Whitsun Reef: The next escalation point?

22 March 2021

The late-night announcement by the Philippines raising serious concerns over Chinese Peoples’ Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels anchored at Whitsun Reef since early March 2021 sparks off the annual rise in tensions in the contentious South China Sea. Several official photographs show near-pristine vessels of the 55m and 60m class identified with the maritime militia anchored in line abreast in groups of at least four, reportedly numbering 220 in all, sheltering near the crook of the boomerang-shaped reef. The Philippines noted that the ships were massed at the reef without undertaking fishing activities, though fully lighted and stationary at night, perhaps preparing for some unknown purpose or exercise.

The sheer number of ships in the middle of the open sea has naturally raised urgent questions, as it was obvious that they were not there to fish. Indeed, the condition of the vessels themselves, practically brand new, not bearing cargo, and showing almost no wear and tear indicates that since their commissioning they may not have even been used for fishing at all.

Prelude to the current situation

This is not the first time the PAFMM has been observed operating in Whitsun Reef, which forms the northern edge of the large atoll known as Union Banks. Exactly one year ago, increased activity was noted in the same area, with PAFMM vessels traversing the length of Union Banks to McKennan Reef further down and Johnson South Reef in the southern end. Both host smaller Chinese artificial islands bristling with anti-aircraft weapons, radar domes, communication antennae, and electronic warfare arrays.

Manila must resume its original policy of standing by international law, reinforce its alliance with the US and strategic partnerships with middle powers like Japan and Australia, and deepen friendships with other external parties such as the UK and the EU.

At the time, it was suggested that perhaps the movements were in connection with Chinese commemoration of the violent clash with Vietnam in Johnson South Reef in 1988, resulting in two Vietnamese ships sunk and 64 soldiers killed protecting a Vietnamese flag planted in knee-deep water. China then took over the Johnson South Reef; nearby McKennan Reef, also known as Hughes Reef, was occupied around the same time. Since then, they have been converted into artificial islands measuring 10.9 and 9.6 hectares respectively.

However, last year there were no reports of such an unusually large number of PAFMM vessels at one time in one location. This time, the photographs indicate that China has not been merely passing through but has been using Whitsun Reef as an anchorage or roadstead similar to the way it shelters ships at its larger island bases like Mischief and Subi Reefs. This seems to imply that the number of vessels deployed in the South China Sea, whether PAFMM, China Coast Guard, or PLA Navy, are now so high as to require that much additional space. Or perhaps, the fleet is being rotated and re-positioned among the different safe harbours prior to other activities.

Potential strategic impact

Such vessels will be ready to be called upon to participate in any operations conducted by China, using strategic locations to quickly reach any corner of the South China Sea. Historically, the PAFMM has been instrumental in numerous maritime operations, from surveillance to interference with the passage of US Navy ships to violent clashes with the Vietnamese. The stationing of these vessels across the Spratly Islands could represent the deployment of auxiliary or reserve forces that can be called upon to assert or enforce China’s dominance in the South China Sea. Large numbers of PAFMM vessels could easily hinder or block other nations’ naval vessels well before they reach their intended objectives or areas of operation. Whitsun Reef being added to China’s array of artificial island bases would be a significant escalation and worrisome development. Union Banks is located just below the centre of a strategic triangle formed by China’s air and naval bases on Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs. Existing facilities on Johnson South, Gaven, and McKennan Reef already operate extensive long-range and over-the-horizon surveillance facilities and communications equipment; a new facility may eventually allow the establishment of a central core or principal node for command and control well protected by the three largest military bases.

Consolidating control of Union Banks itself not only provides a medium to long-term opportunity of a protected C4I headquarters on-site but would also weaken Vietnam’s hold over the area. At present, Vietnam has three of its smallest outposts on Union Banks at Sin Cowe Island, Collins Reef, and Landsdowne Reef, all of which could be directly threatened by increased Chinese presence and operations on Union Banks. Stationing a large PAFMM force PAFMM within arms’ reach is a greater threat to Vietnam, especially considering that China reportedly has not previously restrained itself from threatening Vietnam with force in relation to the latter’s petroleum exploration activities.

