Nguyen Phu Trong’s Beijing trip: Safeguarding regime-state security
Nguyen Phu Trong’s Beijing trip: Safeguarding regime-state security
WRITTEN BY PHAN XUAN DUNG
18 November 2022
Following China’s 20th Communist Party Congress, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Nguyen Phu Trong became the first foreign leader to visit the country. During his trip, which took place from 30 October to 1 November, Trong was in talks with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in what was described as a friendly and warm atmosphere. The two leaders issued a joint statement vowing to bring the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic partnership to a new level and to boost party-to-party ties. The aim of Trong’s trip was to safeguard Vietnam’s regime-state security amid a turbulent strategic environment marked by the Russia-Ukraine war, the current US administration’s declared rivalry with authoritarian regimes, and China's growing international ambitions.
An exercise in ‘bamboo diplomacy’
The term ‘regime-state security’ connotes the linkage between the security of the regime (political stability and survival) and the state (national sovereignty and territorial integrity). In a Marxist-Leninist one-party state like Vietnam, these two factors are often intertwined, especially when Vietnam has to deal with an ideologically similar, but militarily threatening, neighbour to the north. But to be clear, ideology is not the primary factor that guides Vietnam’s external affairs.
After the Doi Moi economic reform in 1986, Vietnam jettisoned its rigid ideologically based foreign policy thinking in favour of one that is more flexible and based upon national interests — the principle of ‘cooperation and struggle’. It dictates that Vietnam is willing to cooperate with any country on the basis of mutual benefit and respect, at the same time as opposing those that harm its national security and interests. Depending on the issue, the United States and China can either be a partner or an adversary to Vietnam. Undoubtedly, with the communist party as the sole ruling force, ideology still matters, but it is more about regime survival than international relations.
Hanoi’s great power balancing act becomes conspicuous when considering both its underlying foreign policy dichotomy of cooperation and struggle and several developments in November. Two weeks after Trong’s visit to Beijing, he met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, two of Vietnam’s strategic partners. On 13 November, Vietnam announced that Trong would have a phone conversation with US President Joe Biden, which would be the first phone call between a VCP chief and a US President. The announcement came after ASEAN upgraded its ties with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the same status that China obtained last year.
As Vietnam’s most senior politician and the architect of the ‘bamboo diplomacy’ concept, Trong should promote efforts to update Vietnam’s strategic thinking, thereby enabling the country to bend and sway in the current geopolitical headwinds with greater flexibility.
In this way, Trong’s Beijing trip should not be framed as a deferential move. Instead, it showcases Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ — Hanoi’s way of staying independent and equidistant vis-à-vis all major powers to maximise benefits and hedge against strategic risks. In particular, Trong could be seen as leveraging the special bond between the two communist states to bolster his party’s political standing at home and ensure his country’s security amid an increasingly unstable external environment.
Safeguarding communist rule
Despite ongoing disputes and past conflicts, both Vietnam and China are bound by their ideological affinity. In the post-Cold War era, with the triumph of pluralistic democracy and so-called ‘colour revolutions’ that ended communist rule in Eastern Europe, the VCP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been united in defending their political systems from what they view as external interference.
Existing with a US-led liberal-democracy paradigm, both Hanoi and Beijing are wary of Washington’s promotion of human rights and democratic values. Hardline ideologues in both Vietnam and China continue to perpetuate the fear of ‘peaceful evolutions’ — US-sponsored schemes to overthrow their one-party systems. US President Biden’s ‘democracies versus autocracies’ rhetoric gives the CCP and VCP even more reason to stay vigilant.
To be clear, Biden's National Security Strategy recognises certain ‘non-democracies’ that share its interest in upholding the international rules-based order and seeks to reassure them of the US’ intentions. While Vietnam is a strong supporter of the rules-based order, this nuanced framing is hardly music to its leaders’ ears. Vietnam has long sought to cast off the label of “non-democracy” imposed upon it by the West while touting its commitment to building a so-called “socialist democracy”.
Trong himself is a conservative apparatchik who strongly rebukes Western liberal democracy, which (according to him) does not “guarantee that power shall truly be of the people, by the people and for the people”. Xi has also taken aim at Western-style democracy, saying that it has caused war, chaos, and displacement across the world. Since becoming the VCP General Secretary, Trong has sought to consolidate Marxist-Leninist ideology and clean up malfeasance within the VCP through his party-building efforts and ‘blazing furnace’ anti-graft drive (which mirror Xi’s campaign to root out corruption and ‘purify’ party ranks). In this way, Trong has many reasons to view Xi as an ally in defending communist rule against both internal and external hostile forces.
