Russia and Pakistan: Strange partnership

11 November 2021

Things are looking good for Russo-Pakistani relations. On 9 October 2021, Pakistani Energy Minister Hammad Azhar stated that the two countries were close to finalising a deal on the Pakistan-Stream Gas Pipeline (PSGP) project, formerly called the North-South pipeline. The gas pipeline is set to connect the city of Karachi with Kasur (Lahore) via Port Qasim on the Arabian Sea, helping to resolve some of Pakistan’s dire energy needs for the next 40 years. On the same day, Russian and Pakistani special forces completed the Druzhba-VI military exercise, which focused on counter-terrorism, in Krasnodar, Russia.

These events are clear indicators of Pakistan and Russia’s strengthening diplomatic, economic, and military ties in recent years. This development is surprising at first glance, given the long and complicated history between the two countries. However, regional and global strategic trends pertaining to Afghanistan and wider international considerations in both Russia and Pakistan have generated the new rapprochement. Though limitations exist as to how far the partnership between the two countries can develop, the relationship itself is representative of the new world where countries join unorthodox partnerships.

Partnership despite history

Russia and Pakistan share a complicated history full of mistrust, as both during the days of the British Empire and the Cold War Pakistan was one of the frontlines for containing Russian power. The apex of distrust was when Pakistan, alongside the US, backed anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989). When the Taliban came to power in 1996, Pakistan and Russia continued to be on opposing sides. Pakistan was one of the rare countries that recognised the Taliban regime, while Russia, alongside India and Iran, supported the Northern Alliance, a coalition of anti-Taliban tribes and fighters. Russia did so as it feared that the Taliban and Al Qaeda would spread Jihadi extremism northwards into the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, enflaming the Russian periphery and endangering Russia along the way. This was one of the reasons why Russia initially supported the US toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan post-9/11. Meanwhile, Pakistan, although formally a US ally, never terminated its strong ties with the Taliban.

Pakistan needs partners among great and regional powers concerned about the fate of Afghanistan. Russia, on the other hand, had to strengthen its diplomatic and market ties with non-Western countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as a result of the Ukraine Crisis and worsening relations with the West.

Today, things are changing as Pakistani-Russian relations are significantly improving because the two countries see a joint interest in establishing stronger ties given the fear of a fallout from Afghanistan. Changes in the global security environment have also helped, as US-Pakistani relations underwent a crisis, and the US-Russia relationship became burdened with rivalry. The process of establishing this new partnership has taken some time. In 2009, an idea circulated among the presidents of Russia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan about forming a quadrilateral initiative that would strive toward greater security and economic cooperation against the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan.

The real breakthrough came in 2014 when Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu went to Rawalpindi to sign an agreement between the two countries on military and defence cooperation. A preliminary agreement was also reached for Pakistan to obtain Russian Mi-35M attack helicopters, which were finally received in April 2018. In 2020, Pakistan participated in the multilateral Kavkaz-2020 military drills in Astrakhan, Russia, using this as an opportunity to strengthen security ties with Russia and Central Asian countries. In February 2021, Pakistan hosted a multinational naval exercise, ‘Aman-2021’, in which Russia participated. Political dialogue has also kicked off as the shared concerns over Afghanistan have become acute and the two countries have sought new partners. In September 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan had two phone calls discussing the situation in Afghanistan and their bilateral ties. In comparison, Khan is angry at US President Joe Biden for not contacting him since assuming office in January 2021.

Another new field of Russo-Pakistani cooperation is infrastructure. While China has invested heavily in Pakistani infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2019, Russia pledged that it would help construct a railway track from Quetta to Taftan. The Exim Bank of China, on the other hand, has been in the process of approving a USD 6 billion loan for upgrading sections of Pakistani railway Main Line-1 (ML-1) that go from Karachi to Peshawar and Taxila to Havelian. Islamabad is looking for partners to modernise its national infrastructure, and Moscow is useful as it alleviates dependency on Beijing as its only source of infrastructure financing.