Concerns for the Philippines

Philippine officials are likely worried that the presence of so many PAFMM ships at Whitsun Reef is a prelude to occupation and reclamation. At this time, no dredging ships have been sighted or reported present yet, only the distinct ‘fishing' vessels that have become a standard and ever-present feature of the contested seascape. This does not warrant complacency, however, as the reclamation of reefs and conversion of artificial islands were always preceded by massive destructive fishing efforts as if to extract whatever valuables there were from the area before burying it with sand and paving it with concrete. If the 220 ships were indeed deployed for actual fishing, they could easily make short work of Whitsun Reef and prepare it for rapid dredging.

Even without dredging activities, however, the use of the area as anchorage itself generates great environmental damage. Anchors most likely crush and latch on to reef structures beneath the waves, and the ship-source emissions and human-generated wastes from inhabitation probably end up concentrated on the reef. Coral reefs are extremely sensitive to any changes in the marine environment. Thus, the quality and sustainability of the reef is probably being reduced by the presence of so many ships at the same time. This is bad news for fishermen, especially Filipino fishermen who have fished Union Banks for decades. Whether through destruction of the reef or exclusion by China, they may be about to lose another valuable fishing ground.

Duterte’s diplomatic missteps

Even without speculation, one thing is clear: China’s extended presence at Whitsun Reef through continuous anchorage can be a variation of the 'Scarborough Shoal model' whereby China took control of a maritime feature in the open sea through continuous maritime presence and establishment of exclusionary measures against non-Chinese vessels. For the Philippines, it would be another serious blow to its fracturing maritime jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea.

If China does not draw down the PAFMM presence and then enforces its exclusionary measures against Filipino fishermen who have been using Union Banks as a fishing ground for decades, Whitsun Reef will become President Duterte’s Scarborough Shoal. Unlike the experience of his predecessor, who lost control over Scarborough Shoal after a prolonged standoff, Duterte’s loss of control will be attributed to his overly accommodating and prone posturing over the West Philippine Sea since 2016. Last year, Duterte stated that China was in “possession” of the South China Sea and underscored his position that it was futile to act against it. This is all the signal China needs to confirm his real lack of resolve. Nearly five years of downplaying Chinese moves and kowtowing to Chinese positions in the contested maritime region have enabled Beijing to create a fait accompli such as turning Whitsun Reef into an anchorage.

The reactionary and abstract nature of diplomatic protests and the perfunctory responses to placate the public have greatly limited the effectiveness of diplomacy, which also requires correct timing. The nearly constant attacks on allies and friends who could lend diplomatic support have left the Philippines relatively isolated and lacking committed international backing. Furthermore, restraints upon external defence and law enforcement activities provided all the openings and freedom China needed to advance and expand further and faster in the South China Sea. With the Duterte Administration’s term ending next year and the Philippines without strong coordinative linkages and mutually shared goals and interests with other countries, the time is ripe for China to make another significant move in the region with minimal political costs.

The way to address this potential crisis is for the Duterte Administration to fully dispense with its over-accommodation of China in the South China Sea. Manila must resume its original policy of standing by international law, reinforce its alliance with the US and strategic partnerships with middle powers like Japan and Australia, and deepen friendships with other external parties such as the UK and the EU. It must seriously engage with other Southeast Asian claimants within ASEAN to work out a proper and coordinated policy on the South China Sea based on serious and deliberate actions and mutual interests, notwithstanding the persistence of intra-ASEAN differences.

Most importantly, the Philippines must abandon its individualist, defeatist, and clientelist mind-set, and mercenary attitude toward geopolitics, hoping China will reciprocate with great favours and unrestricted benevolence. It must realise that an independent foreign policy is not a simplistic game of playing favourites and taking sides between the most powerful, but a visionary and long-term strategy that continuously creates leverage to keep from being totally powerless.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Jay L. Batongbacal is the Executive Associate Dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law and concurrently Director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs & Law of the Sea. He has advanced degrees in maritime affairs and has been doing research on the South China Sea disputes since the late 1990s. He may be reached by email here or here. Image credit: Wikipedia.