Southeast Asia's naval build up in the post-COVID era: A near-term assessment
Southeast Asia's naval builD up in the post-COVID era: A
near-term assessment
WRITTEN BY COLLIN KOH
9 February 2021
If the rosy predictions made last year do come to fruition in the coming months, countries across the Indo-Pacific may start to see initial signs of economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic this year. That’s a big ‘if’ though — emerging more virulent strains and uneven international access to vaccines coupled with the varying impact of the contagion upon economies could put paid to an optimistic post-pandemic outlook for 2021.
As governments scramble to contain the fallout from COVID-19, military spending has become less palatable in the eyes of the public. It simply isn’t politically wise, even from an optics point of view, to bang the gong on spending more money procuring shiny weapons when the people expect governments to direct scarce state resources towards beefing up public healthcare, procuring vaccines, and enhancing social assistance.
Riding on a trajectory of economic recovery, however, Beijing has already reinvigorated its naval modernisation programmes with a series of sea trials for newbuilds (and more in the pipeline). Japan is on the cusp of enacting yet another record defence budget and has also launched a new submarine and light frigate last year. South Korea is forging ahead with its naval programmes, including plans for a light aircraft carrier. India, amongst various items on its naval wish-list, is pressing for a third aircraft carrier.
For Southeast Asian countries that also operate coastguards, now is the time to review the need for navies to relinquish certain tasks that coastguards might perform more effectively. This is especially the case where capacity (quantity) is more critical than having the most hi-tech warships bristling with weapons performing constabulary missions that simply require a presence.
The threat imperatives underpinning their buildups are pretty clear. China primarily perceives an American military threat to its core interests, such as Taiwan. Japan is watching the growing Chinese and North Korean threats with consternation. South Korea is as usual primarily fixated on the traditional threat up north. Meanwhile, India, smarting from the recent and still ongoing border row with China, is increasingly wary of a Sino-Pakistani military nexus in a two-front conflict.
Southeast Asia ‘small boys’ league
Not many countries in the Indo-Pacific can emulate what these major regional players can do. Southeast Asia, smack in the middle of the Indo-Pacific confluence, can barely find the sweet spot to reconcile the competing needs of persisting with naval programmes and coping with pandemic-induced socioeconomic and public health imperatives.
It is important to view this in context. Southeast Asian countries devoted the bulk of their energies during the post-colonial Cold War decades towards socioeconomic development that underpinned the ruling elites’ domestic political legitimacy. The prevailing security environment back then necessitated emphasising mainly land-based military programmes. Southeast Asia’s ‘naval renaissance’ came in the 1990s, as threat assessments shifted from land to maritime domains in the post-Cold War era. There were two unwelcome interregnums following the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and the global economic recession in 2008. But neither economic crisis was as bad as the pandemic-induced situation Southeast Asian countries face at present.
The scale and extent of COVID-19’s economic fallout is unprecedented, and bear potentially far-reaching ramifications. It is not only necessary to contain the pandemic and promote recovery, but also to respond adequately to evolving threats in the maritime domain. Like many of their counterparts worldwide, Southeast Asian navies channelled their daily routine operations towards border surveillance and interdiction of cross-border illicit activities such as smuggling as part of the pandemic containment efforts. These add to varying concerns about other maritime threats as well, for instance, terrorism, piracy and sea robbery, and not least for some of the Southeast Asian countries, the South China Sea disputes. These operational requirements place inordinate strain on the already limited capacities of several Southeast Asian navies. While it may be tempting to anticipate an unimpeded continuation of naval programmes, it would be mistaken to do so under current circumstances.
Tightening pockets
Southeast Asian navies will find their pockets tightened even as they do their part in pandemic containment. New acquisition programmes will be difficult to get off the ground, even if there might be pressing maritime threats that can justify major new purchases.
