Indian geostrategy: lessons from the Raj
Indian geostrategy: Lessons from the Raj
WRITTEN BY GOKUL SAHNI
17 June 2020
Recent weeks have seen India embroiled in border disputes with China which reference treaties from the time of the British Raj. The recent standoff in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh with Beijing has strategic analysts relooking at lines that were drawn when India was a British colony.
While the McMahon line, drawn in 1914 after the Simla Conference, is well known as being the basis for India’s view of the border with China in the eastern sector, India’s border claims in the Ladakh sector are ‘very similar’ to the Johnson line, drawn in 1865. India’s recent border dispute with Nepal is perhaps even more interesting - it references the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, that was signed between the Kingdom of Nepal and the East India Company. For a country that has been independent for over 70 years, it is remarkable that colonial maps are quite often, still, the basis for border negotiations.
Clearly, there is some merit in understanding more about how the British viewed the geostrategy of the ‘jewel in the crown’ of its empire. Deciphering the Raj’s geostrategy, defined as reaching beyond traditional geopolitics to include the cumulative role of history, will help us understand what lessons the current day republic can learn from its own past.
In this feature, I first look at how the British, as ruling colonialists, saw India in relation to its territorial and maritime neighbours across Asia. In the second part, I look at how a newly independent India began to understand the need to secure the Indian Ocean.
Part I: British India’s geostrategy
Perhaps there is no better elucidation of British India’s geostrategy than what was outlined by Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1899 to 1905. In a long speech titled ‘The Place of India in the Empire’ delivered at the Philosophical Institute of Edinburgh in October 1909, Curzon explicitly lays out the role India played in the spread of Empire:
“Consider in the first place what a part India has played in the shaping of British policy and expansion of the British dominion. But for India, Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the shares in the Suez Canal; and but for the Suez Canal, we should not now be in Egypt. The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. Had it not been for India, we should never have seized the Cape or begun that career of South African expansion that has lately entered upon so remarkable and pregnant a phase. But for India, we should not have been able to incarcerate the mighty spirit of Napoleon in the rocky prison of St Helena; Mauritius would not now be ours; nor should we have acquired a predominant position in Mesopotamia, or have controlled the Persian Gulf. India compelled us to lay hold of Aden, a position of incomparable importance, and to establish a protectorate over the neighbouring parts of Arabia. India started us on that career of territorial conquest which was only arrested by the snowy ramparts of the Himalayas, and which converted us from a small island with trading and maritime interests into the greatest land power of the world. It was through India that we established those connections with the Straits Settlements (formerly under the rule of the Governor-General of India), and with China and Japan, that were the foundation of our once unchallenged and still powerful position in the Far East. India took us to the foolishly-surrendered possession of Java.
Even now, consider what India means, in the narrowest geographical sense. When a Viceroy sets out for India, or returns from thence, the first and the last place where he touches Indian soil is Aden. Aden involved the acquisition of Perim, the Kuria Muria Islands, the Protectorate of Socotra, and also the Somali Protectorate, for many years administered from India, but now transferred to the Foreign Office. The Laccadive and Andaman and Nicobar Islands are part of the Indian dominion. It is a mere accident that Ceylon, which is physically a part of the Indian peninsula, and is cultivated by Indian coolies, is administered by the Colonial Office. India includes Burma, which in physical features, population, and creed, might be a part of another continent. It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added, in the world.
The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, its great trading harbours; its reserve of military strength, supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment’s notice upon any point either of Asia or Africa - all these are assets of precious value. On the west, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan; on the north it can veto any rival in Tibet; on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam. On its high seas it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas. Before any of these extensions had been achieved, the supreme value of India as the centre and secret of Imperial dominion was apprehended by the eagle-eye of Napoleon. It was the remark of De Tocqueville that the conquest and government of India were really the achievements that had given to England her place in the eyes of the world.’
There is much to scrutinize here. Lord Curzon attributes control of India as being integral to British foreign policy across Asia and vividly paints a picture of the extent of India’s geostrategic map. Bounded by the ‘snowy ramparts’ of the Himalayas and the Russian Empire to the north, India’s natural geostrategic arc of influence is towards the south: a semicircle extending from Aden in the east to Singapore in the west. Burma, despite being administered as a part of India, is seen as being distinct, while Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka) is ‘physically a part of the Indian peninsula’.
The eastern portions of the Middle East are recognised as having strategic salience to India, with Mesopotamia and Persia (modern day Iraq and Iran respectively) and parts of Arabia (referring to present day Bahrain, Qatar and UAE) specifically outlined. The Cape of Good Hope and South Africa, located at the southwestern boundary of the Indian Ocean, are mentioned too, as well as eastward connections with Java in Southeast Asia, and with China and Japan in East Asia. Lord Curzon has essentially mapped out the entire Indian Ocean with India at its apex.
If modern India continues to base its territorial claims from the work of British civil servants like Henry McMahon and William Johnson, it would make sense to understand more on how the sovereign power of the time viewed India’s own strategic interests.
