Forum 2023: Intra-Indo-Pacific cooperation between India, Japan, and South Korea

Forum 2023: Intra-Indo-Pacific cooperation between India, Japan, and South Korea


 

3 February 2023

In 2022, border clashes between China and India, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and persistent threats from North Korea put a spotlight on finding solutions to security challenges posed by illiberal states. While European and American security initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are frequently highlighted, security cooperation among Asian states tends to receive less attention. However, intra-Indo-Pacific cooperation could be an effective way to deal with various threats to regional security.

9DASHLINE invites several experts to assess the prospect of security-oriented cooperation between India, Japan, and South Korea. Given potential threats like an increasingly assertive China and a nuclear-armed North Korea, how can New Delhi, Tokyo, and Seoul benefit from increased cooperation?


INDIA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA NEED EACH OTHER

DR ANIT MUKHERJEE — ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Considering the vast distance between them, geography appears to be the biggest impediment to enhancing cooperation between South Korea and Japan, on the one hand, and India, on the other. Nonetheless, across the wider canvas of the Indo-Pacific, these countries need each other to deter and balance China, and to deal with other security concerns.

In terms of India-South Korea relations, there is a tremendous potential for frequent meetings between command-and-control elements, especially between the armies and air forces of both states. Fortunately, naval cooperation between the two is a bit more developed, although, even in this case, there is a need for more table-top, naval, and maritime exercises (especially in anti-submarine warfare). In addition, arms trade (which has been steadily growing over the last few years) and intelligence cooperation are other potential arenas for further cooperation.

Defence ties between India and Japan are at another level thanks to the Quad, Malabar naval exercises (involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and various other multilateral and bilateral forums and exercises. Despite frequent exchanges, however, both militaries have room to work on issues related to enhancing interoperability and maritime security cooperation. Defence trade is not as developed between the two, primarily due to complications and costs on the Japanese side. This is an area of potential cooperation which requires concerted efforts from both countries. In addition, there is tremendous scope for cooperation in terms of sharing military intelligence, especially regarding Maritime Domain Awareness.

Some potential areas for cooperation for both sets of countries can be explored through the Quad working groups. As South Korea shows an increasing willingness to enlarge its strategic space, the Quad could provide a potentially useful forum. Emerging technologies are a particularly promising field, which the US and India have already identified as an area for potential cooperation. India, South Korea, and Japan — either by partnering with other like-minded countries or bilaterally — could explore further cooperation in this sector. Perhaps the best way to take stock of existing cooperation and generate ideas for further cooperation would be to hold more frequent track 1.5 and track 2 events between the respective security communities.


CHINA HAS OPENED UP THE SCOPE FOR MIDDLE POWERS

NAZIA HUSSAIN — ASSOCIATE RESEARCH FELLOW, S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and the major power rivalry in the region have opened up the scope for middle powers to engage in security-oriented cooperation with like-minded countries, both bilaterally and through various minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific. India and Japan have a strong record of defence and security cooperation, particularly in the maritime security domain, participating in joint military exercises such as the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), as well as in the multilateral Malabar exercise.

With South Korea’s new administration under President Yoon Suk-yeol unveiling its Indo-Pacific strategy and adopting a policy shift from ‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘strategic clarity’ amid the growing US-China contest, Seoul now has room to engage with Indo-Pacific democracies such as India and Japan through existing platforms like the Quad Plus framework. Maritime security cooperation remains a priority in the Indo-Pacific strategies of the three countries. In 2022, Japan and South Korea participated for the first time in the India-led MILAN naval exercise aimed at improving counter-piracy capabilities and interoperability.


A SHARED NEED TO COUNTER THREATS

ABHIJIT SINGH — SENIOR FELLOW, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

In recent years, there has been a significant uptick in India’s defence ties with Japan and South Korea. As ‘Special Strategic and Global Partners’ since 2015, New Delhi and Tokyo have sought to invigorate strategic relations with high-level political engagement and deeper defence cooperation. Since 2019, the bilateral 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues have created a conducive environment for military collaboration, aided in no small measure by the following year’s India-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that has enabled the exchange of military supplies and services on a reciprocal basis. To help matters along, maritime cooperation between Quad countries has expanded, with the four-nation Malabar naval exercises (featuring India, Japan, Australia, and the US) displaying greater purpose in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.

India and South Korea have also sought to deepen their strategic collaboration. Since 2019, there have been regular military exchanges between the two countries, with annual 2+2 foreign and defence secretary level dialogues exploring new avenues for strategic cooperation. Regular ministerial-level interactions have provided a further impetus to the strategic partnership, with a whole host of proposals from defence trade and joint warship production to intelligence sharing, cyber, and space cooperation.

This comes at a time when there has been a thaw in tensions between Japan and South Korea. Historically, the two countries have had an uneasy relationship, but recent developments have brought them closer. The war in Ukraine and growing aggression from North Korea have created an imperative for Japan and South Korea to join hands in the pursuit of common interests. Seoul and Tokyo have been willing partners in the US-led coalition to condemn and sanction Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. What makes Japanese and South Korean leaders band together, however, is their shared need to counter North Korea’s nuclear rhetoric and China’s ambitious moves in Asia.

For New Delhi, the warming of relations between Tokyo and Seoul is something to be treasured. Many in India’s strategic establishment believe that a trilateral India-Japan-South Korea defence partnership would help the Indian navy expand its own strategic reach and naval presence in the Pacific — a theatre of growing strategic importance for India. In the domain of defence technology, South Korea and Japan could assist India in developing capabilities to deter China in the Indian Ocean. Indian observers surmise that the United States, the principal power in the Indo-Pacific and a friend of India, Japan, and South Korea, would be supportive of a minilateral arrangement that would help New Delhi expand its regional security footprint.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia.