A united Taliban — an existential threat to Pakistan
A united Taliban—
an existential
threaT To Pakistan
WRITTEN BY DR SIEGFRIED O. WOLF
15 February 2023
Pakistan’s security situation is deteriorating, largely due to its failed policy in Afghanistan. The most dramatic and immediate repercussion of this is a new wave of terror attacks throughout the country, especially due to increased activity by the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is the largest and most active armed opposition group in Pakistan. It was formed in 2007 by several smaller subsets of the Pakistani Taliban operating along the Afghan–Pakistan border.
The TTP’s main objectives are to overthrow the government in Islamabad and to establish a Shariah-based Islamic political system. The group shares a common history and overlapping ideology with the Afghan Taliban, with whom they formed a military alliance against the US/NATO troops in Afghanistan. The TTP, which is listed as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ by the US Department of State, emerged in 2007 across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Since then, Islamabad has tried to deal with the organisation through measures “vacillating between appeasement and use of force”. Both approaches have proved fruitless. Numerous rounds of negotiations with the TTP, which functions as an umbrella organisation for anti-Pakistan forces, have only led to temporary ceasefires at best. Major military campaigns against the terrorist group, most noteworthy the Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017) operations, have eliminated a significant number of their fighters.
Pakistan needs to understand that the Afghan Taliban are a liability and not an asset for achieving national interests.
However, large segments of the TTP were able to take shelter in neighbouring Afghanistan, and — more importantly — the basic leadership and the organisational structure of the grouping remained intact. As we are witnessing today, the (remarkable) reduction in terrorist attacks following Pakistan’s use of massive coercive force against the TTP was only a short-lived phenomenon.
Rising animosity towards Islamabad
Against this backdrop, military experts are questioning the potential success of another round of military operations. The likelihood of military actions taking place on Afghan soil was recently insinuated by several Pakistani authorities. The overall capacity of the country’s armed forces seems even more doubtful after the takeover of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban. The latter — despite facing new challenges through the presence of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and other elements hostile towards the Taliban regime (for example, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan) — is currently in an extraordinarily well-placed position to grant unprecedented support to the TTP.
Observers are convinced that the Afghan Taliban will not take action against the TTP. Some even go a step further, arguing that “[a]ny action against the TTP, especially inside Afghanistan, will be deemed by the TTA [Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan or Afghan Taliban] as action against Afghanistan”. Following this rationale, one should expect that Taliban-ruled Kabul will intensify its support for its Pakistani allies. Generally, it is assumed by Pakistani authorities that Kabul “is using [the] TTP as a pressure tool” against Islamabad so as to tackle the challenges and obstacles (foremost the dispute over the Durand line as an international border) in bilateral relations in Afghanistan’s favour.
According to defence and foreign policy analyst Ejaz Haider, it appears that the most influential traditionally pro-Pakistani elements within the Afghan Taliban — namely the Haqqani Network (also described as the Kabul faction), headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani — are “no longer facilitating talks between the TTP and Pakistan”. Afghanistan Defence Minister Yaqoob Mujahid, known for his rather moderate stand, even expressed “his animosity towards Pakistan” on several occasions. This is most likely endorsed by the Afghan Taliban Amir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is also the leader of the Kandahari faction, and possesses almost ‘absolute power’ within the decision-making structure in Kabul. The Kandahari faction is known for being critical of any interference by Pakistan in Afghanistan’s affairs.
It seems that the once diverting views on Pakistan by the rival Kandahari and Kabul factions are now becoming closer aligned. This hints at a major shift within the Afghan Taliban leadership’s stand towards Islamabad, obviously to the disadvantage of the latter. However, some consider that the disobedience by the Afghan Taliban towards Islamabad’s demands has its limitations, particularly considering Kabul’s economic and political interests, as well as its need for support so as to gain formal recognition by the international community.
Towards a major TTP insurgency
Ejaz Haider stresses that during earlier major anti-TTP campaigns by the Pakistani Army, the Afghan Taliban were busy staging an “insurgency against a United States-led coalition of western military powers”. After the departure of the international forces and the breakdown of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, the Afghan Taliban are free from having to face combat troops on the ground. They thus have much more operational freedom and have increased capacities at their disposal due to being able to take over a significant number of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment left by both the US and NATO.
