its role in the world (to date confined to East Asia). Therefore, for South Korea, having more baskets in which to put its eggs may come in handy. South Korea, whose external engagement has so far revolved around the intractable security stances of the US and China, can surely hedge its security interests by embracing Europe. Perhaps South Korea, together with Europe, may stand a chance as a pod of dolphins.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Eunwoo Lee is an independent journalist and a policy analyst based in Paris. Previously, he had served at South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. His articles have also appeared in The Diplomat, The Japan Times, The Geopolitics, and others. Image credit: Flickr/NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.