In Conversation: Rory Medcalf on Indo-Pacific Empire
IN conversation:
rory medcalf on
Indo-Pacific Empire
CHINA, AMERICA AND THE CONTEST FOR THE WORLD’S PIVOTAL REGION
IN CONVERSATION WITH RORY MEDCALF
26 APRIL 2021
We recently sat down with Professor Rory Medcalf to discuss his latest book Indo-Pacific Empire, which has fast become an essential read for anyone seeking to make sense of the worlds most dynamic region. Given the Indo-Pacific’s complex history we started our conversation by looking back.
How much of Australia’s contemporary strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific is a legacy of the lessons learned from the post World War II security environment, and where should today’s policymakers be focusing their attention?
Australian strategic policy today is rediscovering some lessons of 20th-century history. Maybe more the 1930s and 1940s than the post World War II and Cold War eras. Indeed, our Prime Minister alluded to the grave tensions and uncertainties of the 1930s in launching an updated defence policy last year. Our government is now open in its warnings that the nation faces the most dangerous security environment since our forces were fighting Imperial Japan.
What are the lessons? One is how much geography still matters. Australia has rediscovered the opportunities and risks in its Indo-Pacific maritime environment. We are in a multipolar region where maritime connectivity to many partners is essential for national survival and wellbeing, where seapower matters, and where an assertive great power, China, is projecting influence and potentially forces its way into our maritime approaches: north, west and east. The imperial Japan analogy is worth considering, not because China may pose a wholesale military threat to our territory — we should be careful not to exaggerate those scenarios — but because a Chinese military footprint in the Southwest Pacific, like the Japanese strategy in the Pacific War, could in future isolate Australia from supporting any US-led effort to deter or oppose China in a wider regional conflict.
Australian defence policy has for decades been based on the assumption that no potentially hostile power would have bases in our neighbourhood, and that assumption is now dead. No wonder Australia is now becoming so activist in its strategic diplomacy and development assistance in the Pacific Island nations — but we should not forget our northwestern flank. Another lesson being noted from the 1930s-40s and indeed the Cold War too is that national security is not just about military matters — national resilience and cohesion on the home front also matters.
Games only work if the rules are both known and understood by all players. You have noted the many complexities of the new game in the Indo-Pacific and the multiplicity of players involved. Do you believe there are sufficient rules governing this game, and is there an adequate shared understanding of these among the relevant parties?
My book uses game analogies to help explain the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific strategic contest — everything from Go or Weiqi to chess to the 19th century geopolitical Great Game — but I also recognise the limitations of such parallels. We are also learning that not all the players are following the same rules — and it is a many-player game, not just a US-China contest. For a start, China has for many years been contesting at many levels — including economics, infrastructure, influence operations and propaganda — whereas until recently the United States and some others were focused overwhelmingly on the military dimension. Thankfully now most of the significant powers — including also Australia, India and Japan — recognise that geoeconomics, technology and political influence could be the game-changers, and are stepping up and coordinating efforts in those spaces.
The idea of rules in strategic competition can apply in several ways. Governments speak of a ‘rules-based order’, partly as code for the laws and norms that prevent coercive power deciding the outcome of differences between nations. Clearly, there is no longer, if ever there was, a shared understanding of what an acceptable rules-based order constitutes in the Indo-Pacific, especially in relation to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea or other contested waters. But even more pressing, as strategic tensions continue to grow, is the question of what constitutes the rules of competition in order to manage risks of escalation. And here we cannot be complacent. The region lacks strong frameworks to limit the risks of conflict breaking out at sea. While at one level it was good that in 2014 China signed on to the so-called Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea, this set of rules also became a tool for China to justify threatening foreign forces that passed by its militarised and artificial islands — the rules were co-opted as an instrument for territorial expansion. And in the end, we need to form a view about whether the strategic rivalries in the region are still at the level of mere competition — a rule-abiding dynamic — or something uglier and more unfettered, like a struggle or war by other means.
You describe the Indo-Pacific as a region full of ‘black elephants’, or likely events that while looming, still come as a shock. While each scenario carries the potential for devastating consequences, which black elephant do you most fear?
A black elephant is distinguished from a black swan by its inevitability — it was just a matter of time. COVID-19 sadly fits that bill: a major global pandemic was going to happen sooner or later, and the policy challenge was — and is — to prepare for it. If we concentrate on consequence — however unlikely the scenario — then of course any situation that potentially involves escalation to the use of nuclear weapons should give every nation pause. I don’t characterise nuclear war as a black elephant because I do not consider it inevitable; governments have agency in reducing its possibility. Most of the plausible contingencies in our region — the prospective strategic shocks — are circumstances that involve extreme coercion short of major war, and those have much higher likelihoods.
The looming phase of intense pressure on Taiwan by China is a true black elephant — it is obvious, it is coming, it will have large consequences for the future of the Indo-Pacific and the world. The impact of massive environmental pressures on our region, such as overfishing, combined with the effects of climate change: this is a black elephant. My book argues that the rapid expansion of Chinese power and strategic ambition across the Indo-Pacific is adding to and accelerating the proliferation of both black swans and black elephants, but of course, it is hardly the only factor behind such strategic shocks.