At the same time, the TTP no longer faces severe threats from the presence of international troops in Afghanistan (aside from potential drone strikes). Instead, the TTP enjoys hospitality and is allowed to operate with impunity. Against their own differing public statements, the Afghan Taliban are providing the TTP fighters with safe havens. This is without a doubt encouraging the TTP to step up their activities against the Pakistani state and society by opening not only a military but a political front too.
In military terms, the TTP launched a fresh wave of systematic terror attacks in December 2022 — a development which must be described as the emergence of a major insurgency. Politically, the TTP tries to capitalise on the ignorant and repressive approach by Islamabad towards the border regions (formerly known as Federally Tribal Administered Areas [FATA]), which creates much harm against, and anger among, locals. It remains to be seen to what extent the TTP is able to gain leverage. The group is trying to rebrand its nefarious terrorist image by announcing that it intends to steer clear of the “blatant use of indiscriminate violence” and has “disassociated itself from transnational jihadist movements”.
The latter also aims to dilute the “vociferous opposition” present in the inhabitants of the areas, which was reflected in the recent large but peaceful protests. The TTP insists on the “reinstatement of the semi-autonomous status” of the FATA, meaning the reversal of the 2018 merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province — which many locals oppose. Another political measure taken by the TTP is that the group not only rejected the Pakistani constitution but appointed its own government for the border areas. As such, the TTP challenges the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, which means that the group aims for the capitulation of the Pakistani state and its institutions.
In the words of prominent Pakistani political commentator Pervez Hoodbhoy, the TTP is making demands “that no sovereign state can possibly accept”. Furthermore, the group blames Islamabad for the high levels of socioeconomic and political instability. In their public statements, the TTP blames the “corrupt practices” and “cruel policies” of the civilian and military elites responsible for all kinds of undesirable developments, such as the government’s mismanagement of natural disasters, inflation, and ethnic and sectarian conflicts.
However, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military can rely on the support of local tribal communities in border areas either since these suffered significantly more from Pakistani military actions than from terrorism. Pakistani military operations, especially Zarb-e-Azb, did not adequately consider the operational and strategic environments of the border regions. Poor planning contributed to the ultimate large-scale destruction of houses, businesses, and markets, as well as forced displacement. The fact that local people also fell victim to TTP terror attacks does not change the situation.
The anti-TTP protests by locals are not only a statement against terrorism but an expression of frustration about the unwillingness or inability of the Pakistani security forces to implement a smart and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. It is no surprise that Islamabad has lost the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people in the region, or that such a disproportionate use of coercive force has created resentment. This is opening a window of opportunity for others to gain leverage among sections of the tribal people. By losing the goodwill of the local people, the Pakistani military has not only lost the key to winning against the TTP but has also made achieving control over the western borders very unlikely.
Pakistan turns into the main target of regional Jihad
Regardless of the immediate developments in terms of the increased number of armed confrontations with the TTP, there are several takeaways for the Pakistani military and the civilian leadership. Islamabad must realise that the Taliban constitutes a hostile government in Afghanistan and that it is not able to drive a wedge between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. Instead, both groups stand united and are starting to share increasingly anti-Pakistani sentiments. Subsequently, the deeply entrenched “‘good [Afghan] Taliban, bad [Pakistan] Taliban’ binary” perception among the country’s military and intelligence community has come to an end — at a very high price both for the country and its citizens.
Pakistan needs to understand that the Afghan Taliban are a liability and not an asset for achieving national interests. Finally, understanding that terrorism in the country is homegrown, Pakistan’s leadership needs to stop its ambivalent approach towards terrorist groups, the state patronage of Islamisation, its appeasement and sponsorship of terrorist groups, and it must fundamentally reassess its centre-region relations. If not, the TTP insurgency will become a severe threat towards Pakistan’s very statehood, moving the country into the crosshairs of Jihad.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Siegfried O. Wolf is the Director of Research at South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF, a Brussels-based think tank) and a Senior Researcher (member) at the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University in Germany. Dr Wolf worked as a consultant to NATO-sponsored, periodic, and strategic research in assessing Afghanistan-Pakistan issues. His latest book is The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Concept, Context, Assessment. Image credit: Pixabay.