Solomon Islands stress: what happened, why and what does it all mean?

2 February 2022

The events of November 2021 in Honiara drew much attention across the region and beyond. For many, the sight of riots, looting, and burning buildings will have brought back traumatic memories. The residents of Honiara, and the Solomon Islands more widely, are no strangers to civil disorder. This most recent manifestation resulted in a tragic loss of life as well as extensive destruction and damage to businesses and public infrastructure valued at more than USD 66 million. To fully appreciate what drove last year’s events and the implications for what happens next, a greater understanding of the local context, drawing on Solomon Islanders’ thinking and analysis, is needed.

What happened?

On 24 November, protesters gathered to take part in a planned peaceful march to Parliament. While much has been made of this being a Malaita province-centric protest, participants from other parts of the country were also involved. Their objective was to call for the resignation of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, who has been in power since the elections in 2019. Concerns among the population of the Solomon Islands about the Sogavare government have been building over some time. They relate to allegations of corruption, lack of service delivery, and a lack of appropriate parliamentary oversight. Manasseh Sogavare has been in politics in the Solomon Islands for a long time and this is his fourth stint as prime minister. It should not come as a surprise that some have longstanding grudges against him and look for opportunities to unseat him.

The other development, which has received very little attention, was the reported departure of 140 “traumatised” Chinese nationals from the Solomon Islands by chartered flight to Guangzhou.

On arrival at the Parliament, protesters were informed that neither the PM nor anyone else from the government was available to hear their grievances or speak with them. They were called upon to disperse and it appears that tear gas was used to effect that. During this interaction, a ‘leaf house’ in the Parliamentary precinct was set on fire. On realising that there was no prospect of accessing the prime minister, the protesters left the Parliament area and headed towards the business district of Honiara. Their ranks were swelled by others, whose agenda seems to have been less about political dissatisfaction and more about opportunism. The march became a riot, and three days of looting, destruction of property and disorder ensued.

The government’s response was to call on regional partners for assistance in restoring order in the capital. Sogavare spoke to his counterparts in Papua New Guinea (PM James Marape) and Australia (PM Scott Morrison). PNG deployed around 50 personnel under the terms of a bilateral policing arrangement between the two countries. Australia provided defence force, police, and diplomatic personnel in response to the request that was made under a bilateral security treaty. This treaty was signed in 2017 when Operation Helpem Fren (also known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands or RAMSI) ended after fourteen years. Supporting contingents from Fiji and New Zealand were also mobilised under the terms of that treaty. The restoration of order that was largely achieved by the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) has held over the Christmas and New Year holiday period. The visiting forces have largely withdrawn, with a small number of personnel remaining in the country to support their Solomon Islander colleagues.

Two subsequent developments are significant although they have received very different levels of treatment by the media and commentariat. One is that the People’s Republic of China has provided equipment to the RSIPF. A detachment of ‘liaison’ police officers has also been promised. The other development, which has received very little attention, was the reported departure of 140 “traumatised” Chinese nationals from the Solomon Islands by chartered flight to Guangzhou. It is not clear whether these people were long-term residents of the Solomon Islands although it is likely that they were probably quite recent arrivals. Other than a post to Facebook, this event has not been remarked upon either within the Solomon Islands or elsewhere.

What were the drivers?

Much of the discussion of what caused this latest bout of unrest in Honiara has been framed by an over-emphasis on external geopolitical issues, most notably the resurgent diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan. This framework may or may not be necessary, but it is far from sufficient. It suffers from being ahistorical and lacking in cultural, social, and political nuance. A lot of focus has been on dissatisfaction voiced by the leadership of Malaita province. But it is important to be aware that festering discontent exists elsewhere, such as within the population of Guadalcanal, the province where Honiara is located. Significantly, much of the conversation about what is wanted to move forward has been concerning key provisions of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA).

It was this agreement negotiated in 2000 that ended the bloody ‘Tensions’ that had engulfed the country for the previous few years. However, 20 years on, frustrations persist that the government has neglected the TPA. Some argue that it should have played a much bigger part in the work done by RAMSI during the 2003 – 2017 period. The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has never been tabled in Parliament. Provincial governments have not gained more autonomy. Others have reminded us of the complex, murky and often harmful relationships between political elites and resource extraction industries in the Solomon Islands. Again, these are not new and are so entrenched that some observers are left wondering just how Solomon Islands politics could proceed if they were not present.

Added into this already volatile mix, are the persisting concerns about ‘The Switch’ — the 2019 decision of the Manasseh government to repudiate a 36-year diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in favour of adopting the ‘One China’ policy and signing up to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This decision was and remains a polarising issue among Solomon Islanders. It has become a focal point in friction between the Suidani provincial leadership in Malaita and the central government, with the Premier having expressed his unwavering support for Taiwan and his opposition to working with the PRC on numerous occasions. It has also generated what Mihai Sora has described as a “diplomatic pile on” which has likely been less than helpful.

What are the implications?

The public disorder that we saw during three days in November has not recurred and the residents of Honiara have been able to enjoy a peaceful Christmas and New Year period. However, rumblings of discontent, rumours and counter-rumours have persisted, particularly in Auki, the provincial capital of Malaita. The Suidani provincial government is pushing ahead with plans to conduct a survey among Malaitans on self-determination. Although it is hard to see this becoming a reality, by keeping the conversation bubbling, the issue will remain a thorn in the side of the national government. This should not come as a surprise. The co-option of ‘The Switch’ at the end of 2019 by pro-independence factions in Malaita was as prompt as it was predictable.

We can expect developments in the Solomon Islands to illustrate a complex intersection between geopolitics and local political agendas. While some were keen to speculate that Sogavare might ask China to send security assistance to restore and maintain order at the end of November, there is no reason to think that this was ever really a likelihood. Neither is there any indication that China would have provided such assistance even if it was requested. Nonetheless, the offer/acceptance of a detachment of police liaison officers is a notable development and one that will be watched with interest. Foreign police and military officers working alongside their Pacific island counterparts is not a new phenomenon. Neither is the Solomon Islands the first Pacific island country to have Chinese police officers working within their policing service.

The people of the Solomon Islands face many challenges as we head into 2022. The impacts of COVID-19 have damaged their economy, significant parts of the population struggle to access basic services, and their young population lacks opportunity. Their friends and partners within the region and elsewhere may be called upon to offer support and guidance. However, for leadership, they must and will look to themselves.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Tess Newton Cain is the Project Lead for the Pacific Hub at the Griffith Asia Institute. She has almost 25 years’ experience working in the Pacific islands region, with most of those spent living and working in Vanuatu. Image credit: Flickr/Office of the President, Republic of China (this image has been cropped).