Cooperation against ISIS is low-hanging fruit for a stronger Indo-Pacific

8 February 2021

Until today, the April 2019 Easter bombings in Sri Lanka which targeted luxury hotels along with churches in the capital city of Colombo remains the most violent act of terrorism committed under the umbrella of the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS, or Daesh in Arabic). The terror strike killed more than 250 people and was claimed by ISIS through its online propaganda channels. However, it still remains unclear as to what role ISIS itself played, (directly or indirectly) and how a country not even on the map for ISIS-related terrorism became its largest victim?

The answer to the above questions is perhaps not that difficult to ascertain. While ISIS grew in prominence, geographically, financially and militarily in Iraq and Syria (between 2014-17) its ideology travelled via well designed and even better-executed propaganda disseminated through the internet, particularly mainstream social media platforms. One of the first major pro-ISIS ecosystems to pop up outside of the Middle East was in the Philippines.

The battles for territory, recognition and influence

In 2016, a Philippines-based jihadist group — a breakaway from the Abu Sayyaf group — announced its allegiance (baya) to the then ISIS caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, along with other groups from neighbouring Indonesia. For the Philippines, like in many other places, pre-existing insurgencies co-opted the ISIS brand giving them significant and immediate branding, in addition to space within the international discourse. By 2017, the Philippines had declared victory against Abu Sayyaf, taking back the besieged region of Marawi on the southern island of Mindanao which saw large-scale, urban house-to-house combat between the Filipino military and hundreds of pro-ISIS fighters. The gravity of the situation was highlighted by the fact that India donated $500,000 to Manila to aid its fight against ISIS.

While ISIS continues to operate as an insurgency in the Middle East, its online footprint is (visibly) evolving, highlighted by the extensive, multi-lingual release of propaganda material referencing operations in multiple Southeast Asian and South Asian languages.

Over the past two years, while ISIS has disintegrated geographically, the group has moved back to its erstwhile insurgency roots. Attacks on churches perpetrated by pro-ISIS entities or individuals have taken place regularly both in the Philippines and Indonesia. The January 2019 attack on a church in Jolo, Sulu, in the Philippines, claimed by ISIS via its quasi-official Amaq News agency was not the first time that particular church had been attacked. In its pre-ISIS days, under the Abu Sayyaf banner, the church was also attacked in 2010 and 2013, showcasing the common ideology that exists between ISIS and localised Islamist groups and their co-option of the ISIS brand — more than ideology — to arguably gain both potential financial assistance and perhaps, more importantly, heightened prominence within regional jihadist ecosystems.

A busy theatre, filled with actors

From IS Khorasan in Afghanistan to the 2016 attacks in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the 2019 attacks in Sri Lanka and ISIS ecosystems in the Philippines and other neighbouring regions, the threat an expansive ISIS ideology poses to Asian security does not often garner the debate it demands. As Asia, once again, prepares to become the theatre for a potential new power competition between the US and China — which sees an increasingly pensive Beijing acting out from its borders with India to aggressive posturing around Taiwan — counterterrorism can become a driving common aim for the newer quasi-institutional ecosystems such as the ‘Quad’ and older multilateral orders such as the ASEAN to find common working spaces to build support, rapport and confidence. Here, cooperation in the counterterrorism space, specifically against ISIS ideologies and ecosystems should be seen as low-hanging fruit for all like-minded players in the region to converge around.

Counterterrorism as a harbinger of multilateral ecosystems, which includes states that may have diverging foreign policies and interests, has been tried before as a political tool for long-term aims. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes both India and Pakistan, has a strong counter-terror component despite Pakistan’s position as a state-sponsor of terrorism against India. New Delhi allowed this anomaly to take place as part of the sanctity of the SCO, and its larger interests regarding its relations with both Moscow and Beijing. As multilaterals and now ‘minilaterals’ become the toast of Asia's hectic diplomacy season, cooperation against global threats such as ISIS makes for a good starting point.

The value of a holistic approach

The counterterror cooperation angle does not have to be led by kinetic options, thereby giving more space for debate, as is the case for Indo-Pacific nations. As expected, differences have arisen between ASEAN and the ‘Quad’ grouping, with national and regional interests for individual nations often taking precedence. Cooperation in cybersecurity, deradicalisation initiatives, counter-terror information, intelligence and sharing best practices in pushing back against radicalisation within cultures and societies are all opportunities for cooperation with relatively low risk. Advancing these ideas — the democratisation of the debates around counterterrorism and radical extremism from being those that are exclusively aimed at Islamists will also help make cooperation in this sphere easier. For example, the inclusion of far-right radicalisation from recent experiences in Singapore to right-wing nationalism and right-wing extremism in Asia will enhance the discourse around countering violent extremism so it can be approached in a more holistic manner.

Even in a cooperative architecture such as those suggested above, China is expected to remain an outlier. Interestingly, over the past few years, most ISIS narratives have excluded China, despite Beijing’s much-criticised and condemnable clampdown on Uyghur Muslims. Counterterrorism scholar Elliot Stewart recently raised this issue, highlighting the fact that ISIS has been fairly quiet about the plight of the Uyghurs since 2017, seeing China as a counter to the US, i.e. an ‘enemy’s enemy’. Beijing has, as per available evidence, decided on a largely solo approach toward tackling its counter-terror narratives. This is illustrated by the recent break up of a Chinese spy ring in Afghanistan which was reportedly in contact with the Haqqani Network — looking to push back against Uyghur militancy in Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor — which enjoys a 76-kilometre long border with China. The recent removal of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from US terror listings — one of the many final decisions of the Trump administration — also widened the gap in counter-terror narratives between China and the US, and, which, in turn, will see differences in how Beijing views terrorism and its global response in Asia.

Unity derived from a common purpose

The idea that the so-called Islamic State has been defeated is arguably true, but only from a geographical standpoint. While ISIS continues to operate as an insurgency in the Middle East, its online footprint is (visibly) evolving, highlighted by the extensive, multi-lingual release of propaganda material referencing operations in multiple Southeast Asian and South Asian languages. The growing number of geopolitical alliances across the Indo-Pacific have an unquestionable battle against ISIS and its ideologies while simultaneously seeking to navigate differences and gaps in a new Asian order, and the future of China and US relations. A common target — such as ISIS — will only strengthen and build security cooperation and a common strategic agora in the Indo-Pacific and aid the development of a future geopolitical architecture which can be mutually beneficial for all like-minded participating nations.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Kabir Taneja is a Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. He is the author of ‘The ISIS Peril: The World’s Most Feared Terror Group and its Shadow on South Asia’ (Penguin Viking 2019). Image credit: Wikimedia.