India’s primacy over the Indian Ocean is an established fact for Lord Curzon as it ‘commands the routes to Australia and the China Seas’. Islands all over the Indian Ocean are seen as being necessary for India’s geostrategic position. These include small islands which belong to the independent nations of Mauritius, Yemen and Oman today, and those still remaining with the Indian state: the Laccadive (now Lakshadweep) and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. As the preeminent naval power of the time, the British saw these islands as force multipliers, long before the term was coined.
Has India’s geostrategic location changed much from the times of the British Raj? In a few cases, it has. Lord Curzon believed that it ‘could veto any rival in Tibet’, confidence that unfortunately proved to be unfounded as events in the 1950s proved. Lord Curzon seemingly would have exhorted India to take a more active role than simply hosting the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile. He would have also been surprised that China has emerged as the strongest power across Asia, contradicting his assertion that ‘the master of India’ would be the greatest power in Asia, and rather theatrically, in the world.
The separation of Burma from British India in 1937 and the eventual carving out of Pakistan, particularly its western part, undermined independent India’s ability to either decisively play a role in south-east Asian geopolitics or influence the Persian Gulf and the Middle East on its western flank, as was envisioned by Lord Curzon in 1909. Most notably, India’s ability to ‘exert great pressure upon China’ has proven to be limited, leading one to wonder whether India would have been better served if it had continued the Raj’s realpolitik view of its neighbourhood, rather than focus on Afro-Asian and Third World solidarity in its initial years after independence.
1909 map of the British Indian Empire from Imperial Gazetteer of India. British India in two shades of pink and the princely states in yellow. Edinburgh Geographical Institute; J. G. Bartholomew and Sons. - Oxford University Press
There continue to be lessons that the modern Indian state can derive from the Raj. The noted strategist, C. Raja Mohan, has often written about this topic. While accepting the differences between independent India and its predecessor, he notes that ‘there was no escaping the enduring geographic imperatives of India’s security’. Raja Mohan outlines that key tenets of modern Indian foreign policy - India’s opposition to intervention by others in its neighbourhood, security assistance to smaller neighbours, and its imagined security perimeter running from Aden to Malacca - are direct descendants of the British Raj’s policies.
Understanding the British perspective of constructing Indian foreign policy may surprise many Indians who have for decades been taught history with a distinctly nationalist and anti-colonialist lens. The Raj is viewed by Indians, quite rightfully, as being an unjust imposition by a foreign power, which was more interested in plundering India’s resources than governing it justly, and one which set new standards of hypocrisy and racism. Yet if modern India continues to base its territorial claims on the work of British civil servants like Henry McMahon and William Johnson, it would make sense to understand more on how the sovereign power of the time viewed India’s strategic interests. For even in the modern world which brings new threats and opportunities from cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, geography remains permanent.
Part II: India and the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean has been shedding its tag as ‘the least studied of the world's geographic regions’ of late. The region has found itself as an integral part of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategic concept, and is now viewed by many as being ‘at the heart of global geopolitics’. Stories abound in the media ranging from coverage of Chinese admiral Zheng He’s voyages to the region in the fifteenth century to more current stories around India’s role in humanitarian and disaster relief as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean region.
Yet perhaps there is some merit in the claim of this region being under-studied, particularly in the context of India’s geopolitical strategy. Why is it even in India’s strategic interests to pursue primacy in the region? Isn’t India essentially a land-based power which faces its major security threats from across its land borders? Aren’t India’s latest confrontations with Pakistan in 2019 and with China this year proof of the need to prioritize land-based security?
KM Panikkar, India’s ambassador to China, Egypt and France in the 1950s, provides a different take. In his masterly 1951 book, India and the Indian Ocean. Panikkar identified that control over the Indian Ocean has been directly tied to India’s security. Despite the countless invasions that have come for centuries from India’s north-west, Panikkar noted that ‘India never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea in the first decade of the sixteenth century’. While the British were to eventually transform the Indian Ocean into a ‘British lake’, the Portuguese under Albuquerque were the first to establish dominance as a foreign power. The Portuguese built on their conquest of Africa and established control over Socotra and Malacca, to ultimately get a toehold on the Indian subcontinent in the form of Goa.
For Panikkar, it was very obvious on what the Indian Ocean meant to India:
‘While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea. Her life lines are concentrated in that area. Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected.’
He noted that both history and geography gave India advantages that were second to none:
‘India has undoubtedly an ideal geographical position for a naval power. Her geographical position controls the sea vital to her: the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Her peninsular character gives her influence over vast stretches of sea. Her coast line is provided with numerous harbours, and though she is lacking in protected sea areas, except the Gulf of Cutch, she has a pre-eminently maritime position on which to base a strong navy. Her geographical ‘comformation’ sent many of her communities to the sea and even in the days of India’s political subordination Indian seamanship maintained itself not only by its country crafts which sailed the coasts of India, Iran and even Africa, but by service as lascars in foreign vessels.’