For example, while the Philippine Navy is reaping dividends from already implemented and funded pre-pandemic programmes, it is unlikely to obtain funds to purchase many newbuilds on its wish-list for now — such as submarines. In the interim, it will have to consider second-hand assets at the very least. The Royal Thai Navy has already deferred the purchase of second and third submarines from China amid a public backlash. In view of the current domestic political climate and COVID-19 situation, Bangkok may remain hamstrung for a while when it comes to pursuing major naval programmes.
Asian Defence and Security (ADAS) Trade Show 2018 at the World Trade Centre in Pasay, Metro Manila. Image credit: Wikimedia
To circumvent the funding challenge, countries may look for alternative financing such as foreign credit schemes. Indonesia reportedly sought foreign credit to fund its military modernisation programme to help achieve as many objectives outlined under the Minimum Essential Force goals by 2024 as possible. However, the nagging question would be whether it is fiscally prudent to incur more national debts when the government is already facing a widening budget deficit as a result of higher expenditure contrasted with reduced earnings amidst the pandemic. Domestic public sentiment against the government taking on more debt to finance military purchases instead of public healthcare and social assistance could provoke some soul-searching in Jakarta. And Indonesia is not the only country facing this predicament.
In view of the uncertain economic outlook amidst an evolving global pandemic, and faced with the need to sustain daily routine maritime defence and security operations, Southeast Asian navies are expected to do more with less. This is especially the case for several countries in the region that imposed pandemic-related lockdowns and beefed-up border security to stem the importation of infections and prevent the smuggling of healthcare-related commodities. The funding climate will also hit their coastguard counterparts, probably more so given they have always been given less priority in the allocation of funds.
In the near-term, while it is still possible that pre-pandemic funded naval programmes will continue to be implemented, subject to how COVID-19 will impact project schedules, new future acquisitions may slow down in Southeast Asia. Instead, more emphasis could be devoted to maintaining existing capacities for routine operations and training purposes. Already struggling with shortfalls in certain areas, it’s possible Southeast Asian navies may also cut back on their involvement in regional and international defence diplomacy activities in favour of husbanding scarce resources for more pressing operational needs.
Silver-lining over the horizon?
COVID-19 has been a massive inconvenience for Southeast Asian navies. It threw a spanner in the works for new acquisition programmes currently in the pipeline, intensified their operational tempo for pandemic-related border security tasks, and led to necessary but cumbersome health protocols. But it also provides an opportunity for them to take a closer look into areas that have thus far avoided serious examination.
For instance, this is a good time to reassess the future needs of force structure and operations — can navies continue business-as-usual trying to be the handmaiden of every sundry item down the list of missions? If the concerned navy is the sole maritime security institution then this may have been a non-starter. But for Southeast Asian countries that also operate coastguards, now is the time to review the need for navies to relinquish certain tasks that coastguards might perform more effectively. This is especially the case where capacity (quantity) is more critical than having the most hi-tech warships bristling with weapons performing constabulary missions that simply require a presence.
Certain Southeast Asian countries have started working on inter-agency coordination and cooperation between navies and their civilian counterparts. Malaysia, for example, has implemented Operation Benteng that is overseen by the National Task Force made up of multiple government agencies including the navy and coastguard. The pandemic exigency and resource constraints faced by each institution amplify the necessity of such efforts, including information-sharing, intelligence exchange, and resource-pooling. Ameliorating ‘stovepipes’ and ‘turf wars’ between agencies is arguably more crucial than getting the best technical tools for promoting better maritime domain awareness and response.
Finally, the post-pandemic funding climate is going to be even more precarious for navies in the near-term. Past and recent instances of acquisition programmes being delayed, or plagued with non-delivery per schedule, do not bode well for the future of navies. Therefore, appropriate policies are required to ensure ‘smarter’ future acquisitions that can be overseen by proper governance structures to avoid wastage and duplication of efforts. This could result in a more efficacious and sustainable implementation of acquisition as well as maintenance, repairs and overhaul programmes.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Collin Koh is research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet