Khan versus the rest: What lies ahead for Pakistan

19 May 2023

On 9 May 2023, Pakistan’s former prime minister and cricket legend Imran Khan was forcefully and violently whisked away by the Punjab Rangers, a paramilitary force, about a graft reference against him. His supporters, who have been guarding his residence in Lahore since he sustained bullet injuries in an assassination attempt last year, took to the streets in protest. Khan’s Movement for Justice Party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) stressed the need for protesting peacefully. However, what transpired was anything but peaceful.

The police arrested, detained, and beat scores of people who came out in support of Khan. 4G Internet services and access to social media websites were banned across the country. The situation turned violent when the official residence of Lahore’s Corps Commander was ransacked. While the coalition government blames Khan and his party for this and other acts of arson, Khan dubs them an inside job aimed at framing him and his party as anti-state. The Supreme Court’s decision terming Khan’s arrest illegal as well as bail granted to him by the Islamabad High Court ensured his release on 12 May. Thousands of supporters welcomed and garlanded him as he returned to his ancestral home in Lahore, which, some months ago, was vandalised by the police.

The crisis can only end if the government realises that preventing people from exercising their right to vote will be counterproductive going forward.

Less than a day after his release, Khan came out all guns blazing against his opponents, vowing to continue fighting for what he deems ‘real freedom’. The government also seems determined to defy the Supreme Court’s order to hold elections in Pakistan’s Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Further, as evidenced by an ongoing crackdown against social media activists and the senior leadership of Khan’s party, the current government is committed to countering the threat that Khan’s growing popularity poses to its political future. All this means that the political crisis, which started last year with the ouster of Khan, is no way near its end. If anything, the past week's events suggest that the situation will deteriorate going forward.

Difficult times ahead

There are three factors which will keep the situation volatile in the coming months. First, Khan’s popularity, which was already at an all-time high, will increase manifold after his rather triumphant release. The way the former premier was taken away by the paramilitary troops reinforces his and his followers’ belief that he is being victimised and targeted to keep him out of the political arena. The government’s plummeting reputation and popularity will be further dented, making it harder for the 13-party alliance to defeat Khan in any future election. This could mean that, in the months to come, Pakistan’s two major provinces Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could remain without any elected governments. In other words, 60 per cent of the country will be unconstitutionally deprived of choosing their representatives, which, in and of itself, will lead to more uncertainty and instability.

Here, it is important to note that the incumbent government sees Khan as a veritable, existential threat to its politics as clearly stated by Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah. A continued refusal to implement the orders of the Supreme Court will further erode the credibility of the current setup, not least because the swords of contempt proceedings leading to disqualifications will hang over the heads of key government ministers, especially Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. However, fearing that an aggressive, popular, and empowered Khan might gain a decisive majority in the upcoming polls, the government might mull over undemocratic or draconian options to neutralise the judiciary. This will be bad news for a country reeling from multidimensional economic crises. Notably, Pakistan and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are yet to complete the 9th review of the ongoing programme. If the IMF does not release the tranche, Pakistan might default.

Second, the government’s crackdown on Khan’s party, coupled with an increasing willingness to teach it a lesson, will hurt political and media freedoms, which will further aggravate tensions in the country. Cutting the country’s most popular political party down to size will be tough since the government will face many legal and constitutional hurdles. Khan’s successful mobilisation of the masses and the judiciary means that such efforts will be resisted at all levels, triggering clashes between and within institutions. This will make the resulting political impasse more unnavigable. While Pakistan’s political history is rife with examples of eviscerating political parties, the rapid and consistent increase in Khan’s popular support is new and potentially game-changing now.

While previous Pakistani leaders went abroad after they were removed from power, Khan remains in Pakistan and galvanises his dynamic, enthusiastic voters through rallies, processions, and fiery speeches. Although vibrant political participation across domains is healthy for the future of democracy, it may become a source of friction in Pakistan simply because Khan’s nemeses consider it so. Recently, Pakistan’s top diplomat Bilawal Bhutto Zardari likened Khan’s party to a terrorist outfit. This suggests that the government will not shy away from ramping up its high-handed activities if Khan continues to challenge it the way he has been doing. And with the kind of cushion that his fervent supporters provide him, he is more determined to fight it out. Hence, political temperatures are expected to rise, paving the way for more violence and chaos going forward.

Third, as a result of unremitting political and economic turmoil in the country, Pakistan’s ability to effectively deal with foreign policy issues will weaken. Certainly, a government lacking a popular mandate will find it difficult to inspire confidence regarding foreign relations. For example, to benefit from the recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan needs to present itself as a cohesive unit that can make strategic choices. Moreover, the current political logjam, which is a result of the government’s deliberate effort to flout the country’s constitution, will greatly hurt Pakistan’s bid to embrace geoeconomics. Indeed, to become a pivotal geoeconomic actor in the region, Pakistan needs to create an enabling environment for enhancing regional connectivity. This cannot happen if foreign governments and businesses see political instability as a major hindrance.

In Pakistan’s case, government ministers expending time on discussing and berating Khan on mainstream media eats into the time for having and communicating substantive policy discussions, to assure foreign audiences. Moreover, Khan’s ability to apply public pressure on the government whenever required raises many question marks regarding policy continuity. So, at a time when the government is becoming increasingly unpopular and weak, it is unreasonable to expect breakthroughs in the foreign policy domain.

Can the situation improve?

The fight between a defiant, optimistic Khan and an enfeebled yet entrenched government is entering a dangerous phase. This will have serious ramifications for Pakistan in the months to come. The crisis can only end if the government realises that preventing people from exercising their right to vote will be counterproductive going forward. The continued violation of the country’s constitution will leave an indelible impact on the government’s legacy and democratic credentials, and this will not go down well with potential voters. And with the economy in dire straits, all stakeholders need to break the deadlock on holding elections.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is Deputy Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of Lahore. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Voice of America.