Writing only a few years after independence, Panikkar recognizes the importance of working with states in pursuit of securing the region, and notably also cooperating closely with the UK, which continued to have significant naval interests.
‘If a steel ring can be created around India with air and naval bases at suitable points and if within the area so ringed, a navy can be created strong enough to defend its home waters, then the waters vital to India’s security and prosperity can be protected and converted into an area of safety. With the islands of the Bay of Bengal with Singapore, Mauritius and Socotra, properly equipped and protected and with a navy strong enough in its home waters. Security can return to that part of the Indian Ocean which is of supreme importance to India.
‘It need hardly be said that such an Oceanic policy for India is possible only in the closest collaboration and association with the states of the Indian Ocean area, Britain has evacuated the Indian mainland but not the Indian Ocean. She has a line of defence stretching from Aden to Singapore via Trincomalee which gives her effective control of the Indian seas… The future of India will undoubtedly be decided on the sea. It is indissolubly connected with developments in the Indian Ocean. India cannot therefore afford to take the selfish view that the control of the sea is Britain’s job and that our freedom will be allowed to grow and develop within the magic circle’.
For Panikkar, it is almost self-evident that:
‘It is an obvious fact to any student of history that India’s security lies on the Indian Ocean: that without a well considered and effective naval policy, India’s position in the world will be weak, dependent on others and her freedom at the mercy of any country capable of controlling the Indian Ocean. India’s future therefore is closely bound up with the strength she is able to develop as a naval power.’
Writing in the recent aftermath of World War II, Panikkar noted that Britain continued to be dominant in the Indian Ocean, with her main props of oceanic power being Aden, Trincomalee and Singapore. Yet it was clear that ‘India, with her geographical position and greater resources’ will eventually have to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean for its own security. Ceylon’s (Sri Lanka) defence, whether naval or land-based ‘cannot be separated from that of India’, while Burma’s lack of resources would stymie it from becoming a true naval power. The newly created Pakistan, with its western and eastern wings, was structurally disadvantaged from becoming a strong naval power given the geographical constraint of having to maintain two independent navies. For Panikkar, there was no serious regional rival that could emerge to challenge India, which was blessed with geography, resources, to dominate the Indian Ocean – a necessity for its security and prosperity.
British carrier Hermes sinking in the Indian Ocean after Japanese carrier air attack on Sri Lanka April 9, 1942. Photo taken from a Japanese aircraft.
Did Panikkar expect extra-regional powers to enter the Indian Ocean in a way similar to the Europeans in the age of imperialism? Writing almost eight decades ago, Panikkar identified that China was likely to be a geopolitical player in the Indian Ocean region. China’s base in Hainan places it ‘in even a more advantageous position than Japan’ which threatened British India during World War II with its lightning conquest of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. China’s considerable naval tradition during the times of Zheng He coupled with the significant proportion of overseas Chinese settled across Southeast Asia make it impossible for China to ‘neglect her naval interests’ in the future.
What would Panikkar likely recommend to India today? Apart from the constant reiteration that India cannot outsource its defence and security (read the US today rather than the British) and must develop a strong navy which can help it dominate the Indian Ocean, he notes that ‘a naval power, however well organized from the point of view of warships and fighting personnel, cannot count for much in the sea unless it is supplemented by a great national mercantile marine’.
This is an area that has been tremendously overlooked. A report by Gateway House highlights the dichotomy where Indians comprise the world’s third-largest cohort on merchant marine vessels, while using mostly foreign-owned ships to transport its trade, giving rise to an estimated annual freight bill of $52 billion USD. India has much to learn from other Asian countries like Japan and China, which have developed national merchant fleets of both scale and significance beyond comparison with India. Indian ports are no better, as they are regarded as being ‘low quality infrastructure’ that raise business costs and reduce global competitiveness.
India’s largest port, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust near Mumbai, had less shipping volume than Sri Lanka’s Colombo Port. Maritime cooperation in the security realm is a field where India has begun to show promise or late, but the overall development across all spheres of the Indian maritime industry remains disappointing. India has understood the importance of joint patrols across the Indian Ocean with the French, and is deciding whether to build a three aircraft carrier navy or not, but has failed to understand the importance of becoming a commercial heavyweight across the Indian Ocean as well.
Perhaps the main lesson that India can derive from Panikkar is to stop focusing only on land threats, and recognize the need for pursuing primacy, both strategic and economic, across the Indian Ocean. Panikkar’s work remains essential reading for understanding how Indian history has witnessed devastating effects of sea threats to the mainland. There are many more voices today, within India and from outside, urging the country to enhance its maritime capabilities and capacity in the Indian Ocean. India must learn from its own history how to convert the Indian Ocean from a source of threats, to one of opportunities.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Gokul Sahni is based in Singapore and writes on geopolitics and geoeconomics, with a particular focus on Indian foreign policy. He holds an MSc in International Relations from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and an MBA from the Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. All views and opinions expressed are personal. Image credit: Imperial War Museum.