Navigating partnerships: The Trump administration meets the Blue Pacific

19 September 2025

Six months into the second Trump Administration, a more transactional, ‘America First’ foreign policy is coming into focus. Secretary of State Rubio articulated a clear framework: every foreign policy dollar spent, every program funded, and every policy pursued must answer three questions: Does it make America stronger? Does it make America safer? Does it make America more prosperous? Meanwhile, the Pacific Islands have charted their own strategic course through the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, the region’s long-term development strategy. So, the question is: where do these strategic outlooks align, and what opportunities exist at their intersection?

The rising profile of the Pacific Islands

The Trump Administration’s renewed interest in the Pacific Islands region began during its first term, when leaders of the Compacts of Free Association (the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) were hosted at the White House. Then-Secretary of State Pompeo also launched renegotiations of the COFA agreements. The Biden Administration built on this momentum by: hosting Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders at the White House twice; opening embassies in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga; publishing the first US-Pacific Partnership Strategy; reintroducing the Peace Corps post COVID-19; and establishing a USAID mission in Fiji.

Without CBRs, Pacific Islands face reduced financial inclusion and slower development. For the US, it risks pushing the region toward central bank digital currencies and de-dollarisation; a trend that could weaken US financial influence.

This continuity of engagement underscores the Pacific Islands region’s rising strategic profile as a key theatre of US-China geostrategic competition. Spanning an ocean area comparable in size to Asia, Europe, and North America combined, it sits along key maritime trade routes and within the second island chain - making the region important to both US economic and homeland security. The region represents a significant diplomatic voting bloc: the twelve independent Pacific Island Countries represent over 6 per cent of the UN. It also includes three of the twelve countries that maintain diplomatic recognition of Taiwan: the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. Beyond geography and diplomacy, the Pacific Islands are rich in natural resources. It holds some of the world’s largest seabed mineral deposits and produces approximately 70 per cent of the world’s commercially caught tuna.

Where US and Pacific Islands interests align

The US and Pacific Islands have a number of overlapping interests:

- Does it make America stronger?

Strengthening Pacific regionalism serves both US and the Pacific Islands strategic interests. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the region’s premier political and economic body, enables its 18 members to respond collectively to shared challenges, seize common opportunities, and amplify their voice on the global stage. Since China refuses to engage with the PIF as a bloc, due to three members maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the US holds a unique strategic advantage in deepening ties across all members. Hosting a third PIF Leaders Meeting at the White House could further solidify this partnership, but only if Washington delivers on the commitments from the first and second meetings.

Another important area of alignment is the US’ implementation of the COFA agreements. These agreements grant the US unrestricted military access to an area roughly the size of the continental US. This access forms a strategic corridor from Hawaii to the Philippines, which could prove vital in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. In return, COFA citizens are allowed to live and work in the US, serve in the US military, and receive access to specific federal programs and economic assistance. However, during the Trump Administration’s review of development assistance and shuttering of USAID concerns arose around delivery of key COFA benefits, like disaster relief and veteran support. While many services have since been restored, failure to fully deliver COFA commitments risks eroding US credibility and opening the door to greater Chinese influence in the region.

- Does it make America safer?

Expanding US coast guard operations and ship rider agreements makes both the US and the Pacific Islands safer. The US maintains twelve ship rider agreements with the Pacific Islands, enabling US Coast Guard vessels to host local law enforcement officials while patrolling their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). For the Pacific Islands, these agreements help combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; a problem that costs them an estimated US $123 million annually. They also help deter drug trafficking, human smuggling, and other transnational crimes. A 2024 methamphetamine seizure of 10.6 pounds in Fiji underscores the region’s role as a key drug transit hub. For the US, these agreements also serve domestic interests, aligning with President Trump’s priority of securing the global supply chain and addressing the national emergency posed by illicit drugs.

