Australia’s civil maritime security strategy may not be so 'civil'

14 June 2022

While maritime security has been on the political agenda in Canberra for many years, issues concerning the effect of China’s rising sea power on Australia’s national security have become more prominent recently. In April 2022, the Department of Home Affairs released a new document, titled “Australian Government Civil Maritime Security Strategy” (AGCMSS). Although the strategy was proposed before the federal election in May, it is likely to remain similar under the new government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. This was not the first time that Canberra proposed a maritime strategy. The Australian government has published numerous official documents from various departments responding to maritime security over the past 20 years. However, these have lacked a common, all-encompassing definition for maritime security within the government.

Defining maritime security

The term “civil maritime security” is also not new. Two years ago, the Maritime Border Command Canberra published the “Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements” (GAMSA), where the term was introduced. According to David Letts, an associate professor at the Australian National University, this was noteworthy because “it indicates that in Australia’s case there is a clear distinction between ‘civil’ maritime security and ‘other’ types of maritime security that are referenced in other government publications”. The GAMSA outlined eight categories of ‘civil’ maritime security threats: unauthorised maritime arrivals; maritime terrorism; prohibited imports and exports; illegal exploitation of natural resources; piracy; robbery or violence at sea; illegal activity in protected areas; compromise to biosecurity; and marine pollution. However, the GAMSA only focused on highlighting civil maritime security threats; it did not provide a precise definition of the term.

Information sharing is even more difficult for states when it involves cooperating with non-state actors because they are cautious about the connections companies and individuals may have with other states.

In contrast, the more recent AGCMSS offers a definition. As stated in the strategic framework, “civil maritime security advances and protects Australia’s interests by actively managing non-military risks to Australia and Australia’s maritime domain”. Here, the Australian government highlights the “non-military” nature of civil maritime security to distinguish it from other maritime security threats. In fact, the AGCMSS emphasises that “civil maritime security is but one component of Australia’s overall maritime arrangements… [which] also comprise military operations and maritime safety”.

The introduction of a civil maritime security strategy could be the Australian government’s attempt to shift away from traditional agendas on maritime security, such as naval warfare and maritime territory protection. Instead of adopting the poorly defined term “non-traditional” maritime security, it suggests that Canberra is more interested in maritime security issues that are of greater concern to citizens and the private sectors, such as tourism, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and, most importantly, climate change.

A state-centric approach to civil maritime security

The AGCMSS includes little discussion about naval operations or the role of the navy in maritime security. Nevertheless, while stressing the “civil” dimension of maritime security, some of the objectives in the paper are still related to national security or foreign policy. In fact, the vision outlined at the beginning of the AGCMSS has signalled this problem, as it seeks to “advance and protect Australia’s interests through strong, integrated and adaptive national civil maritime security”. It is unclear whether the Australian government aims to discuss national security or civil security in this maritime strategy.

For instance, one of the priority actions stated in the AGCMSS to address “Objective 1: uphold Australia’s sovereignty, freedom of navigation and maritime trade” is to “maintain a strong strategic presence…to advance and protect [Australia’s] sovereignty and sovereign rights”. When discussing how to “strengthen relationships within the region”, it upholds the importance of the Australian government in increasing “international partnerships, capacity building and leveraging soft power capabilities”. In addition, the paper also mentions threats such as foreign interference and border control, which are issues that should be addressed by national security. Thus, the role of the state is the key focus of the AGCMSS. This is not surprising given that the AGCMSS is a government policy document.

One takeaway from the AGCMSS is that the Australian government has considered the complexity of maritime security and has suggested how different departments could interact to address particular issues. The appendix of the AGCMSS lists policy areas in maritime security and the corresponding actors within the government. The Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade are included in most policy areas. Unfortunately, the document does not propose the leading departments in each policy area. This can potentially become an institutional problem because the experience of other countries in addressing complicated maritime security shows that domestic agencies may compete for political resources creating more complexity and inefficiency in maritime management.

The difficulties of going beyond state actors

Still, maritime security involves more than coordination between government departments. As suggested by Professor Christian Bueger and Professor Timothy Edmunds, the two leading scholars in maritime security studies, contemporary maritime security issues do not only involve a range of “national partners, but also other non-state actors, including shipping companies, private military and security companies, fishing communities and other substate groups”. The AGCMSS does suggest the need for a “holistic national approach to civil maritime security” and engagement with industries and other participants in the maritime domain, but actual policy action is still rather limited. Regarding “Objective 3: protect Australia’s natural maritime resources” and “Objective 4: protect users of Australia’s maritime domain”, the government not only functions as a coordinator of national policy, but it can also consult or even cooperate with private enterprises in providing security for their businesses and resources.

The emphasis on state actors is relatively common in addressing maritime security. Primarily, sharing of information and data has been the main obstacle to involving non-state actors. Because the ocean is still a relatively unknown region to humans, most countries regard data collected from the sea as a valuable asset. Their unwillingness to share this data with other states has hindered trans-national cooperation in maritime security. Information sharing is even more difficult for states when it involves cooperating with non-state actors because they are cautious about the connections companies and individuals may have with other states. This also partially explains why foreign interference has been included in the AGCMSS, as the Australian government is concerned about national intelligence in maritime security. In particular, China, as Australia’s security concern in the region, has been pursuing greater influence in the Indo-Pacific through non-state maritime activities, such as fishing and the purchase of commercial ports. Therefore, the AGCMSS mentions Australia’s interest in protecting maritime infrastructure, and the marine environment, culture and heritage, which needs to be addressed by the government instead of non-state actors.

Overall, the recent civil maritime security strategy suggested by Canberra remains a state-centric approach to maritime security. It reflects the difficulty of addressing maritime security and the challenge of a national government considering policy actions beyond the role of state actors. Still, it indicates that countries are increasingly likely to focus on non-military maritime security problems, which will be one of the main agendas of ocean governance in this century.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Edward Sing Yue Chan is a Postdoctoral Fellow in China Studies at the Australian Centre on China in the World, the Australian National University. His research focuses on China’s foreign policy, East Asian security, and maritime security. Image credit: Wikipedia.