India in Afghanistan: lost opportunities and the way forward
India in Afghanistan: lost opportunities and the way forward
WRITTEN BY YATHARTH KACHIAR
14 May 2020
After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, India renewed engagement with Afghanistan with three discernible objectives: to support the nascent democratic order which came out of the Bonn process, to thwart the Pakistan-backed terrorists from using the Afghan territory against India. Finally, to prove its mettle as a global and regional power. Today, after 18 years and an investment of over USD 3 billion, Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan stands at a cross-road. India’s absence from all the major regional formats, such as “6+2+1” group, discussing the future of Afghanistan is a reality for New Delhi. Fear of losing in ‘the Great Game’ has led some to suggest opening a dialogue with the Taliban. Others have pointed out that “talking to the Taliban is not same as recognizing it.”
As appealing and pragmatic these viewpoints are, they fail to grasp that the strength of India’s Afghanistan policy is its people-centric approach. At present, when the violent attacks in Afghanistan are rising, civilian casualties are higher than before, democratic order is in danger; wagering the partnership nurtured with the people of Afghanistan over 18 years in the hope of establishing political relations with the Taliban will be folly for India. India’s engagement with the Taliban should be based on the radical group’s ability to relinquish violence and engage in intra-Afghan dialogue.
Talking to the Taliban may not be equal to recognizing it, but it amounts to legitimizing it as an important stakeholder in Afghanistan. Analysts argue that the Taliban is already accepted as a legitimate actor in the peace process by the global and regional players alike. Perhaps unintended but a recognizable consequence of this move is that it has strengthened the Taliban at the expense of the nascent democratic order in Kabul. It is precisely the reason why prominent Afghans have urged the Indian government “to not engage with the Taliban too early.”
In the last 18 years, India has nurtured a constituency of pro-democratic forces across age, gender, and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It is time for New Delhi to rally behind these groups assertively.
Since the signing of the US-Taliban deal, there has been a record number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The recent Kabul Maternity Hospital attack reveals the flawed nature of the western strategy of promoting and legitimizing the terrorist groups before verifying the sincerity of their claims.
It is crucial to mention that the US accepted all the factions of the Taliban including the Haqqani Network, a US-designated terrorist group, infamous for its violent attacks on Indian and US facilities, as a legitimate actor in the peace process. Despite an evolving strategic partnership with the US, India could not establish a quid pro quo with Americans to not accommodate the Haqqanis in the peace process. Nevertheless, America’s acceptance of the Haqqanis does not diminish the threat faced by India from such groups.
It is worth recalling that under the Taliban regime (1996-2002), Afghanistan became a training ground for Rawalpindi-backed terrorists stoking terror in Kashmir. The Taliban regime also facilitated the resettlement of anti-India terrorist groups from Pakistan to eastern Afghanistan. The resettlement of terrorist groups helped Islamabad in averting the international pressure to curb the terrorist activities emanating from its soil. Today, when the situation in Kashmir is gradually stabilizing, it will be problematic for India’s national security if the Taliban becomes the dominant power in Kabul.
The Taliban’s refusal to relinquish violence in Afghanistan and open intra-Afghan dialogue exposes its disingenuous claims about its transformation into a moderate group. In January 2020, the UN Security Council report clearly stated that the Taliban still maintains close ties with the terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. Indian policymakers should be wary of the fact that any claim of good conduct by the Taliban is to gain tactical leverage and to improve its image in the international community.
By opening a dialogue with the Taliban at this point, India will lose its credibility in Afghanistan, which it has earned over 18 years. Further, any quid pro quo established between India and the Taliban is likely to be a failure. India’s terrorism concerns stems from Pakistan. The Taliban which is economically and militarily nurtured by Pakistan since its inception can only claim to be independent as long as it does not cross the red lines of Rawalpindi. For these reasons, New Delhi needs to chart its course in Afghanistan rather than bandwagoning.
Under the circumstances, India’s best option is to support and strengthen the pro-democratic forces in Kabul. As opposed to the view which favours engagement with the Taliban, at present, it will be better for New Delhi to continue working in tandem with the legitimate government in Kabul. At the same time, while supporting the legitimate government in Kabul, New Delhi need not adopt a passive approach. India needs to actively keep up the pressure at the global level to protect the painstakingly built democratic order in Afghanistan and aggressively demand a humanitarian ceasefire in the country. In the last 18 years, India has nurtured a constituency of pro-democratic forces across age, gender, and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It is time for New Delhi to rally behind these groups assertively.
Instead of responding to the strategic environment shaped by others, New Delhi can shed some of its reluctance and take the lead in organizing a forum for pro-democratic forces in Kabul. India has the capability and incentive for bringing together various factions in Afghanistan. Engaging proactively with various groups in Kabul will also help India in seeking an observer status in the intra-Afghan dialogue. Also, India must appoint a special envoy to infuse the dynamism in Indian policy towards Kabul. The cost of inaction would not be to the advantage of either New Delhi or Kabul.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Yatharth Kachiar is a Research Associate at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), a think tank based out of New Delhi. She holds a Doctorate from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. The views of the author do not reflect the views of the VIF. Image credit: Ministry of External Affairs/Flickr.