How likely do you think a coalition of like-minded countries, the kind the European Union has been increasingly pushing for, will be able to create and maintain a sense of coexistence? And, in this context how do you see the future of ‘an alliance of multilateralism’ as German foreign minister Heiko Maas has envisaged?
The book argues there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to regional diplomacy. I have long endorsed a multilayered approach, much like the strategy Australia has been prosecuting for the past few years. Of course, big bilaterals still matter — especially the US alliances — but we need to build a context of respect for rules and principles in multilateral forums like the East Asia Summit (which is actually an Indo-Pacific summit). What was once the missing link between the two, between the bilateral and the multilateral, is now being filled in — the small groups united by convergent interests, complementary capabilities, some set of shared principles, and a willingness to act. The Quad is fast becoming a forerunner among those small groups – the minilaterals — here in the Indo-Pacific. Many of us have kept a degree of confidence in the idea of the Quad — Australia, India, Japan, America — but with the recent (March 2021) Quad summit and its vaccine action plan it has surpassed expectations, putting China off-balance. But the Quad won’t be the only answer.
The trick is to coordinate among many small groups — look too at the trilaterals, like Australia-India-France or Australia-India-Indonesia. And yes much of this can be global rather than regional: let’s see how the Quad can coordinate with the G7, or the Five Eyes, or nascent global groupings of democracies like the proposed D10. Indeed, the challenge for Germany and other key players in the EU will be to recognise that they cannot quarantine their economic relationship with China from the growing global tide of awareness around the security risk in China relations, and you can see that tension already being acknowledged, for instance in Germany’s own 2020 Indo-Pacific foreign policy document.
You describe the Indo-Pacific as something of a metaphor for collective action while also emphasising the complexity inherent within a multipolar space. In the face of an increasingly assertive China, how can small and middle powers advance their own interests for themselves?
Part of the answer is the middle powers’ activism in building coalitions and partnerships. And some of these should purely be among middle and smaller powers, partly to reinforce the view and the reality that setting limits to Chinese power is not simply some American plot. We all have concerns, we all have agency. Australia has also set an example — and others are setting their own, in their own way — of how a middle power can lead in resisting and making itself resilient against coercion and foreign interference. Part of this is simply building capability, whether military force or the laws and assets domestically necessary to safeguard sovereignty.
India and Japan have each also taken their stands, in India’s case against much more direct and violent pressure. At the same time, the storms and madness of aspects of Trump’s external policy have reminded us that the United States can in its own way be a source of risk and uncertainty, even to friends and partners. So the middle powers need to seize the opportunity of respectful engagement that Biden now offers while continuing to build up their own strategic weight and ties with one another.
As a conceptual framework, the Indo-Pacific means different things to different states. What do you see as the core principles and building blocks for the future and how do you see these being expressed in the years ahead?
It is easy to criticise the Indo-Pacific concept on the basis that different governments seem to interpret it differently — after all, not two nations have wholly congruent interests. And some observers make a cottage industry out of parsing diplomatic communiques — which countries say ‘free and open’, which ones don’t? Moreover, even generally like-minded countries like Australia and Japan seem to see the boundaries of the region differently — is the east coast of Africa part of the Indo-Pacific or not? In practice, though, the Indo-Pacific is a fluid region — it is maritime after all — and what matters more is its core, the critical importance of sea lanes of southeast Asia, something we can all agree on, rather than its shifting periphery, which is defined more by the interests of the region’s major powers at any given time. But more important than the differences over the Indo-Pacific are the commonalities.
There are some fundamental principles to the Indo-Pacific as a framework for coexistence and cooperation among nations, and these principles are common to every single governmental articulation of an Indo-Pacific vision: Australia, Japan, India, Indonesia, ASEAN, the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Taiwan, and probably by the time you read this, the list will be longer still. These include respect for the sovereign equality of states, multipolarity, non-coercion, a rules-based order, international law especially UNCLOS. There is also a recognition that the dynamics of the region are both about connectivity and competition. The contours of a shared Indo-Pacific vision are emerging and this is not about ‘containing’ or excluding China, but about respecting the interests of all — a region where China is prominent but not dominant.
China has made clear that its landmark Belt and Road Initiative remains central to its future plans and continued prosperity while Europe’s immediate future looks destined to focus on rebuilding its shattered economies. In light of growing hostility to China and Europe’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, how do you see these respective interests playing out?
We are still in the early phases of a long and uneven dynamic between Europe and China, and between their economic and strategic interests. The past few years have generally brought a reality check to European perspectives on China. There is no longer an uncritical or self-deluding pursuit of commercial and economic gains regardless of the risks and costs — in strategic vulnerability, human rights, or long-term loss of intellectual property advantage. The Trump factor slowed down and complicated Europe’s recognition of common cause with the United States and many Indo-Pacific partners in limiting China’s influence. But there is no simple adjustment now to Europe’s increasing risk-awareness about the opportunity in its China relations.
