Italy-China relations under Meloni: Less hard-line than expected
Italy-China relations under Meloni: less
hard-line than
expected
WRITTEN BY LORENZO LAMPERTI
16 February 2023
On 26 July 2022, during the Italian general election campaign, Giorgia Meloni posted a few lines on Instagram, accompanied by a photo of her with a Taiwanese diplomat. “Fruitful working meeting with Taiwan's representative in Italy, Ambassador Andrea Sing-Ying Lee. Always at the side of those who believe in the values of freedom and democracy”. In doing so, Meloni, the leader of the right-wing party Brothers of Italy, sent a twofold message: support for Taipei and a demonstration of their dependability in regard to the United States' policies concerning the People's Republic of China.
At that moment, Meloni’s aim was to guarantee the Atlanticist line of her coalition (which included Forza Italia and the League). The respective party leaders of Forza Italia and the League, Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini, both have pasts studded with deep ties to President Vladimir Putin and have also made ambiguous statements on the war in Ukraine.
Unable to presently guarantee total alignment when it comes to sharing the American point of view on Russia and the current war in Ukraine, Meloni has chosen to present herself as fully aligned with Washington on the Chinese front. Since 2019 (at least), when the Conte government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) about joining Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Italy has been under American scrutiny.
Before the Italian elections, rumours were circulating about the possible dispatch of an Italian navy ship to the Indo-Pacific in 2023.
Still, a turnaround had also been in the making: the Conte government stopped further investment from Chinese company Huawei, after having previously favoured its involvement in the development of 5G network infrastructure. Under the following government headed by Mario Draghi, Italy signalled a return to the Atlanticist line. After the Brothers of Italy's clear victory in the 25 September 2022 elections, Rome seemed ready to complete its turnaround on relations with China. In office, however, Meloni’s government is proving to be more cautious than previously expected.
Sweet on Taipei, tough on Beijing — before the elections
Meloni has always been critical of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2008, as Italy’s Sports Minister, she called for the boycott of the Beijing Olympics over China’s policies in Tibet while advocating for international support of the protests. During the recent election campaign, Meloni repeatedly said she did not want to renew the Belt and Road agreement which expires in 2024. In addition, she repeatedly linked the war in Ukraine to possible Chinese military action on Taiwan and espoused the view that the world is facing a battle between democracy and autocracy.
In a written interview with Taiwan's Central News Agency, Meloni expressed her party's “sincere friendship” with the Republic of China, lashed out at Beijing's “unacceptable behaviour”, and declared that the ‘Taiwan issue’ would be “fundamental” for Italy. Brothers of Italy has long sought closer ties with Taipei. Party member Lucio Malan is one of two Italian co-chairs in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which was formed to coordinate how democratic countries should approach Beijing’s increasing assertiveness.
As the head of the Italy-Taiwan Interparliamentary Friendship Group since 2013, Malan has also been a vocal critic of China’s aggressive foreign policies. Support for Taiwan, however, always seems to be at least partly motivated by the need to show hostility to the People's Republic of China (given the binary interpretation of the subject in Italian politics): if you have ties with Taipei, it means you want to show hostility to Beijing or vice versa.
In the interview, Meloni herself emphasised the difference in views between her and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen: “Although our political ideas are different, Taiwan and Italy will be able to have fruitful cooperation”. Meloni did not elaborate on the issues In which she differs from Tsai, such as same-sex marriages.
Still, Meloni is speaking with China
However, once the election campaign was over and the time for governing began, Meloni's tone became more cautious. In November 2022, Meloni met Chinese President Xi Jinping in a bilateral meeting on the sideline of the G20 summit in Bali. The communiqué issued by the Italian government had a very conciliatory tone and focused on the subject of economic relations — much like previous Italian governments have focused on presenting China as a large potential market.
A few hours before the meeting, Beijing gave the go-ahead for the purchase of at least 250 ATR aircraft — owned by Italy and France (Leonardo and Airbus) — by 2035. The negotiations had taken 36 months. In terms of the frozen BRI memorandum, the two leaders have not spoken about this matter explicitly. Meloni proposed to Beijing rebalancing their trade by increasing exports to China. Xi showed himself amenable in this respect but made a point to recall the weight of the sanctions battle with Europe over the Xinjiang conflict.
The communiqué left aside more sensitive political issues, including Taiwan. Instead, it focused on reiterating the sharing of a millennia-old history between the two countries, an old argument used by China to create a sense of having a 'community of shared destiny' with Italy. At the end of the meeting, President Xi invited Meloni to pay a visit to China, which she accepted.
