Australia, China and the South Pacific
Australia, China and the South Pacific
WRITTEN BY MELISSA CONLEY TYLER AND PRAVIN SILVA
13 May 2020
Last month in Vanuatu, a Royal Australian Air Force plane delivering aid was forced to turn back in mid-air and make a 2,000-kilometre trip home after discovering that a Chinese plane carrying medical equipment was occupying the tarmac at Port Vila airport. While it is unclear how this incident occurred, it neatly illustrates the concern that has arisen in Australia’s strategic community regarding growing Chinese influence in the Pacific.
Australia’s closest neighbours, the island nations of the South Pacific, have emerged as a flashpoint for competition for influence. The region has long been viewed by Australia as part of its sphere of influence, with the prospect of a rising China wielding increased influence being viewed with concern.
Australia’s historical role in the South Pacific
One of Australia’s greatest strategic priorities from the colonial period until the mid-20th century was maintaining British and then Australian control over nearby islands to the east and north, to prevent them being from being taken by a potentially hostile power such as France, Germany or Japan.
But by the 1960s, fears of a return to militarism in Japan had dissipated and the perceived threat from China began to wane. Australia and Britain gave up their colonies in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and other territories.
Australia has remained the major Pacific aid donor, but its relative influence has diminished as nations in the region have developed economically. Australia’s aid spending fell dramatically from 2013 with its investment in development and diplomacy now at its lowest ever level. Australia has been criticised for being sporadic in its attention to the region, despite deep personal, cultural and historical ties. It is in this context that China has emerged in the last decade as a growing investor and aid donor in the South Pacific.
The return of China as a great power on the world stage has profound implications for Australia’s defence. Australia’s security has long benefitted from its remoteness. This advantage would be threatened by the prospect of an ambitious great power maintaining a military presence nearby, particularly in the South Pacific. While China currently maintains only one formal overseas military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, countries including India have raised fears of a “string of pearls” of civilian port and naval facilities across the Indian Ocean. Rumours of a proposed Chinese military base in Vanuatu were viewed with concern by the Australian security community.
Pacific step-up
In the context of growing Chinese influence, the Australian Government announced a Pacific Step Up in 2018 including increased aid, establishment of an Office of the Pacific and a $2 billion infrastructure fund to give alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Prime Minister Scott Morrison also announced the redevelopment of a small naval base at Lombrum on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island in partnership with the United States. The newly expanded base began to open in August 2019 and will host Australian and American navy vessels.
But there are signs that Australia’s stance on climate change is likely to continue to strain its relationships in the South Pacific for the foreseeable future. Not meeting the expectations of Pacific Island nations on climate change is likely to erode Australia’s leadership credentials and provide opportunities for other countries to grow influence in the region.
Responding to COVID-19
As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds, Australia has attempted to play a leadership role in the South Pacific. Pacific Island nations are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 as many have fragile health systems and the region is heavily dependent on the outside world for aid, migration and tourism, meaning that the economic cost of closing borders will be great.
Australia has pledged financial support and is providing protective equipment, medical supplies, planning surveillance, risk communication and specialist advisers in countries across the region. In the case of Papua New Guinea, it has re-distributed $123 million from the existing aid program to COVID-19 response.
Australia is playing an active role as a transit country to ensure that humanitarian and essential services as well as medical investments are reaching Pacific countries; for example, Pacific islanders transiting Australia to return home are exempt from Australia’s 14-day quarantine requirement. Pacific workers living in Australia under seasonal worker labour schemes whose visas are about to expire are being allowed to remain in Australia for up to one year.
China is also providing COVID-19 aid to the Pacific including sharing knowledge through videoconferencing and the creation of a $1.9 million China-Pacific Island Countries anti-COVID-19 Cooperation Fund to allow the purchase of Chinese medical supplies. It has provided assistance to the Solomon Islands for testing and grants to Vanuatu and Tonga. Some experts view China’s assistance during this time as Beijing leveraging its soft power for the longer term.
Whether Australia can maintain a sphere of influence in the South Pacific remains an open question. Australia remains the major aid donor in the South Pacific, even with increasing Chinese aid and investment, and has been helpful for the region’s COVID-19 response. Australia understands that it will have to compete for influence in the South Pacific with China in coming decades, but it is likely to strive to retain its status and influence in its immediate neighbourhood.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Melissa Conley Tyler is Director of Diplomacy and Pravin Silva is Project Coordinator, Diplomacy at Asialink at the University of Melbourne. Image credit: Australian Department of Defence.