During their meeting at the end of October, both leaders underscored their respective parties’ achievements and legitimacy. Their joint statement highlights the two parties’ success in maintaining socio-political stability, promoting economic growth, and handling the COVID-19 pandemic, which demonstrates “the superiority of the socialist regime”. The two governments also pledged to deepen their exchanges toward “protecting the Party and the socialist regime in each country” and fighting against ‘peaceful evolution’ and ‘colour revolutions’.
Coexisting with China
Another reason why Trong seeks to promote the VCP’s ties with the CCP is to maintain a stable and cooperative relationship with China for the sake of Vietnam’s security. Vietnam-China ties are being frayed by the South China Sea dispute. Hanoi has been the loudest claimant in pushing back against Beijing’s maritime assertiveness. Vietnam has raised the profile of the South China Sea issue in international institutions and has strengthened maritime cooperation with the United States and other major powers to deter Chinese aggression.
Image credit: Wikimedia.
At the same time, Vietnam maintains direct engagement with China and avoids overt side-taking postures. The latest joint statement stresses that the two countries will continue to manage their maritime disputes in accordance with the 2011 agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues. Notably, this is the first Vietnam-China joint statement that mentions the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
During their latest meeting, Trong reassured Xi that his country would not host foreign military bases or join a military alliance against China. The message is clear: despite close defence ties, Vietnam is not siding with the US. Hanoi is aware that such a move could potentially invite Chinese economic or military retaliation. In 1979, China launched a border raid to “teach Vietnam a lesson” for allying with the Soviet Union and intervening in Cambodia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, following the latter’s growing alignment with the West, has further reinforced the Vietnamese leadership’s beliefs that it is strategically wise for smaller states to uphold a non-aligned posture in dealing with an overbearing neighbour.
Trade and supply chains also featured prominently on the agenda. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and among its largest foreign investors with bilateral trade surpassing USD 165 billion in 2021. Vietnam imports important raw materials from China while exporting much of its agricultural and garment products to the country through cross-border trade. But recently, Beijing’s strict COVID-19 measures and border restrictions have disrupted supply chains, hurting Vietnamese firms and farmers. Therefore, it was important for Trong to secure China’s pledge to ensure stable supply chains with Vietnam and speed up the process of importing Vietnamese agricultural and fishery products.
Geopolitical headwinds put Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ to the test
Trong’s meeting with Xi reflects Vietnam’s continued exercise of ‘bamboo diplomacy’ in protecting regime-state security. However, Hanoi’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ is facing significant challenges. During Xi Jinping’s third term, China will likely be more ambitious in asserting its South China Sea claims, at Vietnam’s expense. Vietnam will also need to grapple with China's strategic alignment with Russia in challenging the rules-based order that Vietnam supports and relies on. The prevalence of anti-China sentiment in the country is also a factor that will complicate Vietnam’s bid to preserve cooperative relations with its ideological brother-in-arms. The VCP’s domestic political legitimacy will be at serious risk if it is perceived as failing to defend Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from China’s aggression.
Meanwhile, the threat of ‘peaceful evolution’ is often exaggerated. There are limits on how far the United States is willing to press Vietnam on human rights, especially when Washington is seeking to upgrade the official bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership. In fact, it has been willing to overlook Hanoi’s human rights record to strengthen ties with its former enemy. President Obama’s decision to host Trong at the White House in 2015 was a symbolic gesture that goes a long way to drive home the point that the US does not seek regime change in Vietnam. More recently, US leaders and officials have repeatedly stressed that they support a strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam and respect Vietnam’s choice of political system. Vietnam should not be alarmed by the rhetoric of ‘democracies versus autocracies’ since it is not perceived by the US as a troublemaker vis-à-vis the rules-based order the way that China is.
Since the strategic environment is rapidly evolving, Vietnamese leaders need to constantly reflect on and recalibrate their strategy in dealing with great powers. As Vietnam’s most senior politician and the architect of the ‘bamboo diplomacy’ concept, Trong should promote efforts to update Vietnam’s strategic thinking, thereby enabling the country to bend and sway in the current geopolitical headwinds with greater flexibility.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Phan Xuan Dung is a Research Officer at the Vietnam Studies Programme, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. His research interests include Indo-Pacific geopolitics, Vietnam's foreign policy, and Vietnam War legacies. He has published work in the Asia Policy Journal, International Journal of Asian Studies, ISEAS Perspective, East Asia Forum, The Diplomat, and Fulcrum. Image credit: Wikimedia.