Yes, COVID-19 has brought disastrous harm to European societies and economies, and yes there remain wide and unresolved concerns regarding China and the origins of the pandemic, and yes most European powers — and especially Britain (not EU but still European) — have woken up to the dangers of authoritarian political interference, technology competition and geopolitical ambition. But China remains economically vital, for now in some ways even more so than before, and Europe understandably still wants and needs a big part of that. In the long run, I do see Europe more actively aligning with the United States and other democracies, but it will be a rocky path, and European partners will need to be realistic about where they can most make a difference: for example, in protecting their technology and innovation base, or showing solidarity in opposing cyber-attacks, economic coercion or mass affronts to human rights, rather than raising expectations of their global military roles.
Looking toward Northeast Asia, Germany is considering sending a warship to the region including port calls in Japan and South Korea (possibly Australia). While the timing in itself is interesting what do you feel is being signalled and, perhaps, more importantly, how do you think it will be received by the key actors.
The Indo-Pacific has a paradoxical quality: a regional system, albeit a vast one of two oceans, but also a region that draws its meaning precisely from its maritime connectivity to the world. This means that global powers not necessarily resident in this region actually have large interests in regional stability. That includes the EU and its member states and indeed Britain. And sure enough, there is now a tide of European interest, policy formulation and diplomatic activism with regard to the Indo-Pacific. First France then Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and the EU — all developing formal policy statements and beginning some practical action. This includes naval presence, where France has shown the way — and of course, remains a resident power with territories in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Britain is arriving in force with the aircraft carrier group visit later this year, and even Germany — not a country used to long-range naval diplomacy — is sending a frigate here.
Our European friends should not imagine that their naval presence here alone will be decisive to the region’s future, or indeed that it is the most critical element of their support for a rules-based order in the region. Diplomatic solidarity, development assistance, capacity building, technology cooperation, intelligence sharing — these things all matter too. But it is fair to generalise that most Indo-Pacific countries welcome the new style of European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, which is about partnership and cooperation, helping us consolidate the reality that this is a sea of many flags that no one power is entitled to dominate.
China may occasionally attempt to project a propagandist message that this all stirs echoes of colonial gunboat diplomacy, but this distortion dissolves against the fact that Europe is here as a welcome contributor and partner to many, as borne about by polling showing high levels of Southeast Asian trust in Europe. Indeed, the title of the international edition of my book, Indo-Pacific Empire (noting that the Australian edition of the same book is called Contest for the Indo-Pacific), could be read as an allusion to the many empires that have sought to dominate the region over the centuries — and these days the country most widely accused of neocolonial or even imperial behaviour is China.
In the aftermath of the Trump presidency (and the 6 January Capitol riot) how do you assess his impact on the region both in strategic terms and the ability of a now seemingly diminished US to deliver on its aims? And finally — on China — President Biden has signalled his intention to maintain the approach of the previous administration, from an Australian perspective how and where should they seek to pick up?
It is impressive and reassuring how quickly and comprehensively the Biden Administration has moved to shape and implement its own Indo-Pacific policies. At the start of this year, there was still some lingering anxiety that the new Administration would throw the Indo-Pacific baby out with the Trump bathwater, but that has not proved the case. After all, America’s recognition of an Indo-Pacific character to its regional engagement actually began around 2010; there was always an Indo-Pacific edge to the ‘rebalance’, and of course the Obama and George W Bush Administrations’ closening ties with India.
And now we see the emerging shape of the Biden approach: combining the stark recognition of strategic competition with China, that was an important legacy of 2017-2020, with much greater overall competence, coordination and respect for allies. The Quad summit is a vital early signal of this: Biden’s first meeting with multiple other world leaders, and an agenda that focuses on constructive things, contributions to the common good, leaving it up to China to choose cooperation, coexistence, competition or confrontation. Having said all that, yes Trump left a diminished America, with serious internal divisions and damage to its reputation — even if some aspects of relative decline predated 2016. And yes, Washington must now focus on many fronts, prioritising domestic recovery and pandemic response. But even a weaker-than-before America is still a decisively powerful player in this region, and goodwill among partners and allies is rebounding quickly.
The debate now — and there are many astute policy leaders in the new Administration who are living it — is what constitutes a sustainable ambition for America in this region: all-round ‘primacy’, or something else, for instance, what Mira Rapp-Hooper has defined as a more selective kind of ‘pre-eminence’? And how does this adjusted vision translate into support for allies and a willingness to deter China if and when need be? Some early clues can be found in the way Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell seems to be thinking and acting — and as an Australian, I cannot help but close with a recognition of the importance of America’s apparent new willingness to protect allies against geoeconomic as well as military coercion.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Rory Medcalf is the head of the National Security College at The Australian National University. His professional background involves more than two decades of experience across diplomacy, intelligence analysis, think tanks, and journalism. His latest book ‘Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the contest for the world's pivotal region’ was published in March 2020 and is available here.