Will China build a 'Great Wall' in the East China Sea?
Will China build a “Great Wall” in the East China Sea?
WRITTEN BY SATORU NAGAO
7 September 2021
When China started building artificial islands in the South China Sea in 2013, Japanese experts warned of the possibility that China would create similar facilities in the East China Sea. A year earlier, China had declared its intention to set up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, and it also set up radar on the oil rigs there. If China connects this radar network to its many military planes, it is not only the South China Sea but also the East China Sea that could become part of China’s next "Great Wall”.
Despite its 2013 declaration of an ADIZ in the East China Sea, China has not committed to the project. Chinese fighter jets do not patrol the ADIZ routinely, and militarisation of the oil rigs has not developed the area into a fortress. However, according to the Nikkei Asia Review, in March 2021 Japanese experts explained to lawmakers of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party that China has a plan to build artificial land around the Senkaku Islands of Japan that would be large enough to accommodate 20,000 inhabitants. It is unlikely that most civilians would want to live on the artificial land around the Senkaku Islands. More likely, the plan is to expand the Senkaku Islands into a base for 20,000 soldiers. If true, it shows that China has not given up on constructing military outposts in the East China Sea. This situation raises three questions: Why does China want to build a fortress in the East China Sea? Why has China not “formally” committed to this plan yet? And what will happen in the future?
Why does China want to build a fortress in the East China Sea?
Building a fortress in the East China Sea could offer three important security benefits. First and most importantly, China could secure its coastal cities, which is a key priority as these are critical to driving its economic development. China is working to push back all foreign military presence in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Along with the plan, China has been constructing fortresses in the South China Sea. If China deploys nuclear ballistic missile submarines under the protection of military planes and warships, no country would attack these islands and take the risk of starting a nuclear war over the South China Sea. However, even if China builds a fortress in the South China Sea, it cannot protect its coastal cities without a fortress in the East China Sea.
The more China escalates the situation, the more Japan-US-Taiwan security cooperation will be institutionalised, making it more difficult for China to construct another “Great Wall” in the East China Sea.
Second, denying foreign military access to waters inside the East China Sea and the South China Sea would enable China to exert more leverage over Taiwan. Taiwan is located just 100 miles off China’s coastline and between the East China Sea and the South China Sea. If China establishes fortresses in both seas it would be easier for Beijing to exert military pressure over Taipei and force the Taiwanese to accept China’s rule. Third, if China were to establish a fortress in the East China Sea, it would be easier to put military pressure on Japan’s southwestern islands. China is concerned about Japan and the US stationing armed forces on Japan's southwestern islands because they could support Taiwan should China follow through on its threat to take the island nation by force.
Why has China not “formally” committed to this plan yet?
Despite the benefits of building a fortress in the East China Sea, it is possible that China lacks the capability to do so. Compared with the South China Sea, the East China Sea is deep. There are no islands or reefs where China can construct artificial islands except Japan’s Senkaku Islands. Additionally, except for China, other countries bordering the South China Sea have few military capabilities. Due to this “power vacuum” China has started to construct artificial islands in the area.
Compared to the South China Sea, Japan and the US have a far stronger military presence in the East China Sea. Japanese fighter jets continue to intercept the People’s Liberation Army Airforce (PLAAF) in moves designed to enter the territorial airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Although the number of these incidents reached 458 in 2020, Japan still has enough capability to intercept them. Importantly, the East China Sea does not suffer from the form of a power vacuum that has enabled Beijing to project its power in the South China Sea.
What will happen in the future?
Although China has the will to establish a South China Sea-type fortress in the East China Sea it lacks the capability. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2011-2020, China increased its military expenditure by 76 per cent while Japan’s increased its spending only 2.4 per cent. If current trends continue, China will be in a position to exert ever-increasing levels of pressure on its neighbours as a means to advance its interests in the East China Sea.
However, because of China’s provocation, cooperation between the US, Japan and Taiwan has deepened significantly. Documents from Japan’s Ministry of Defense demonstrate this fact. For example, the 2020 edition of the Annual white paper covered the Taiwan security situation in “Chapter 2, Section 2: China”. But the 2021 edition separated Taiwan from the China section and devoted a new section to US-China relations. Recent remarks from high-ranking Japanese government officials indicate the same trend. Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said that Japan would defend Taiwan. At a virtual Hudson Institute event in June, Japanese State Minister of Defense Yasuhide Yamanaka asked the Biden administration to be strong in its defence of Taiwan. And in July, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the US’ armed forces conducted joint drills to prepare for a Taiwan emergency.
Therefore, the more China escalates the situation, the more Japan-US-Taiwan security cooperation will be institutionalised, making it more difficult for China to construct another “Great Wall” in the East China Sea.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Satoru Nagao is a non-resident fellow at the Hudson Institute based in Tokyo, Japan. His primary research area is US-Japan-India security cooperation. Further information about Dr Nagao and his work is available here. Image credit: Flickr/Jaws300.