Enormous setbacks to Myanmar’s democracy: The path forward examined
Enormous Setbacks to Myanmar’s Democracy: The path forward examined
WRITTEN BY HUNTER MARSTON
4 February 2021
In the pre-dawn hours of Monday, 1 February, before Myanmar’s Lower House of Parliament could convene as expected the same day, security forces detained at least 26 political leaders, chief ministers, ministers of parliament, and activists. Those detained include State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other prominent elected officials of the civilian government.
Around the same time as these arrests, phone and internet service were shut off in the capital Naypyidaw, and mobile networks started to go down in Yangon as well, though WiFi was operational throughout the day. Banks were reportedly closed throughout the country, and there were long lines for ATMs in Yangon, which were rumoured to shut down, though, for the most part, ordinary people went about their business as usual.
On Wednesday, the Myanmar police (which report to the military, not civilian authorities) charged Aung San Suu Kyi with violating the Export and Import Law for allegedly possessing illegal walkie-talkies. President Win Myint is facing similarly erroneous charges for violating the Natural Disaster Management Law by waving to supporters during the campaign period in violation of COVID-19 restrictions. The military has already announced a new cabinet with many familiar faces from the previous government of the military-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing has pledged to hold “free and fair” elections after which it will transfer power to the appropriate party.
Why now?
The big question on everyone’s mind is why now? The military had initially caused concern about possible political instability when it pressed the opposition USDP party’s claims of electoral fraud following the overwhelming victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in November elections. Military spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun then raised alarm bells when he refused to rule out the possibility of a coup in a press conference on Tuesday, 26 January. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing made vague threats that the military might have to “revoke the Constitution” if the law was not upheld.
Kurt Campbell, who Biden named Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, was an integral architect of the Obama administration’s “opening to Burma”. He will likely have some sleepless nights once again designing US Myanmar policy. It is unclear what options Washington now has left beyond widening sanctions against the military.
However, the military (or Tatmadaw as it is known in Burmese) appeared to walk back those threats on Saturday when it issued a statement promising to respect the constitution and uphold rule of law, asserting that the media has misrepresented Min Aung Hlaing’s previous remarks. There were rumours on Sunday that negotiations between the military and civilian government were not going well, which quickly proved to be correct in the dramatic events that unfolded the next day.
In a statement shortly after the nationwide arrests, the military emphasised that it had requested the Union Election Commission to review its claims of election fraud and urged the President to convene the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), the highest decision-making body in the country. It furthermore stated in an announcement broadcast on national television that Vice President U Myint Swe would serve as Interim President and had agreed to transfer all political power to Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, who would serve for one year.
It is difficult to determine whether the claims of electoral fraud loom larger than the behind-the-scenes power struggle between the Commander-in-Chief and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, or if they were merely a pretext for the military coup. Credible sources have told the author that the military took issue with Aung San Suu Kyi’s creation of the State Counsellor position in 2016 as a convenient workaround since she is constitutionally barred from holding the office of president due to her foreign spouse and two children. Other Myanmar experts speculate that Min Aung Hlaing may have held personal ambitions to become president himself. The Senior General is legally required to retire from the role of Commander-in-Chief when he turns 65 in July.
Perhaps sensing his time was drawing to a close and calculating that he had no other legitimate avenue to the presidency, the general decided to launch a coup to secure the reins of power by force. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the military has couched its seizure of power as an attempt to defend the 2008 Constitution, which it drafted to secure its own broad political interests. The particular clauses that the military has cited as a pretext to justify its coup de force, Sections 417 and 418, expressly grant the president the power, “after coordinating with the National Defence and Security Council”, to declare a state of emergency, and it is the president’s power (not the Commander-in-Chief’s) to transfer power to the Commander-in-Chief. In any event, it seems clear that the military has little regard for the letter of the law and seeks to rule by armed force.
Near-term consequences
Myanmar people are bracing for demonstrations, even as ordinary activity took place in downtown Yangon throughout the week, with the markets only slightly more crowded compared to an average day. Still, Myanmar analysts expect citizens to rally in support of their champion Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains overwhelmingly popular across the country despite (ironically) defending the military against charges of crimes against humanity, perpetrated against the Rohingya Muslim minority in 2016 and 2017, before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
It is unclear how the current struggle will play out, but the Tatmadaw appears determined to hang onto power for the near term and was clearly prepared for a popular backlash against the coup by deploying troops on the streets of Yangon and Naypyidaw. The NLD for its part urged its followers “not to respond rashly” in a statement from party spokesperson Myo Nyunt. However, an ensuing statement attributed to Aung San Suu Kyi encouraged supporters “not to accept” the military takeover and “to protest against the coup”.