Similarly, US investment in undersea fiber-optic cables and repair capabilities advances shared interests in economic resilience and national security. Undersea fiber-optic cables carry over 95 per cent of international data, making them critical for financial transactions, military communications, and everyday internet traffic. Strengthening US involvement safeguards information, directly counters China's Digital Silk Road, and strengthens defences against “gray zone” tactics such as covert cable disruptions. The US-supported cable spur to Palau and Google's $1 billion Pacific Connect Initiative reflect momentum in this area. For the Pacific Islands, ICT infrastructure are lifelines for connectivity, economic development and disaster response. For example, in 2022, Tonga’s volcanic eruption severed the country’s main undersea cable, leaving it digitally isolated for weeks.

Closely linked to digital infrastructure is the need to enhance cybersecurity, which is a growing priority for both the US and Pacific Islands. The Pacific Islands region has been increasingly targeted by significant cyberattacks. Some examples include: the infiltration of the PIF Secretariat network; a cyberattack in Samoa that targeted government and critical infrastructure systems; and a breach of New Zealand’s parliamentary network. For the US, strengthening Pacific cybersecurity protects US information and enhances detection and understanding of malicious cyber actors. For the Pacific Islands, it's essential for national security and economic development.

- Does it make America more prosperous?

Administering the South Pacific Tuna Treaty funding presents a mutually beneficial economic cooperation. This treaty grants US fishing vessels access to 16 Pacific Islands’ EEZs. In return, the participating Pacific Islands receive US $600 million over ten years from the US Government, along with additional industry payments. The treaty supports sustainable resource management and creates economic opportunity on both sides.

Beyond fisheries, the US’ expanded support for public-private partnerships and private sector engagement offers new commercial opportunities for both the US and the Pacific Islands. The Trump Administration is focused on shifting from traditional aid to private-sector-led investment. Through institutions like the US Trade and Development Agency and US International Development Finance Corporation, the US can support investments in priority areas, such as infrastructure, transportation, renewable energy and tourism. This bolsters Pacific Islands’ economies while advancing US business interests and countering unfair foreign competition.

Finally, the US supporting correspondent banking relationships (CBR) through Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) compliance capacity-building preserves US financial influence while promoting the Pacific Islands’ economic resilience. CBRs enable cross-border payments, including wire transfers, foreign exchange transactions, and other financial services. However, many Pacific Islands are facing a decline in CBRs due to de-risking by international banks. Pacific Islands often struggle to meet complex and costly AML and CFT requirements. Without CBRs, Pacific Islands face reduced financial inclusion and slower development. For the US, it risks pushing the region toward central bank digital currencies and de-dollarisation; a trend that could weaken US financial influence.

Where US and Pacific Islands interests diverge

Despite these areas of strategic alignment, significant points of divergence remain. Climate change is the Pacific Islands’ highest priority, with PIF leaders consistently identifying it as their greatest national security threat and an existential risk. Under the Trump Administration, climate-related and disaster-resilience programs have faced substantial cuts. At the same time, the Pacific Islands remain the most aid-dependent region in the world, with acute needs in health, education, and basic services. These issues, however, are unlikely to be prioritised by a Trump Administration that has emphasised self-reliance and a shift away from traditional forms of development assistance.

The US and Pacific Islands share overlapping interests that can form the basis of a productive, if transactional, partnership. However, credibility and long-term influence in the Pacific Islands region will require more than policies that align with Secretary Rubio’s three-point framework. It will demand consistency, mutual respect, and a willingness to respond to the region’s self-identified priorities.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Jemima Holborow is an Honorary Research Associate for Political-Security Affairs and Trade at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). Prior to joining ASPI, she worked at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in Fiji, focusing on trade and economic development across the Pacific region. Jemima has also served at the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where she worked on New Zealand’s bilateral relationships with the United States of America and Malaysia, as well as on New Zealand’s engagement with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Small Advanced Economies Initiative. Image credit: Flickr/US Embassy in New Zealand.