Cope North 2022: Deepening security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

4 March 2022

In February 2022, the US, Australia, and Japan participated in the Cope North military exercises across Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Described as the US Pacific Air Forces' ‘largest multilateral exercise’, the trilateral forces jointly responded to a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) training scenario over 16 days. The exercise also included aerial combat training, with more than 2,000 sorties.

Around 1,000 personnel combined from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Koku-Jieitai (Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or JASDF) trained alongside more than 2,500 US military personnel. The exercise revealed two of the key security challenges facing the maritime Indo-Pacific: natural and humanitarian disasters, which are likely to be more pronounced due to climate change, and strategic competition provoked by the rising influence of China. It also reflects the US’ strategy of building capability and interoperability among its allies and partners to manage these emergent security challenges.

Deepening security cooperation with allies and partners

One of the Biden administration’s goals in the Indo-Pacific is to work in an aligned manner with its allies and partners in the region, and for its allies to deepen their relationships with each other. Originally a bilateral exercise that began in 1978 between Japanese and American aircraft and crew in Misawa, Japan, Cope North moved to Guam in 1999 and has been joined by Australia since 2012. Exercises such as Cope North reflect key features of Indo-Pacific security dynamics: the growing preference for trilateral and minilateral cooperation and joint military exercises, often involving the US working alongside more than one ally or partner. The contested oceans of East Asia, for example, are becoming increasingly congested with warships from states conducting joint naval drills.

Both the 2022 Cope North exercise and the Tonga example highlight concerns that hard and soft security are not so easily distinguishable.

Focused on involving air and ground forces, the annual joint field training exercises are designed to strengthen regional partnerships and interoperability through training with regional allies and partners, often (but not always) trilaterally with Japan and Australia. This allows the forces to practice operations in a controlled environment in preparation for real-life operations. The pursuit of interoperability — meaning the ability of military forces, systems or units to conduct joint operations — brings together capabilities in a ‘larger combined force’.

This is part of a broader trend towards developing a networked security architecture, which was a feature of the Obama administration’s approach to Asia-Pacific. This approach sought to reduce alliance asymmetry by encouraging the ‘spokes’ in the US-centred ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system to increase their interoperability and joint capacity. The Biden administration appears to be following a similar path in emphasising the interrelated web of alliances and partnerships. Building collective capacity with allies and partners to advance a ‘free and open’ region is at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific strategy announced last month. It places integrated deterrence at the ‘cornerstone’ of its approach to bolstering security in the Indo-Pacific.

A rather nebulous concept, integrated deterrence may very broadly be defined as building collective capacity to deter and counter aggression, or in the words of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “using every military and non-military tool in our toolbox in lockstep with our allies and partners”. The two key US allies of the Cope North exercise, Australia and Japan, have deepened their ‘special strategic partnership’ over recent years, most clearly demonstrated by the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in January 2022, providing for joint training, military and disaster relief operations and contributing to the ‘peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region’. However, these deepening relationships may also reflect the loss of US primacy, as allies and partners seek to increase their interoperability to deal with the challenges presented by China’s rise.

The relationship between HADR and strategic competition

The exercise also highlights the strategic significance of the Western Pacific region. The so-called ‘second island chain’ is important to the US defence posture in Asia. In this vast maritime domain, the US has territories — Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands — as well as the unique Compact of Free Association with Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Reflecting the strategic environment, the training scenarios occurred “across complex island terrain” to bolster responses to natural and humanitarian disasters, which are only to become more likely as the Pacific feels the impact of climate change. However, for the first time, the HADR scenario involved an “escalating threat environment” as part of the exercise, highlighting its dual purpose in responding to the two distinct but interrelated security challenges of natural disasters and strategic competition.

While focused on HADR, such a combining of capabilities into a larger force may have broader implications for defence cooperation and preparing for other crises that might arise. One report suggested it was a training exercise in deterring a potential missile strike against US forward bases. Brigadier General Jeremy T. Sloane was quoted in one news report as telling an Air Force Association event that “China and Russia can increasingly hold overseas US bases at risk”. On Twitter, US Strategic Command declared that Cope North enhances Integrated Deterrence and a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, reflecting applications beyond natural and humanitarian disaster relief.

HADR can get tied up in power politics as a form of rivalry by stealth. The security challenges of natural disaster and strategic competition were recently linked during the eruption of an underwater volcano near the island nation of Tonga. Australia coordinated its assistance with Japan and the United States, as well as France and New Zealand, Fiji, and the United Kingdom. The Quad — comprising the Cope North participants plus India — has also sought to emphasise ‘soft security’ such as HADR to shift the narrative that it is aimed exclusively at countering China. This also reflects the original Quad’s antecedents when it developed as a way of coordinating HADR response following the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

According to Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, “since 2004, when we collaborated in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, Quad partners have continued to respond quickly and effectively to natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific”, referencing Australia’s assistance to Tonga. The RAN’s flagship HMAS Adelaide — one of two Landing Helicopter Docks in the Australian fleet — travelled to Tonga to respond to the disaster but was beset by a COVID outbreak and stranded for some time due to a total blackout from power failures, including the emergency back-up supply. This precipitated concerns that such issues in delivering HADR could open the door for China to provide support. Indeed, one news headline stated that “China’s navy comes to the rescue amid Australia’s huge failure”, as China’s Ministry of National Defence announced that its amphibious assault ship Wuzhishan and supply ship Chaganhu would travel to Tonga for disaster relief.

While Australian officials publicly declared that disaster relief was not a competition, at the end of January, privately it was reportedly acknowledged that the situation highlighted the strategic tussle for influence in the region. This example underscores how strategic competition can become linked with disaster response as states scramble for influence among the island states of the Pacific. Both the 2022 Cope North exercise and the Tonga example highlight concerns that hard and soft security are not so easily distinguishable. Through such exercises, militaries are increasing their capacities to work together across a range of traditional and non-traditional security challenges, reflecting the complexity of the contemporary threat landscape across the Indo-Pacific.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Bec Strating is Director of La Trobe Asia and an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University. Image credit: Wikimedia.