The prospects for China’s engagement in Afghanistan
The prospects for China’s engagement in Afghanistan
WRITTEN BY JEREMY GARLICK
23 August 2021
Amid the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the question of China’s future involvement in the country known as the ‘graveyard of empires’ rears its head. With the Taliban now in the ascendant, what will be China’s approach to its troubled neighbour?
The probable answer is that there will be little real change in Beijing’s policy towards Afghanistan in the short- to medium-term. It is unlikely, given Afghanistan’s ongoing instability, that the Chinese will thrust their heads into the lion’s jaws just yet. Although Chinese officials often make public proclamations of friendship with developing countries, in practice Beijing generally sticks to a cautious approach to countries it considers risky bets. For instance, despite repeated announcements of a USD400 billion investment drive in Iran, the reality is that China has not yet committed much capital to the Islamic Republic. Similarly, Chinese investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have progressed more slowly than anticipated. Since Chinese leaders are all too aware of the fate of Britain, Russia, and now the US, they are not likely to invest much in the way of either money or manpower in Afghanistan — at least, not until they are sure that the dust has settled.
China’s security priorities
Seeing the writing on the wall as far as the US occupation was concerned, the Chinese began negotiating with the Taliban back in July. The publicity surrounding their meeting in the Chinese city of Tianjin included images of the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, greeting Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban. In a speech, Wang advised the Taliban to improve their image, advice which the group’s leaders appear to have taken to heart in their dealings with Western media — at least for now.
Beijing will look to ensure first and foremost that Uygur separatists do not gain support from the Taliban. In return, they will dangle some promises of investment for the sake of generating goodwill.
Significantly, Wang also extracted a promise from Mullah Baradar not to allow Uygur separatists to establish a stronghold in Afghanistan. The emphasis placed on this point by the minister is revealing of China’s priorities concerning its relations with its neighbour. For Beijing, ensuring that the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) — which shares a land border with Afghanistan — remains firmly under Chinese control is a core national interest. Persuading the Taliban to prevent Uygur separatists from developing a support base in Afghan territory is, from Beijing’s point of view, the most vital principle underlying the two regimes’ emerging diplomatic relations. Everything else is secondary.
Some commentators have noted the supposed opportunity for China to take advantage of the vacuum left by the American withdrawal. In this analysis, Chinese leaders are said to be rubbing their hands at the chance to exploit Washington’s loss of influence. However, there are reasons to believe that the Chinese will not be as delighted by the situation as some believe. Chinese leaders insist that they apply the principle of non-interference in foreign policy. Given the degree of influence, Beijing wields in the internal affairs of countries such as Myanmar and Pakistan, it is worth remaining sceptical about such claims. However, in the case of war-torn Afghanistan, there is less cause to distrust China’s expressed preference for non-involvement. The Chinese will not seek to repeat the mistakes of their great power rivals by becoming over-committed in Afghanistan. While looking to build solid relations with the Taliban as far as possible, they will not open themselves up to excessive entanglement in the chaos of Afghan internal affairs.
China’s cautious investment strategy
Russia’s ten-year Afghan misadventure in the 1980s was analysed closely in Chinese decision-making circles. The two-decades-long American misjudgement will be similarly dissected. While the Americans were bogged down in Afghanistan, there was no need for China to get involved. Beijing could sit back and save its resources while the US took on the task of pacification and nation-building. Today, however, President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), would logically include the development of Afghanistan. The BRI is intended to link Asia with Europe via Central Asia, and Afghanistan could be a good connecting piece in the BRI jigsaw puzzle. Nevertheless, there is no urgent need for Chinese companies to rush to build transport and other infrastructure in Afghanistan just yet. The time for Chinese loan investment may come. However, given the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan’s future, that time has not yet arrived.
The record of Chinese investments in Afghanistan is instructive. There are good reasons for the Chinese to invest in Afghan mining and resources. Afghanistan has large deposits of natural resources in the form of metals and minerals essential for Chinese industrial production. One would expect the Chinese to be eager to leap in and start exploiting these resources.
In fact, an Afghan copper mine, Mes Aynak, has been run by a consortium of Chinese companies since 2008. However, the mine has remained undeveloped due to contract renegotiations, the plummeting price of copper in world markets, and the poor security situation. The fact that the investment stalled despite the Chinese already being present does not suggest that Chinese companies are likely to set to work at a rapid pace. Recent reports notwithstanding, this is unlikely until they are sure that the situation has substantially improved. And even in that case, judging by the slow drip of investments in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, the rate of development is likely to be slower than anticipated.
Predictions of rapid Chinese engagement in Afghanistan are therefore likely to be wide of the mark. Beijing has already established working relations with the Taliban and will certainly continue to develop these further, but there will be no quick commitment to risky investment in a country that Chinese leaders justifiably regard as a quagmire for foreign powers. Given the fact that China suspended work on a hydropower construction project after six of its engineers were killed in a recent terrorist attack in neighbouring Pakistan, the Chinese will be wary of exposing any more of their nationals — and financial capital — to further peril.
For the time being, China’s goals in Afghanistan are the following. Beijing will look to ensure first and foremost that Uygur separatists do not gain support from the Taliban. In return, they will dangle some promises of investment for the sake of generating goodwill. But do not expect there to be rapid action on investments in exploiting Afghanistan’s natural resources until Chinese decision-makers believe that the situation has stabilised sufficiently to make the effort worthwhile.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jeremy Garlick is Director of the Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business. He is the author of The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: From Asia to Europe (Routledge). His tweets at @jeremy_garlick. Image credit: Wikipedia.