Forum: Russia’s war and the international order — one year on
Forum: Russia’s
war and the international order — one year on
24 February 2023
On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that upended Europe’s security order and shook the international order. One year on, and despite an unprecedented level of Western sanctions on Moscow, the war is still ongoing.
9DASHLINE asks several experts to assess what Russia’s war in Ukraine means for the international order and what the consequences may be for issues in the Indo-Pacific.
REINFORCING DETERRENCE AND STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
NATHAN LEVINE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CHINA ANALYSIS, ASIA SOCIETY POLICY INSTITUTE (ASPI)
If anyone hoped that sanctions could rein in Russia after the war began — that is, help bring a quick end to the war — those hopes were misplaced. There was never much chance of the sanctions changing Vladimir Putin’s mind after he made the fateful decision to roll the dice and invade Ukraine. Instead, the threat of sanctions was used by the United States and the EU as a form of deterrence, a threat of punishment if Russia went ahead with its invasion. Unfortunately, this threat was insufficient and therefore failed to deter Russia, which had been preparing measures for sanctions evasion in precisely such a scenario for years.
This has implications for the Indo-Pacific. In particular, we should understand that the threat of sanctions alone is unlikely to be sufficient to deter China from taking military action in pursuit of its strategic goals, such as in a scenario involving Taiwan. This is especially the case now that China seeks to learn lessons from Russia on how to further mitigate sanctions measures. Fundamentally, the hard truth is that successful deterrence will rely on maintaining a sufficient regional balance of military power.
However, the broader lesson from the war is likely to help reinforce, not undermine, deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s unexpectedly disastrous military performance in Ukraine (in the face of stiff and courageous resistance) is a dramatic reminder of the immense uncertainty and risk any leader faces when choosing to unleash the chaos of war, even if they think themselves well-prepared. And an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, for example, would be a far more complex and daunting task than Russia’s campaign against neighbouring Ukraine. Meanwhile, the war has contributed to the increased awareness of the need for a robust commitment to and coordination on regional deterrence in many democratic countries in the region, such as Japan. So, while the war may not shift Beijing’s long-term strategic priorities, it may give them pause.
BALANCING TWO SYSTEMS
DR HEE KYOUNG CHANG, LECTURER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG-ESSEN
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken the international order. The most debatable argument about the implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine for the international order is whether a ‘new Cold War’ system of ‘authoritarianism’ versus ‘democracy’ could emerge. This interpretation seems to be supported by the changes in the European security order and the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia.
First, the peaceful European security order, which was established after the Second World War based on sovereignty and territorial integrity, has been shattered by the Russian invasion. In response to this war, Germany increased its defence budget to 2 per cent of its GDP and has supported Ukraine with military equipment and weapons. In addition, traditionally neutral nations such as Finland and Sweden are about to join NATO. Beyond Europe, representative democracies in Asia such as South Korea and Japan for the first time attended NATO meetings in June 2022 to discuss future cooperation.
Second, the US and Europe have imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia, and, again, South Korea and Japan also joined the effort. However, after a brief slump, the Russian economy has proved to be more resilient than many expected because China, India, and Turkey have imported Russian oil and gas despite the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. China also exported chips to Russia that the US prohibits from being exported. Additionally, North Korea supported the Russian invasion and supplied Moscow with conventional weapons.
In light of these facts, it may seem to some that we are in a ‘new Cold War’. However, this is not automatically the case, because many countries in the Indo-Pacific are not firmly committed to either side. Although many Indo-Pacific countries have criticised Russia's aggression, they have not joined the US-led economic sanctions. Thus, the Indo-Pacific region will play an important role in balancing the two systems due to its geopolitical significance. The United States, for example, has emphasised the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific in balancing against Russia and China. Europe intends to establish a norm-based international order by aligning itself with the Indo-Pacific region over joint priorities such as free trade on its sea lanes and abundant energy resources. Thus, the Indo-Pacific will be critical in deciding the future international order, either a bipolar or multipolar system.
THE TAIWAN CONNECTION
DR LEV NACHMAN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY TAIPEI
Despite several false equivalencies between Ukraine and Taiwan, one important lesson the war in Ukraine has for the Asia-Pacific region is the world’s solidarity with democracies threatened by autocratisation. When Russia invaded Ukraine, one common wisdom in Russia was that it would be a swift operation and that most countries would not come to Ukraine’s aid. But democracies around the world have proven Putin wrong. From Taiwan to Germany to the United States, we have seen an unprecedented level of support for Ukraine based on the shared values of democracy and anti-authoritarianism.
Xi Jinping has witnessed this international democratic solidarity. If war is waged over Taiwan, it is far more likely now that Xi anticipates global support for Taiwan, rather than apathy. It should not be expected, however, that this will deter Xi or the Chinese Communist Party’s claims or ambitions to take Taiwan. Ukraine has not changed Xi's or the People’s Republic of China’s desires, but it has perhaps changed their calculations of the cost of such a conflict, and how far-reaching the international response would be. The level of support and solidarity we have seen from democratic countries for Ukraine will hopefully prove a meaningful deterrent against conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/The White House.