In Conversation: Chris Ogden on China and India

IN CONVERSATION WITH CHRIS OGDEN

23 March 2021

Your 2017 book China and India: Asia's Emergent Great Powers explored the history of both India and China with a focus on the values and identities of these two emerging powers. What drew you to write the book and was there anything surprising for you about the norms that drive their foreign interactions?

Firstly, a big surprise for me in writing the book was the many similarities between India and China. We have two rising powers, potentially great powers very soon, and in terms of domestic policy, both want to develop their economies and their living standards. They want to modernise and pull their societies up in terms of education and wealth.

This is also reflected internationally. Both Beijing and New Delhi want a multipolar world order and importantly, both are suspicious of the international system and its gatekeepers. This is primarily due to the negative experiences and interactions they endured before World War II. India as we know was colonised but China was also heavily subjugated by Western powers and later Japan. This has led to a sense in both nations that they want to restore history.

One aspect that drew me to write the book was the work of Angus Maddison, who tracked and analysed GDP through the centuries. This research found that both India and China dominated the global economy until 1750, which I had never fully realised. This meant that for centuries, both India and China were responsible for a quarter of world trade and the idea that this past glory needs to be restored acts as connecting scar tissue between the identities of these two Asian powers.

How do India and China’s respective political systems inform the conduct of their foreign policies? Are there similarities in the conduct of both states at the international level despite their differences?

Despite initial appearances, there are huge crossovers between the two states in terms of policymaking. While China is authoritarian and India is largely democratic, there are autocratic tendencies within both systems and a very small group of people dictate foreign policy in each state.

In Beijing, the Politburo Standing Committee consists of seven members (maybe nine at a stretch) while similarly in India, there are perhaps only four or five cabinet members involved. An example I like to use with my students is, when India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, only four members of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government knew about that decision and that did not include the defence minister — power is therefore highly concentrated.

In one way, through respective foreign policies, you can identify a deeper identity as they are not interested in exporting their political systems to other countries. Both believe in the principle of non-intervention in international affairs and this is down to the legacy of colonialism. This is especially true in India and New Delhi will not export its democracy, in a missionary sense, unless it is specifically asked to do so. A very good example of this is Afghanistan, where the government there has explicitly asked New Delhi for assistance. In contrast, with the recent events in Myanmar, we are seeing a military coup with pro-democracy activists on the streets being killed, but India is not going to intervene because it wants to maintain access to Myanmar's markets.

Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping have cultivated nationalism as a powerful tool. How does this affect their foreign policies?

With Narendra Modi and the BJP, we are seeing an explicitly Hindu nationalist movement, i.e., they prioritise the importance of Hindus over any other group in India. Equally, their world view is very India-centric, India First. This is different from previous leaders but not substantially so. Indian leaders have, in the past, been highly nationalistic and have promoted Indian exceptionalism within the international system. Nationalism has always been there. The difference now is that the BJP is far more strident in its ambitions and with Narendra Modi, we see certain key similarities with Xi Jinping. Modi is very confident, bombastic, assertive, and unafraid to deliver the vision of India which his supporters want.

With Xi Jinping, we also see nationalism and the narrative of the Century of Humiliation, but the danger here is that nationalism on the mainland serves as a foil for criticism of the CCP. The economy will eventually slow and we will therefore see more normal levels of GDP growth. At some point, China will experience a recession, which will be a complete unknown for most of the population. At that point, we can see a scenario where nationalism can be used to distract or redirect sentiment away from the CCP to an external actor.

The danger for Xi Jinping is that Chinese nationalism is easy to turn on but very hard to turn off. Through its education system and leaders, China's population has been taught to be suspicious of other countries, especially Japan due to its role during World War II. This was seen in 2005 when the Communist Party encouraged anti-Japanese protests on the streets which escalated beyond the point of control leading to attacks on Japanese businesses and its embassy.

This applies to Xi Jinping's immediate future where nationalist forces could attempt to tip his hand and push him towards more assertive action in East Asia. Should he reject this, he risks looking weak and becoming trapped in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This could happen with Taiwan, which is a lightning rod for nationalism on the mainland owing to history and the role the United States plays in maintaining the status quo. In the era of the ‘Chinese Dream’, the Communist Party and Xi Jinping cannot afford to appear weak.

India and China have been engaged in a military standoff in the Ladakh region since last summer, and similar standoffs have been reported in Sikkim more recently. Are the two now outright military rivals or is the relationship more nuanced?

Foreign policy exists in certain zones and by that I mean it is entirely feasible that one week these states can have a border conflict and the next they can be involved in trade negotiations. It is, therefore, possible that in a multilateral setting Beijing and New Delhi can work together on global issues such as climate change.

The difference, however, is that tensions between the two have grown as both have become more powerful. Nationalist forces in both India and China alongside those in the military are now agitating toward action. On the Chinese side, some of this may be based on opportunity (with the world focused on Covid-19) though there may also be a more straightforward attempt to further its interests. Equally from the Indian perspective, Narendra Modi will not tolerate being perceived as weak and the Indian media is highly nationalistic and sensitive to China due to the 1962 border war. Despite the nationalistic sentiment, this has not led to major military escalation as neither side wishes to become involved in a war — in essence, both China and India seek stability in their border regions.

Mindsets matter, and in international relations the realist mindset says both states are amassing military power and that they are destined for conflict. I disagree with this reading of Sino-Indian relations as the nationalist rhetoric and identities at play increase the risk of conflict and the leaders may feel they cannot back down — but we are not there yet. While the border is highly symbolic, what is far more important to the Indian and Chinese are the wider structural questions of who will be Asia's leader in the Asian Century, and for that, they need to develop their economies and build their trading ties with Southeast Asia and beyond.

