Why India must engage pro-actively in Afghanistan
Why India must engage pro-actively in Afghanistan
WRITTEN BY CHAYANIKA SAXENA
14 August 2020
As the time for intra-Afghan dialogue nears, apprehensions regarding its course and outcomes are mounting. If the peace process is successful in achieving a relatively stable ceasefire, India stands to benefit from having a politically like-minded neighbour in the region. It would, more importantly, allow for greater and more secure access to the resource-rich Central Asian economies. A democratically stable Afghanistan could also mitigate Pakistan’s security-upsetting role in this part of the world too.
Increasing Chinese involvement in India’s extended neighbourhood, such as its recent overtures to Iran and the latest quadrilateral parleys with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal, also demand that India adopt an agile approach to South Asia’s larger geopolitical realities. Since Afghanistan sits at the intersection of India’s regional and trans-regional ambitions, geographically as well as strategically, New Delhi would be well served to embrace a new policy of pro-actively engaging Afghanistan.
Years of apprehension and mistrust
For a country that has always been in favour of an “Afghan-led, owned and controlled” peace process, why has India been reluctant to engage in the impending negotiations? Historically, there has been bad blood between the Taliban and India – from the hijacking of IC 814 plane in 1999 to the more recent attempts to sabotage India’s infrastructural contributions to Afghanistan – there are also political and strategic reasons behind India’s distrust of this group. The Doha agreement of February 2020 also does not directly alleviate Indian concerns regarding the use of Afghan territory for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks against India. As a recent report by the UN reveals, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues to draw ideological and material assistance from the Taliban, adding to India’s reluctance to engage with this group.
Engaging with the Taliban could also offer significant strategic benefits. It may allow India to de-hyphenate the Taliban from its mentors in Pakistan, particularly at a time when the former is seeking to revive its political fortunes in Afghanistan.
Numerous international setbacks over the years have only added to Indian apprehensions regarding the earnestness with which its involvement in Afghanistan is sought. On different occasions – right from the early American sidelining of Indian help in favour of Pakistan to its lack of inclusion in the recently held “6+2+1” regional grouping at the UN Secretariat – international reception of India’s assistance to Afghanistan has bordered on indifference.
The cultural clout enjoyed by the country and its economic largesse has mattered little to these international donors in light of their respective strategic and military objectives. India was also relegated to the outermost circle in President Ashraf Ghani’s “five-circle foreign policy” during the early years of his tenure. That said, current Indian apprehensions, particularly related to Taliban-backed terrorism, cannot be addressed via another country. If anything, India has been advised to take up its security problems with the Taliban directly; however, this suggestion has not found many takers in New Delhi.
Time for India to shed its reluctance
As the Taliban becomes a permanent actor in Afghanistan’s evolving political landscape, there are three possible outcomes: long-drawn negotiation between different domestic actors resulting in a broadly acceptable and sustainable political outcome; a unilateral taking-over of power by the Taliban; and, a collapse of the peace process. Although the Chairman of the High Peace Council, Abdullah Abdullah, recently observed, “four decades of war does not mean that we cannot solve (the conflict)”, given the history of peace negotiations in Afghanistan, the third outcome is far more probabilistic. Therefore, India needs to get “pally with the Taliban” as its “policy of avoiding any engagement with the militants has had its day”.
First, India must lose its reluctance to talk to the Taliban. To be clear, a willingness to engage with the Taliban does not mean granting legitimacy or recognition to this group, and India should continue to support the Afghan central government. However, since the Taliban’s presence in the peace process is inevitable, India must abandon its self-imposed binary approach to the impending negotiations and adjust its strategies accordingly. India’s either/or approach is no longer viable, especially when the Afghan government is willing to negotiate with the Taliban. Therefore, it would be prudent for India to pay heed to Hamid Karzai’s advice to talk to ‘all’ the sections of Afghan society, which also include the Taliban.
Not a zero-sum game
Engaging with the Taliban could also offer significant strategic benefits. It may allow India to de-hyphenate the Taliban from its mentors in Pakistan, particularly at a time when the former is seeking to revive its political fortunes in Afghanistan. Acknowledging, if not outright accepting, the Taliban’s recent overtures could help drive a wedge in its deep-state bonhomie with Pakistan. This could allow India to address some of its security-related concerns. In fact, recent developments such as the promotion of Mullah Yaqoob to the post of Taliban’s military chief indicate Rehbari Shura’s attempts to consolidate its control over the whole movement and the peace process.
In fact, as changing geopolitical circumstances bring countries like China and Iran even closer, the Indian role in and beyond Afghanistan should be based on evolving realities and leverage historical ties for strategic benefits. India must bear in mind that its former ‘allies’ in Afghanistan, namely Russia and Iran, are already talking to the Taliban. China too has been parleying with this group in different capacities. In view of these changing equations, it will be conducive for India to replace its zero-sum approach with a more pro-active role in the Afghan peace process both for itself and Afghanistan.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Chayanika Saxena is a President’ Graduate Fellow and PhD candidate at the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore. She has worked for over seven years on the geopolitical and domestic dynamics concerning Afghanistan. She is fluent in Hindi, English and Urdu; has a working knowledge of Dari-Persian and beginner’s linguistic proficiency in Arabic. Image credit: Royal Air Force/Flickr.