Russia, India and the S-400 deal: Complicated geopolitics
Russia, India and
The S-400 deal: Complicated Geopolitics
WRITTEN BY DIVYANSHU JINDAL
29 September 2021
The Indo-Russian deal for five regiments of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles worth more than USD 5 billion has attracted attention across the world. Upon delivery, India will become the third foreign buyer of the system after China and Turkey. The S-400 'Triumph' is a Russian long-and medium-range anti-aircraft system, designed to destroy all modern aircraft and missile projectiles, costing around half of its western alternative. Since the first outlines of the deal came to light, it has worried both China and the United States but for different reasons. Whereas China sees the deal as the embodiment of close India-Russia defence ties, Washington sees this deal through its inability to choke Russia through sanctions and the loss of market share for its defence industry.
But the story doesn’t end here. The possibility of invoking CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) against India due to defence procurement deals with Russia is a matter of concern for other prospective buyers like Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, whom the US has long eyed as markets for its defence offerings.
What is CAATSA and why it matters?
CAATSA, signed by former US President Donald Trump in 2017, enables Washington to impose sanctions against companies, organisations, and individuals from any nation for conducting ‘substantial’ transactions with Russian defence sector enterprises. CAATSA recognises sanctions in 12 categories, at least 5 of which must be imposed when invoking the Act. Some of these sanctions involve blocking loans from the US and international financial institutions and banning any procurement of defence equipment from the US by the sanctioned party, under both the foreign military sales and strategic partnership models. An often-relayed message is that CAATSA sanctions are not designed to be punitive against partners and allies but are designed to impose costs on Russia in response to activities deemed hostile. This gives the impression that the imposition of CAATSA would simply punish Russia, however, geopolitics in the realm of national security requirements make defence deals a much more convoluted reality.
While delivery of the first batch of S-400 systems is still a few months away, in future, new dynamics in Afghanistan and increasing cooperation between India and the US in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad will surely be important factors affecting the decision to impose or waive CAATSA sanctions against India.
It is widely accepted in Russian political circles that India will go ahead with procuring the S-400 despite numerous American attempts to lure India away, either by CAATSA related pressures or by offering alternative defence systems to India. For Moscow, this shows New Delhi's commitment to a strong relationship between the two nations. This re-strengthening of ties and commitments has become increasingly important for Moscow as its defence trade with China has decreased since 2018 (after allegations by Russia about Chinese activities related to reverse-engineering of Russian proprietary technologies surfaced). In recent years, there has been a growing narrative in Chinese and Pakistani media about India moving away from its Cold War era relations as the Indian government becomes increasingly ‘pro-American’, requiring Moscow to re-evaluate ties with New Delhi. To a certain extent, a lull observed between India and Russia for a decade between 2005-2015 gives credence to this narrative, making way for insecurities between the two long-standing defence partners.
For Russia, beyond securing a guarantee of New Delhi not falling gradually into Washington’s orbit in the field of defence trade, the S-400 deal provides a boost to the Russian defence industry which has seen increasing competition in recent years from emerging competitors, especially China. The procurement of such systems is not a short-term engagement. As such platforms are supposed to function for decades on top of which newer versions can be built or upgraded, the sale of such systems offers a ‘generational opportunity' for the seller. Such systems serve as a foundation for future procurements and can also make a difference to any nation’s defence portfolio when it comes to interoperability and the integration of systems from different manufacturers.
Washington’s CAATSA conundrum
According to some experts, the United States is facing a Catch-22 situation. Both China and Turkey were sanctioned for their S-400 deals. In the Indian case, the question is not ‘if’ CAATSA would apply — the Act comes into force the moment the ‘significant transaction’ clause is satisfied. The question is whether waivers will be given and if not, then which of the 12 sanctions will be applied to India. There have been indications that the US has been trying to assess options to bypass the sanction clauses and provide a waiver to New Delhi under the modified waiver clauses introduced into the legislation in 2018. One of the clauses that can be utilised for giving waivers falls under the category of national security exception. Another clause takes into consideration the cooperation between the government of the nation involved and the US government on other security matters that are critical to American strategic interests. Both of these clauses hold significance in emerging geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, where India is seen to be a key partner for the US.
Furthermore, a hard-line approach towards the application of CAATSA will certainly put pressure on the likes of Vietnam and Saudi Arabia to make a hard choice between the US and Russia for defence imports, whereas a milder approach might increase hopes for avoiding sanctions through diplomatic efforts with Washington while negotiating defence deals with Moscow. The deal with Saudi Arabia will be especially important as it might shape how the US and Russia will be perceived in the Persian Gulf in terms of having the capability to be a security provider in the coming future. Although Trump notably adopted a softer approach towards the Khashoggi murder case in 2018 and signed a deal for the sale of the THAAD missile system amidst an uproar over the close US-Saudi ties, Joe Biden has frozen the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia and started a review process of the deal.
More recently, the US even pulled its own missile defence system and Patriot missiles out of Saudi Arabia, which were installed at Prince Sultan Airbase outside Riyadh, as part of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is happening at a time when Russia is eyeing a return to South Asian geopolitics and has already made a comeback in the Central Asian security landscape by becoming the region’s net security provider post the US’ Afghanistan withdrawal. Several nations will be looking at Russia and Russian defence offerings from multiple geopolitical lenses in the months ahead.
What lies ahead for India and the S-400 deal?
Unlike Turkey, which is a NATO member with a huge Western defence technology base, the Indian defence base overwhelmingly comprises Russian and ageing Soviet equipment. India has several joint projects with Russia like the BrahMos hypersonic missile and the assembly of T-90 tanks in India. Even if recent Indian diversification plans are taken into consideration, a significant decrease in India’s reliance on Russian equipment cannot be imagined in upcoming years. Like the cold war era, India and Russia have switched to settlements in national currencies due to the US blocking payment possibilities in dollars. This not only fits with ongoing Russian plans for de-dollarisation but also helps India to fit into the wider narrative of a multipolar world and shield itself against any aggressive US policies in future.
Russia is looking towards delivering the first batch of the S-400 system between October-December this year. Given the lack of clarity around the sanctions and waivers, India and Russia will want to explore new ideas for future defence cooperation. Following Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s expression of confidence about the S-400 deal during a recent visit to New Delhi, and comments on deepening military-technical cooperation within the framework of the 'Make in India' program, some experts have come to view the joint production of Indian air defence systems on Indian territory as a possible way of overcoming sanctions for Indo-Russian cooperation.
The delivery of the S-400 systems to India in the coming months will surely be a much-celebrated event. Regardless of how China and the US react, the Indo-Russian defence relationship is bound to strengthen after this procurement. India will now be warier than ever as the security situation in South Asia is likely to remain in flux for some time and as China and Pakistan engage with the Taliban and attempt to influence subcontinental geopolitics. While delivery of the first batch of S-400 systems is still a few months away, in future, new dynamics in Afghanistan and increasing cooperation between India and the US in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad will surely be important factors affecting the decision to impose or waive CAATSA sanctions against India. Any souring of India-US ties over the S-400 is bound to negatively affect both nations’ interests. With waivers increasingly looking like the better option in India’s case, reactions from different parts of the world will be interesting to observe when the decision is announced.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Divyanshu Jindal is a doctoral student at the Jindal School of International Affairs in India. Image credit: Flickr/Dmitriy Fomin.