India and China are both vast countries with enormous populations, but is this reflected in the power of their diplomacy? Do Beijing and New Delhi carry the same level of diplomatic influence?

India's diplomatic capabilities in terms of the number of embassies, experts, diplomats, and general bandwidth are far less than China. And this does constrain its diplomatic effectiveness. As a broad generalisation, however, India has a better image even as a flawed democracy versus Beijing, which is more authoritarian in how it conducts diplomacy.

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy, where it explicitly warns states of negative outcomes if they do not agree, is very different from the way India conducts itself. Indian diplomats have a reputation for naysaying, which means in negotiations they do not give in. You would think this approach is unproductive but because of their relative strength in terms of market access, the fact is that other states have increasingly looked to India for advice.

India has a major diplomatic presence in South Asia, but some countries see New Delhi as a threat because India has intervened far more in its periphery than China. Indian troops have been deployed to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh, and this has a historical legacy. China, in contrast, is viewed more positively, since it acts as a counterbalance to India's relative strength. Nepal is a useful example of how a smaller state has managed relations with New Delhi by balancing its trading relationship with China. The Sino-Pakistani relationship is incredibly interesting as it anchors Beijing's influence in South Asia.

In fact, trade is the foundation of China's diplomacy. Considering major regional actors beyond South Asia, India has a far better relationship with Japan than China. However, China is the bigger market for Japanese goods. Indeed, China is the largest import and export partner of all of its neighbours, except Afghanistan.

How would you assess the current state of relations between Beijing and Washington, and are India and the US natural partners or friends of convenience in the face of a rising and truculent China?

Beijing is now a strategic competitor for the United States, not only in terms of military and economic power but also in terms of influence in multilateral institutions. The US is perceived to be in relative decline, which was inevitable especially in the wake of China's rise. It looks very likely that in the future the US will be one among several great powers including China and potentially India.

Under Biden, the US is more likely to lean in on human rights and authoritarianism, so there will be more competition in those domains. However, if you want something done on climate change as Biden has indicated, then you need Beijing. Structural issues also matter in Sino-American relations. China seems to have bounced back quickly from Covid-19, while the US is still in the throes of the pandemic. This has only accelerated China’s rise and America’s relative decline. The attack on the Capitol building on 6 January has put a huge question mark over the ability of the US to serve as a model for democracy.

I think India is overshadowed by China because of the focus on the US-China rivalry. Contemporary great powers are acting as gatekeepers; they can isolate states or bring them into the international community. We saw that with China in the 1970s, and with India in 1998 following the nuclear tests. The US recognised the advantages of having India as a partner and helped New Delhi sidestep the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which adds to the sense of Indian exceptionalism that drives Indian foreign policy. Twenty years later, I would say that positive ties with the US have become a substantial pillar of Indian foreign policy, not as allies but as partners due to mutual advantage. However, I hypothesise that India may one day become a rival of the US because China’s growth may slow down or experience a recession, whereas, with its huge and young population, India has a lot of potential for growth in the coming decades.

What do you make of talk about a ‘new cold war’ with China?

I think its very clumsy language. Policymakers are drawn to analogies from the past. If you say to a policymaker ‘Cold War 2.0’, they immediately understand what is being referred to, and China as a communist state plays into that too. But the current situation is completely different from the post-World War II strategic competition with the Soviet Union. Most of the world was divided into blocs, there was no globalisation occurring between East and West and no interconnection of economies or ideas. Talk of a ‘new cold war’ is overblown though if China (due to its nationalism) and America’s incessant need for a hostile ‘other’ to define itself against want to turn each other into enemies they can do so easily. Nevertheless, this is not a foregone conclusion.

Where do you see Sino-Indian relations heading and what legacy will Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping bequeath to their successors?

I think India and China can have very positive relations in the future because they have so much in common. Their shared postcolonial history and identities as developing states mean they have common interests. Both want economic development and market access for their goods and services. Likewise, in their attitude to the international system, they have common interests in becoming influential gatekeepers. The border issue should not be taken lightly but since they stand to benefit from changing the international system in their favour, I think we could see very close ties between these two.

In the context of regional leadership in the Indo-Pacific, I think we will see competition between them as each seeks to establish itself as the ‘leader’ of the Asian Century. So far, China is ahead of India: it has created international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is a direct challenge to the Asian Development Bank. For India, the key thing would be securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There is speculation that if the UK breaks up and Scotland becomes independent, there would be an opportunity for India to replace the UK on the council.

As to the legacies both leaders will leave their successors, the question really is will there be a successor in the near term? Xi Jinping will not be leaving power anytime soon and given how weak the Indian National Congress has become in the past few years, there is speculation that Modi and the BJP could be around for the next 20 years.

If the BJP stays in power for another decade, I think India will become an increasingly Hindu country, and the role of the RSS then becomes more interesting because rather than swearing allegiance to the Indian flag, its members swear it to an imagined ‘Bharat’, which is a fully Hindu state. When Modi eventually leaves power, I think it will be very hard for India to return to a fully secular, tolerant, and unified society. With China, the hope is that as it develops economically, its foreign policy behaviour will also mature and stabilise. In the long-term, China might find itself satisfied with its position globally and be happy that it achieved the revolution without conflict.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Chris Ogden is a Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor in Asian Security. He joined the University of St Andrews in 2010, and his research analyses the relationship between national identity, security and domestic politics in South Asia (primarily India) and East Asia (primarily China), as well as the rise of great powers, authoritarianism in global politics, and China’s coming world order. He is also concerned with the role of norms and identity in International Relations, and the analytical uses of social psychology and has previously taught at the Universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Durham, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His book China and India: Asia's Emergent Great Powers was published in April 2017.