The European Union needs a more pragmatic foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific

5 September 2025

Whether the “Pivot to Asia” concretely materialised or not, it is hard to deny that the Asia-Pacific has gained significant importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Recognising the importance of the region, the EU has also begun to seek deeper involvement in one of, if not the, most important geopolitical centres of the 21st century.

At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security convening, French President Emmanuel Macron echoed this interest, positioning the European bloc as an actor eager to maintain the global order in the Indo-Pacific — an appellation increasingly favoured in Europe — and improve economic ties with regional economies.

This involvement is not limited to security, norms-setting, and trade, however. Indeed, EU foreign policy is underpinned, at least rhetorically, by ethical and moral standards, which the Union intends to promote alongside the other dimensions of its engagement.

This very posturing, however, has been criticised for its moralising, double standards, and complete disregard of the needs of local actors and the challenges they face. If the EU wants to become an influential presence in the Indo-Pacific, such an approach must be corrected.

The European Union’s foreign policy principles

Broadly defined, EU foreign policy is designed to protect its members’ economic interests and security abroad while contributing to upholding global peace. However, it also aims to “develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms”. Such language highlights the role the EU wants to endorse and is a recurrent theme in the discourses of the EU and its member states.

This approach is mirrored in the EU’s foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, unveiled in 2021. This framework reveals the Union’s intention to champion “democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and universally agreed commitments” in the region, thereby not only positioning the EU as an economic and (aspiring) security force, but also as a “moral” one.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, only an approach less concerned with morals and more with pragmatic engagement can pave the way for the EU to spread its values in the Indo-Pacific.

At any rate, this strategy has had some success. For example, President of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto reached an agreement on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) on 13 July. Besides its obvious focus on economics and trade, the agreement also serves as a new avenue to strengthen ties built upon “shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law”.

Another recent example is the 30th EU-Japan Summit, which took place on 23 July 2025. Before even mentioning security matters, the two “like-minded” actors praised the strength of their partnership, underpinned by shared “values and principles” amidst shared regional and global challenges. In this case, Japan specifically welcomes the European dedication to upholding the rule of law and freedom of navigation — a particularly sensitive matter for Tokyo given its proximity to the Taiwan Strait and the importance of the South China Sea for global trade. Paired with commitments to strengthening economic ties and defence coordination, the EU thus ascertains its overall Indo-Pacific standing by echoing the Japanese values and barely hidden — and partly moral — criticism of Beijing’s regional assertiveness.

Denouncing European moralisation

Nonetheless, these advancements pale in comparison to criticism towards the EU for its moral posturing, which echoes wider condemnations of “Western” actors imposing their own moral standards as being universal. At the centre of recent criticism is the bloc’s posture towards the events unfolding in Gaza. “Global South” nations, especially ones with large Muslim populations, as is the case for some ASEAN countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, lament double standards from the EU. The latter, quick to criticise human rights violations, especially vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine, turns a blind eye and avoids direct criticism when it comes to the war in Gaza.

This silence — an example among others — severely undermines the credibility of the EU’s foreign policy values. Instead, the EU is often perceived as a mere moraliser unable, or unwilling, to act according to its own professed morals. Again, this criticism is not isolated: it echoes broader condemnations from the “Global South”, which laments the pandering of “the West” and its lack of self-reflection. The latter leads to the bloc being seen as a hypocrite and prevents the EU from establishing a long-term impact abroad. After all, it seems difficult to be respected and welcomed as a partner if one’s presence mostly consists of criticism and empty statements.

Instead, amidst increasing regional tensions ranging from multiplying maritime skirmishes between China and the Philippines to North Korean intimidations, recently toppled with waves of tariffs, Indo-Pacific actors expect a more pragmatic EU engagement centred around economic and security incentives. A blueprint for such engagements is the visit of French President Macron to Indonesia. His visit focused on strengthening ties in meaningful ways through arms deals, as well as presenting France as a reliable, engaged partner. Reportedly resulting in EUR 17 billion in contracts, showcasing that European actors can be pragmatic actors and not mere moralisers made this visit a success.

As previously noted, the EU-Indonesia CEPA and recent exchanges with Japan provide other tangible examples of economic pragmatism, thereby complementing security-focused moves like France’s arms engagement. Such moves also extend to European relations with Singapore, with which a digital trade agreement (EUSDTA) was signed in May to accelerate economic growth in digital sectors. Only if such agreements are followed with trade deals and investments can the EU slowly establish its role as an Indo-Pacific actor, and not just a spectator.

Pragmatism first

So, should the EU discard the values-based component of its foreign policy and solely engage in security and economic ventures? The answer is no.

First, although the EU can be inconsistent in the application of its values, the latter remain a reflection of the EU’s identity and the values shared by its population. Discarding this part of the EU identity would ultimately undermine the EU’s distinct global role. Second, it would suggest that Indo-Pacific actors do not have principles they wish to uphold and are in fact upholding, which could not be further from the truth. ASEAN, for instance, attaches strong values to its regional and external initiatives.

Rather, Indo-Pacific actors are critical of the EU for two main reasons. First, they decry the European hypocrisy and double standards, especially against a perceived lack of practical benefits the Union brings to the region. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Indo-Pacific countries are obliged to be pragmatic due to a geopolitical context marked by increased tension, as well as their smaller military and economic weight and development objectives. Such imperatives prompt a focus on concrete projects and not on moral alignment with one pole or another. In such a context, constantly discarding the reality that Indo-Pacific actors face is bound to create frustration.

This piece thus suggests that the EU first needs to showcase the pragmatic, quantifiable benefits it can bring to the Indo-Pacific before hoping to influence regional values — many of which naturally align with European ones. That is, the European regional weight and agenda can only be respected if built upon a strong, reliable foundation — which also means presenting a credible moral standing rid of double-standards. Perhaps counter-intuitively, only an approach less concerned with morals and more with pragmatic engagement can pave the way for the EU to spread its values in the Indo-Pacific.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Angelo M'BA is a Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University and an Oxford graduate specialising in Chinese foreign policy, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and international cooperation. He briefly lectured on cross-Strait relations and Indo-Pacific security, and his geopolitical analyses have appeared in outlets such as The Diplomat, the Oxford Political Review, and Pacific Forum, where he is a Young Leader. Image credit: European Union, 2018.