A few days after the meeting between Meloni and Xi, Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi also met. The two expressed their commitment to relaunching the bilateral dialogue and strengthening economic relations in crucial sectors (starting with energy transition and efficiency), while also hoping for easier access of Italian food products to the Chinese market. Tajani stated that Italy's market is open to Chinese businesses. This was a change of tone from what Adolfo Urso, the new Italian Industry Minister, had said some weeks earlier: “Italy will not be dependent on Chinese trade or technology and will safeguard any sector deemed as strategic. We will not put ourselves into the hands of the Chinese”.
The future of Italy-China relations
Under Draghi, Italy’s previous government had already decisively returned the country to the classic Euro-Atlantic mode, using or threatening to use the so-called ‘Golden Power’ legal tool on several occasions to block the acquisition of Italian companies, such as semiconductor equipment manufacturer LPE in 2021.
In March 2022, the government decided to cancel the sale of the military drone company Alpi Aviation to Mars Information Technology, which is owned by Chinese state-owned companies. Efort Intelligent Equipment, a Beijing-linked company, wanted to increase its stake in Robox, a Novara-based company from 40 per cent to 49 per cent. But Rome opposed the technology transfer envisaged in the agreement by using its special powers. One of the latest ‘victims’ of Sino-Italian turnarounds is the Emilian Motor Valley, where the investment of over EUR 1.3 billion promised by Silk Faw may never arrive.
Meloni has labelled the Belt and Road membership as a mistake several times, suggesting that a step backwards will probably be necessary: “If I had to sign the extension tomorrow morning, it would be hard for me to see to the political conditions to do so”. She was even more assertive in the past, linking the need to exit the Chinese project with the need to rebalance Italian foreign policy and ultimately reassure Washington.
“Our foreign policy has to be Europeanist and Atlanticist,” she said in 2021, asking Draghi’s government to review Italy’s participation in the BRI. But this does not mean that her government will try to sever ties with Beijing. This position was well summarised by Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto a few days after the Bali summit: “Our position will not change, so any renewal [of the Belt and Road MoU] I see as unlikely”. “On the other hand,” he said, “I do not think we can do without economic cooperation with a giant like China”.
However, the desire to maintain or expand trade ties might suggest greater caution on the thornier issues related to the People's Republic. As the previous cases of Australia and Lithuania have shown, taking an overly vocal line towards Beijing on human rights and other delicate issues like Taiwan or Xinjiang can lead to economic retaliation. This is exactly what Italy, whose foreign policy is very much devoted to trade, would like to avoid.
Still, it is also difficult to foresee a substantial change in Italy’s relations with Taiwan. In the coming months, a delegation of Brothers of Italy MPs is likely to visit Taipei, rumoured to take place at the beginning of 2023. But this trip appears to have been postponed till after Meloni visits Beijing. Support for Taiwan will remain strong in words and could become stronger in actions, should the relationship with Beijing be compromised.
However, the Meloni government does not seem intent on starting any initiatives that could jeopardise relations with Beijing. Rather than pursuing European initiatives, the Meloni government seems to be cultivating an image of closely following Washington's wishes. But Rome seems to be hoping that the political and confrontational path that is being pushed by the US can be separated from the economic one, and that there will be no breaking point where Beijing insists on trade relations.
On the other hand, if a confrontation cannot be avoided, it seems more difficult to imagine a step back by Meloni in the face of Chinese threats of retaliation. The anti-communist ideological flavour of the ruling coalition could also lead towards a hard-line dispute that Beijing itself has so far shown it wants to avoid. Having said that, it cannot be ruled out that the Meloni government will also consider clearer signs of strategic alignment with the US. Since 2020, “Italy has been urged to take part in Beijing's maritime containment, flanking the US and its partners in naval patrols in East Asia”. So far, this has not happened.
At the recent 15th Conference of Italian Ambassadors, Foreign Minister Tajani promised: “We will keep a close eye on the Indo-Pacific area [in particular so that Taipei maintains the] status quo”. Before the Italian elections, rumours were circulating about the possible dispatch of an Italian navy ship to the Indo-Pacific in 2023. If it happens, it will most likely be after Meloni visits Beijing. It is better not to risk prematurely angering Xi.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Lorenzo Lamperti is an Italian journalist who covers China and East Asia. He is the editor-in-chief of China Files, the only Italian-language platform entirely dedicated to China and Asia. He collaborates with various newspapers, radio stations, and research institutes, including La Stampa, Il Manifesto, Wired, Radio 24, and ISPI. Currently based in Taipei, he edits the weekly magazine 'Taiwan Files'. Image credit: Italian Government.