Nuclear weapons: the permanent handmaiden for South Asia's instability

3 July 2020

It’s been more than two decades since the India–Pakistan rivalry turned into an out and out nuclear braggadocio, where both sides actions managed to turn South Asia into “the worlds most dangerous place”, as1998 saw respective announcements of nuclear tests followed by military clashes in Kargil.

Despite maintaining an equipoise of destructive power for more than 20 years both sides have engaged in numerous military face-offs where the possibility of a full-fledged conventional war has remained very real indeed. The threat of a nuclear conflagration hangs over South Asia each time relations between these hostile neighbours heat up. This article ostensibly looks to sketch out the issues that contribute to South Asia’s instability, especially after the arrival of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's penchant for nuclear risk-taking

After achieving the status in 1998 as the Islamic world’s sole nuclear power, it was clear that Pakistan’s nuclear program was 'wholly and solely' dedicated towards India. The conventional military capability gap with India (always a matter of worry for Pakistan) drove its development of nuclear weapons leading it (un)surprisingly to become home to the world’s fastest-growing nuclear program. Its missile delivery system can target the whole of India’s territory including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Nuclear weapons rather than serving as deterrence or moving the conflict below the threshold of conventional war, have instead only brought further instability to South Asia. If India and Pakistan do not practice restraint, then genuine fear of a nuclear war will feed into South Asia's economic milieu as investors and tourists flee potential hostilities.

The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons deliverable via ballistic and cruise missiles remains the most dangerous development for peace in South Asia. While Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons does not dwarf that of India, it does reflect a penchant for nuclear risk-taking. Compared to New Delhi it is apparent that Islamabad has a loose cork on its nuclear bottle when seen in the context of India’s ‘No First Use' (NFU) nuclear doctrine. Pakistan does not adhere to the NFU policy, instead Lt. General Kidwai of Pakistan maintains their ‘four red lines' doctrine - should India transgress these lines it could trigger a nuclear first strike from Pakistan.

The four essential aspects include, first, the loss of large parts of territory, second the destruction of large parts of land or air forces, third, economic strangulation and forth large-scale internal subversion. No less than Bharat Karnad has previously highlighted red lines said: “significantly, each of the thresholds is qualified by the word 'large' leaving the Pakistani army lots of room for interpretations, manoeuvre, and actions short of nuclear weapon use”. Islamabad's departure from 'credible minimum deterrence' to 'full spectrum deterrence' indicates a major doctrinal shift towards the Pakistani armed force’s explicit reliance on its nuclear weapons and the hope that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will deter all Indian action whether it is nuclear, conventional or non-conventional.

Nuclear weapons and instability in South Asia

Kashmir has always played a central role in shaping the bitter relationship between both neighbours. Pakistan’s strenuous attempts to highlight Kashmir as the 'nuclear flashpoint of the world' to bring the sharp attention of the international community towards Kashmir. The situation has become tenser after the abrogation of Article 370. The abrogation, in turn, led to deep disdain for Pakistan’s leadership and its civil society. Though there are some statements from within Pakistan calling for a possible war between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, this remains improbable. Pakistan’s inferior military capabilities vis-a-vis India compel Pakistan to avoid any direct military action against India over Kashmir. The Hindu nationalist government of India may have other ideas, however. The right-wing government of Narendra Modi has been known for its nationalist fervour and truculent statements towards Pakistan.

Following the abrogation of Article 370 and the solving of the Ayodhya dispute, the BJP government in New Dehli is in search of a new vote fetcher. The issue of Pakistani occupied Kashmir (POK) could be fodder for its populist designs, which in the face of a slowing economy could rally support in favour of the government before the 2024 election. Any military misadventure by India in POK could rapidly escalate into a nuclear exchange in no small part due to Pakistan’s inability to resist an Indian conventional military attack and its favouring of tactical nuclear weapons in a military environment. In this scenario, India would likely be held responsible in the court of global opinion for a nuclear disaster in South Asia.

The other conceivable scenario stems from Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorist activities in Kashmir which has seen attacks both there and in the Indian mainland. Due to Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail strategy, New Dehli has not resorted to large scale conventional actions in response. This works perfectly for Pakistan who can continue its proxy war against India without fear of large-scale Indian reprisals. India too, after acknowledging its inability to use conventional military action, has directed itself towards the doctrine of 'Cold Start', which was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Uri attack in 2016 and the Pulwama attack in 2019. In both those instance, India resorted to limited airstrikes and special forces raids. The success of these tactics is debatable especially in their utility to punish Pakistan in the wake of another terrorist attack.

An uneasy future

Analysts and policymakers in India have started to talk about firmer and more continuous military action against Pakistan to check its perceived support for terrorism. But in a scenario, where the Cold Start strategy seems to have failed in producing a favourable result, India will only have two options left. Either hit Pakistan hard militarily or continue to face the prospect of further suffering resulting from the aforementioned proxy war. The latter option risks being unbearable to India and the former can not be practised by India owing to the risk of Pakistan resorting to nuclear weapons. This, therefore, creates a situation where nuclear weapons are the permanent handmaiden for South Asia's instability.

The situation could easily deteriorate given reports the United States could resume nuclear testing, which will put pressure on India to end its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests amidst the allegations of shortcomings in its 1998 nuclear tests. If India upends the nuclear test moratorium it could trigger a new arms race in South Asia, one which would likely escalate because of Pakistan’s obsession in maintaining a stockpile relative to that of India.

In summary, Nuclear weapons rather than serving as deterrence or moving the conflict below the threshold of conventional war, have instead only brought further instability to South Asia. If India and Pakistan do not practice restraint, then the genuine fear of a nuclear war will feed into South Asia's economic milieu as investors and tourists flee potential hostilities, as was the case in 2002. This would be a devastating outcome for a region already affected by dire poverty. The COVID-19 crisis has already dampened South Asia’s economic growth and therefore the region simply cannot further risk bearing the cost of an arms race - let alone a war.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Gaurav Sen studied an M.A. in Politics and International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Dehli. His areas of interest include the Indo-Pacific, Sino-American relations and India’s foreign policy. Image credit: Ministry of Defence, Government of India via Wikimedia Commons

South Asia9DLJuly 3, 2020India, South Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan