Political pardons in South Korea: President Yoon’s relationship to rule of law
Political pardons
in South Korea: President Yoon’s relationship to
rule of law
WRITTEN BY HANNES B. MOSLER
21 February 2023
Under conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol, the new South Korean government recently published its so-called ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, which is the country’s first global foreign policy strategy. It declares that South Korea “will uphold international norms and strengthen a rules-based order built on the universal values including freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights”. It is, of course, no coincidence that these core principles are in line with those of like-minded countries “with whom [they] share values”, and thus with which South Korea seeks cooperation in “realizing the vision for a free Indo-Pacific”. Besides the US and Japan, this includes “substantive cooperation (value diplomacy partnerships) with the European Union (EU) and its member states”.
This commitment is mutual. South Korea is an important value partner in East Asia, as stated in the foreign policy strategy papers of the EU and member states such as Germany. This is not surprising at all. South Korea is the tenth-largest economy in the world, and it also has a comparatively exemplary history in terms of democracy. The leadership of countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea are increasingly challenging the rules-based international order. Therefore, alongside Japan, South Korea plays a central role for Western allies in the region to support value-based multilateralism with liberal-democratic principles and norms at its core.
The yawning gap between Yoon’s words and deeds
Part of the Yoon administration’s aspiration of becoming a “Global Pivotal State” involves styling itself “as a model democracy [...] committed to promoting freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights”. In fact, early on in his presidential campaign in 2021, Yoon had already repeatedly emphasised his focus on ‘liberal democracy’, ‘liberal democratic basic order’, and ‘rule of law’. As a former senior prosecutor who had successfully fought corruption at the highest levels, many found this rhetoric coherent and persuasive.
Alongside Japan, South Korea plays a central role for Western allies in the region to support value-based multilateralism with liberal-democratic principles and norms at its core.
However, even a quick look at how Yoon has been leading state affairs reveals a considerable gap between his words and his actual deeds. The freedom of companies to strive for commercial profit seems to be more important to Yoon than the basic rights of workers — as seen, for example, in the case of the striking cargo truck drivers in December 2022. He threatened them with the full force of the law if they did not obey, to the point that the UN International Labor Organization reached out to express their concerns about Yoon infringing upon workers’ rights to freedom of association.
Freedom of the press seems to be granted only so far as Yoon does not see himself restricted in enjoying the liberty to do as he pleases. As, for example, when he was caught on camera seemingly insulting members of congress during a state visit to the US, and subsequently accused the South Korean broadcaster MBC of malicious intent and fake news.
The prosecutor-turned-president punished the TV station for airing the rant by excluding its journalists from the press pool in the following state visit, which ultimately prompted an intervention by the International Federation of Journalists. Apparently unperturbed by the international attention, Yoon’s foreign ministry recently sued MBC, requesting they “correct the facts” regarding the report in question. Meanwhile, MBC has filed a constitutional complaint against the government, claiming that they are restricting their “freedom to [...] impart information”.
Even when it comes to law and order, Yoon takes the liberty he frequently invokes to make exceptions to the rule of law. At least that is what appears to have happened in December when he pardoned 1,373 civilians, among them high-profile politicians, as well as former officials who were convicted of corruption, bribery, election interference, and other white-collar crimes. Most prominent among them was former President Lee Myung-bak. Ironically, it was Yoon himself who put Lee behind bars in 2018 when he was still a prosecutor. Lee was found guilty of large-scale bribery, embezzlement, and tax evasion, and was sentenced to 17 years in prison and received a fine worth around EUR 10 million. Now, however, his sentence has been lifted, and he is no longer required to pay any of the fine.
Other former officials of the Lee administration were also pardoned. For example, Won Se-hoon, former chief of the National Intelligence Service and President Lee’s right-hand man at the time, was exempted from his remaining prison time. He had been found guilty of directing his agents to stage smear campaigns against opposition politicians by manipulating user comments on the Internet in the run-up to the South Korean presidential election in 2012 (which was ultimately won by Park Geun-hye).
Unsurprisingly, another group that Yoon pardoned consisted of those officials who were crucially involved in the influence-peddling scandal that led to former President Park’s impeachment and later conviction. Park was found guilty of abuse of power, bribery, illegal receipt of funds, and violations of the electoral law. She was sentenced to 22 years in prison and a fine of EUR 16 million. Park’s former chief of staff, Kim Ki-chun (who also served under the late military dictator Park Chung-hee, Park Geun-hye’s father), was among those accomplices in the ‘Park scandal’ who have now been pardoned. He was convicted for his role in ‘blacklisting’ artists critical of the administration, and ‘whitelisting’ rightist organisations fond of the Park government.
Questionable pardons are a slippery slope
Despite this stunning mass amnesty of felons, Yoon, for his part, does not seem to have made any serious efforts to provide a convincing reason for so excessively resorting to his clemency power — which makes his decision look rather arbitrary. The press statement of his justice minister justifies the special pardons simply as being engineered to “resolve confrontation and conflict in our society”, and to “create an atmosphere of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘embrace’, and to bring together national power through ‘broad national unity’ to clear the past and use it as an opportunity for future-oriented development of the Republic of Korea”.
It is, however, more than questionable whether pardoning convicted criminals will have the stated pacifying and unifying effect. The ‘mass mercy’ was met not only with resistance in the opposition Democratic Party but reportedly also by the majority of the population (53 per cent were against Lee’s amnesty, with only 39 per cent in favour). This is not surprising when, among the 44 pardoned former high-profile government officials, no less than 39 were tied to the former corrupt conservative presidents, while only five belonged to the democratic camp. Put differently, apparently it was not the nation that was to be united through this coup, but rather the various right-leaning and reactionary splinter-groups that had dispersed mainly as a result of the Park administration’s political meltdown.
Not least, the upcoming general election in spring 2024 will require Yoon to work on increasing his approval rating, which (while recently having risen from a low of between 20 and 30 per cent to about 37 per cent in early January), still reflects his poor support in the citizenry. The election will be a crucial opportunity for the divided government to improve its leverage in parliament, which is presently dominated by a large majority of the oppositional Democratic Party.
Certainly, Yoon is not the first South Korean president who has exploited his unchecked pardoning power for political gains and against democratic principles but he is hopefully the last. Of course, there is no flawless democracy on earth, and it is difficult to determine where the hollowing out of democracy begins. However, this must not lead to simply ignoring the danger of apparent democratic deterioration. Particularly, if it is a partner with whom you supposedly share the values of liberal democracy.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Hannes B. Mosler is a Professor at the Institute of East Asian Studies and the Institute of Political Science of the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. Image credit: DEMA(Defense Media Agency), Official Photographer: Yang Dong Wook.