Furthermore, Pakistan is considering signing a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). If the EEU were to be fused with the Chinese BRI, it would allow landlocked Eurasian countries to connect with the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar and bypass the dangerous Afghan territory. Whether this idea will come to fruition partly depends on China. In 2018, the EEU countries and China signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation that provides a foundation for project collaboration between the EEU and the BRI. China would also benefit from regional connectivity projects that bypass the unpredictable Afghanistan and, more importantly, that excludes the US. While this initiative is an idea in inception, it should not be taken lightly.

Shifting alliances

Taking the above into account, the relationship between the two countries has developed directly from shared concerns over Afghanistan after the US withdrawal and changes in global alliances. The US and India’s strengthening bilateral partnership due to their shared apprehensions about China’s rise is an important factor. To reduce dependence on Russia as its top arms supplier, India has been increasingly willing to buy weaponry from the US and other suppliers. As India had always been a major export market for Russia’s defence industry, the need emerged to compensate this loss with another major country in South Asia, making Pakistan the logical choice.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has its rationale too. Pakistan’s ties with the US are in a crisis, as Washington questions Islamabad’s loyalty and reliability as a counter-terrorism partner. This was exposed by the assassination of Osama bin Laden in 2011, who was hiding in Pakistan, and US drone strikes on Pakistani territory. Moreover, Pakistani foreign policy elites share the perception that the world is moving towards multipolarity and that the country needs to hedge its bets and diversify partnerships, creating an opening for powers like Russia. In India, there are theories that Pakistan aims to drive a wedge between Russia and India — or at least to dilute that partnership.

With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the responsibility of ensuring the country’s stability has fallen to regional states. Russia and Pakistan establishing a partnership is logical, as Russia considers Pakistan a vital partner in Afghanistan, and the same goes for the Taliban. Russia has already hosted Afghan peace conferences involving the Taliban and Pakistan, and will continue to host these talks in the so-called “Moscow format”. The arrival of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, which resulted in the formation of the Afghan franchise of this militant group (called the Islamic State of Khorasan), has propelled Russia and Pakistan to form a tacit alliance that also includes China and Iran to combat this threat. Islamabad is equally concerned about the militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), known as the Pakistani Taliban, which targets security forces from bases in Afghanistan. Pakistan also fears a large influx of refugees from Afghanistan.

To better cope with security threats emanating from post-America Afghanistan, Pakistan needs partners among great and regional powers concerned about the fate of Afghanistan. Russia, on the other hand, had to strengthen its diplomatic and market ties with non-Western countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as a result of the Ukraine Crisis and worsening relations with the West. Having a largely Muslim country like Pakistan on that list has symbolic resonance, as it promotes Russia as an independent power forming partnerships with non-Western societies in Eurasia.

The new partnership has its limits

Russia’s new partnership with Pakistan does have its limitations. Moscow is aware that Pakistan already has two other major powers with which it is affiliated, the first being the US, with whom Pakistan will hardly sever all ties despite extant problems. The second is China, which has already made Pakistan a major element in its Belt and Road Initiative. The presence of these two powers in Pakistan will always compel Russia to calibrate every action regarding the country. Russia will also be cautious regarding how much it invests into its partnership with Pakistan, as its traditionally good relations with India are still relevant for Russia. One reason for this is that Russia has tried to assert itself as a partner to rising Asian powers — a group India belongs to unquestionably.

Despite these limitations, the Russian-Pakistani partnership is worth keeping an eye on, given both countries’ geography, size, and nuclear status. The relationship between the two indicates a new geopolitical environment as the world shifts from Pax Americana to the bipolar rivalry between the US and China. Other regional and great powers will engage in fluid and ever-changing processes of forming alliances and partnerships, without firm allegiances and with opportunistic interest assessments.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Vuk Vuksanovic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He got his PhD in international relations at the LSE. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues. Image credit: Flickr/МИД России.