Sri Lanka-India relations: finding a way forward
Sri Lanka-India relations: Finding a way forward
WRITTEN BY MANAVIK RAJ
13 AUGUST 2020
Sri Lanka and India share many cultural and anthropological similarities, dating back over two thousand years. Sri Lanka, owing to its proximity shares strong cultural and religious connections with the people of continental India, most notably with the Tamil Hindus and their links to the state of Tamil Nadu. In more recent history, India and Sri Lanka have also faced shared struggles, with both emerging as independent nations from the shadow of the British Empire between 1947-48. As former British colonies, both states share common threads, particularly the administrative system left behind by that period which served to aid India and Sri Lanka’s understanding of one another early on in their bilateral ties.
Since independence, events have buffeted the two sides often creating deep diplomatic fissures, seen notably during India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka’s civil war and the fallout from the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. In the current realm of South Asian affairs where China’s influence is increasingly prominent, Sri Lanka now plays a pivotal role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). A role recognised by New Delhi. As a new government is formed in Sri Lanka following recent parliamentary elections, both New Delhi and Colombo will have to make efforts towards building closer relations, despite the many issues that exist between them.
Parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka
In November 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s defence minister during the final months of the civil war won the country’s presidential election with 52.2% of the vote. Sri Lanka’s subsequent parliamentary election, held this month on 5 August, saw the Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP) under Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, the president’s brother and former president, decimate an alliance of opposition parties centred around the United National Front (UNF) and United National Party (UNP).
The recent developments in the India-China relationship, specifically the stand-off in Ladakh, India’s growing interest in the South China Sea and the development of the Quad all have implications for the India-Sri Lanka relationship, in large part due to China’s perceived influence in Colombo.
In the 225-member parliament, the SLPP won 145 seats, while the UNF/UNP alliance won just 57. The UNP a traditional party of government in Sri Lanka and the party of former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, ousted by Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2019, secured just a single parliamentary seat. The outcome leaves the SLPP and its ally, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), just five seats short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution and reverse the 2015 reforms brought in to curb executive power.
Many analysts now agree that the Rajapaksa family, whose popularity among the Sinhalese electorate stems from their roles in ending the Sri Lankan civil war and defeating the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), are in positions of power far stronger than the more recent administration of Maithripala Sirisena. The victory of the SLPP also highlights the Rajapaksa’s ability to mobilise Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as a political and electoral force, with calls for patriotism, tinged with majoritarianism, appealing to the core voter base of Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese.
Since the late eighties when Sri Lanka erupted into civil war, electoral divisions have increasingly fallen along ethnic lines, with Sinhalese backed political parties on the one side and the other parties consisting of Muslim Tamilians and other minorities on the other. Parties like the UNP, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) who represent Sri Lanka’s minorities all faced serious setbacks in the 2020 election.
China, India, and Sri Lanka – the geopolitical conundrum
The makeup of the incoming government in Colombo matters to India. Sri Lanka sits just 18 nautical miles from India’s coastline and is a key country in India’s security and maritime policy framework. As the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) grows increasingly contested, owing to the important sea routes that connect Asia, Africa and the Middle East, countries are hedging their bets through maritime influence, defence and trade deals. No country more so than Sri Lanka, which has sought to balance traditional ties with India through closer economic relations with China. This was especially evident under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as president, who turned to Beijing firstly to aid in reconstruction following the 2004 tsunami and then again following the defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan Army.
The recent developments in the India-China relationship, specifically the stand-off in Ladakh, India’s growing interest in the South China Sea and the development of the Quad all have implications for the India-Sri Lanka relationship, in large part due to China’s perceived influence in Colombo and the increased presence of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing has taken a keen interest in the IOR with 80 per cent of China’s trade and energy passing through the region’s sea lanes via the Straits of Malacca, much of which passes in close proximity to Sri Lanka and its strategic ports. Beijing’s investment in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, as well as the Coco Islands, Chittagong, and other key strategic locations in the IOR are now increasingly viewed as a threat by Indian defence analysts. In the event of further tensions between India and China, Sri Lanka under the Rajapaksa’s risks being caught between having to choose Beijing’s economic interests and New Delhi’s defence concerns.
The legacy of the civil war also plays heavily into India-Sri Lanka relations. A key concern for New Delhi remains the issue of the implementation of the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution. The 13th amendment, a provision of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord, would allow for the devolution of powers from Colombo to the minority Tamils in the north. Under the Rajapaksa’s this process was never fully implemented by Sri Lanka, even after the defeat of the LTTE.
In January 2015, when Maithripala Sirisena assumed his role as president, India’s Narendra Modi was quick to visit Sri Lanka. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also visited Colombo as New Delhi sensed an opportunity to implement a diplomatic reset. Through loans and capital, Beijing supported Columbo economically and provided diplomatic cover via the UN Security Council both during and after the final months of the civil war but following the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2015 presidential election, India was keen to renew talks on trade, security and the implementation of the 13th amendment. Events, however, overtook this opening for Modi as Sri Lanka's 2018 constitutional crisis saw the return of Mahinda Rajapaksa as prime minister, followed shortly thereafter by Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election as president. Their return has thrown into doubt the implementation of the 13th amendment which as of writing remains an unfulfilled process.
The way forward
Amid ethnic and political divisions, Sri Lanka also now faces an economic crisis. According to staffers from the International Monetary Fund and a recent J.P Morgan report, the debt to GDP ratio in Sri Lanka has shot over 90 per cent, leaving little space to manoeuvre fiscally. President Gotabaya's most recent visit to India last year saw discussions about the arrangement of a currency swap agreement, and a three-year moratorium on a $960 million loan by New Delhi.
As a means to challenge China’s influence in Sri Lanka, India and Japan have sought to come to the country’s aid signing trilateral agreements to develop the eastern Trincomalee city and to help build the Colombo Port’s Eastern Container Terminal (ECT). In the past, Colombo has been suspicious of Indian investment, but given the wave of challenges now facing Sri Lanka, there is space to renew this relationship whatever the misgivings about the Rajapaksa’s and their ties to Beijing.
The new Sri Lanka government under Gotabaya and Mahinda Rajapaksa faces important strategic choices. With an economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, India and Sri Lanka will have to cooperate and face the elephant in the room. China’s role in the India Ocean remains a challenge in India-Sri Lanka relations. Beijing’s recent aggression in Ladakh is a reminder that South Asian countries need to cooperate to secure their neighbourhood. There can be greater cooperation between India and Sri Lanka on trade and infrastructure to prevent stand-offs between India and China damaging economic ties and investment flows. With the right approach, renewed diplomacy between the Modi government and the Rajapaksa administration can open new doors and allow for a new way forward in India-Sri Lanka ties.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Manavik Raj is a policy analyst and journalist based out of Bengaluru, India. He has a keen interest in geopolitics, particularly, Indian and South Asian affairs. You can contact him here. Image credit: Nazly Ahmed/Flickr.