Foreign governments around the world have reacted with alarm and expressed grave concern regarding the military’s power play. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on the military to “reverse these actions immediately” by releasing the detained political leaders and respecting the outcome of Myanmar’s November election. White House Spokesperson Jen Psaki declared that Washington “opposes any attempt to alter the outcome of recent elections or impede Myanmar’s democratic transition, and will take action against those responsible if these steps are not reversed”. Analysts expect the Biden administration to respond with targeted sanctions in coordination with allies and partners in an attempt to strike a balance that maintains leverage over the Tatmadaw.
Long-term repercussions
In the longer term, this week’s coup represents a profound setback for Myanmar’s democratic aspirations and unrealised political reforms. After successfully holding two multiparty elections in 2015 and 2020 (in addition to the 2010 election tightly controlled by the military and its proxy party the Union Solidarity and Development Party), the country had begun to feel somewhat comfortable with its tentative progress. That is not to say Myanmar people ever ceased living in fear or fully discounted the possibility of a coup after so many had grown up or lived through decades of repressive military dictatorship under the previous regime.
The response of the international community notwithstanding, the current political upheaval is likely to depress foreign direct investment and trade, further slowing Myanmar’s sluggish economic progress in the wake of an already tedious COVID response. International sanctions, while most likely to target the military rather than resume broad-based punitive measures against the entire country (widely regarded as counterproductive), have failed to influence the Tatmadaw’s strategic calculus in the past. It seems fairly certain that the stubborn military brass, which regards itself as the defenders of the country’s sovereignty from both internal and external threats, will cling onto power with little regard for international opprobrium or domestic outcry. The military has shown little regard for the lives of Myanmar’s citizens in the past.
Regional repercussions
The broader regional implications are equally concerning. Myanmar’s neighbourhood has experienced significant democratic backsliding in recent years, with Cambodia’s Hun Sen embracing increasingly authoritarian tactics to suppress the opposition and neighbouring Thailand mired in military misrule. Perhaps the generals in Naypyidaw have gambled that the international community will begrudgingly accept the coup as a fait accompli and deem that it is in their best interest to retain influence with the new leaders, as the world responded to Thailand’s 2014 coup with ambivalence and muted outcry. After all, under Donald Trump’s presidency, Washington made efforts to rebuild ties with the military government in Bangkok, and even kept an open channel with Hun Sen’s Cambodia. It would be hypocritical of Washington to treat Myanmar differently.
Yet Myanmar has always been a different case. Largely cut off from US geostrategic concerns and its security and trade priorities in East Asia, Myanmar was one place where Washington traditionally put values of democracy and human rights first. The Biden administration signalled early on that it would emphasise the role of US values in its foreign policy. But Myanmar presents an early — and unwanted — challenge for his national security team. Kurt Campbell, who Biden named Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, was an integral architect of the Obama administration’s “opening to Burma”. He will likely have some sleepless nights once again designing US Myanmar policy. It is unclear what options Washington now has left beyond widening sanctions against the military.
One potential card that Washington should not ignore is the fact that the Myanmar military and US policymakers both distrust China’s intentions. Despite Aung San Suu Kyi’s reliance on Beijing for diplomatic protection at the United Nations and Chinese investment for major infrastructure projects and stimulating much-needed economic growth in Myanmar, the generals remain wary of Beijing’s strategic designs, especially the Chinese role in Myanmar’s internal ceasefire negotiations with ethnic armed groups.
Though the Biden administration will be loathe to engage with the generals in light of this week’s events, it could potentially use this mutual distrust to its advantage, while still promoting US values of democracy and human rights. Ultimately it will be a precarious balance to strike, but Washington should consider all options on its table at the moment in order to facilitate Myanmar’s return to a democratic path.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Hunter Marston is a PhD candidate in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs Department of International Relations at the Australian National University and has written about Southeast Asia in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. Image credit: Flickr/Jack Szwergold