In Forum — Great power politics amid great turbulence

23 February 2024

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2023 escalation of violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict have shaken the international order. In addition to long-term effects on food and fuel prices, both are likely to have far-reaching consequences. For many in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific particularly, the West’s contrasting responses to the two crises have revealed a hypocrisy that undermines the very rules-based international order it is seeking to protect and promote.

In this In Forum, 9DASHLINE asks a number of experts how these factors will shape great power competition in the coming months.

RESOLVING CONFLICTS WILL REMAIN A CHALLENGE IN 2024

KABIR TANEJA — FELLOW, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, NEW DELHI

Even as the world was seeking an off-ramp with Russia over the war in Ukraine, the terror attacks against Israel by Hamas on 7 October last year created another challenge for the global community to address. The impact of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza will be felt deep into this year, as crucial countries, including the US and India, hold general elections.

However, there is a broader, more notable and consequential shift in international politics that affects both Ukraine and Gaza: the US-China contestation. The idea of multipolarity gained more traction in 2023, and strategic autonomy was pursued more aggressively, particularly by states in the Middle East. India, which hosted the G20 summit, pushed further in its quest for a revised multilateral framework, including expanding the United Nations Security Council, to highlight new realities of the global order.

The rise of China is no longer a question today, but Beijing’s own “world view” and its potential imposition is where new geopolitical cooperatives and blocks are being formulated. Both the Indo-Pacific and more recently, threats in the Red Sea region, highlight the realities of power, perceptions, and balance. While the Indo-Pacific construct is more collaborative, in the way of the Quad for example, the crisis in the Middle East has shown that the US continues to be the only state capable of mobilising to secure its interests as well as those of its allies and partners. While its challenge will be to manage capacity between theatres, China will remain its long-term challenge across the board.

Finally, amidst all these developments, global shifts towards multipolarity will continue to take place under a bipolar order. How Washington D.C. and Beijing manage their affairs will directly impact the fundamentals of what a future order should look like, both geopolitically and in geoeconomics.

DESPITE OTHER DIFFERENCES, THE US HAS CONSENSUS OVER CHINA

ANN MARIE DAILEY — POLICY RESEARCHER AT RAND CORPORATION, AND NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

As the United States approaches the 2024 Presidential election, the key limiting factor for aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan will be political, not industrial. Though key capabilities, such as Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger and Avenger anti-aircraft systems, and Patriot air defence systems are in high demand and short supply, there is minimal overlap between military aid demands for the three countries.

This could change if the Israel-Gaza conflict erupts into a broader war in the Middle East, but no one wants an expanded conflict. While Iranian proxies have increased attacks, it does not seem like Tehran is actively stoking this activity. Arab nations have lobbied for a ceasefire as their populations decry civilian casualties. While the Israel Defense Forces have been receptive to US pressure for greater protection of civilian populations, pleas for Israeli politicians to moderate their inflammatory rhetoric fall on deaf ears in Netanyahu’s government. This intransigence will dampen any Arab-Israeli cooperative efforts — including projects such as IMEC and I2U2 — for the immediate future.

In the US, aid to Ukraine is endangered not only by far-right Republicans but also by a lack of political will in the Biden administration to commit to aiding Ukraine for not just “as long as it takes”, but with what it takes to win. Aid to Israel also has proven to be a political flashpoint, with vociferous calls from the Democrats’ left wing for a ceasefire in Gaza.

However, the one thing US politicians do agree on is that China is bad. Thus, political support for aid to Taiwan will persist no matter who is in the White House. As Washington continues to increase aid to Taiwan, Xi will continue to set conditions to unify with Taiwan. India will be able to count on continued US overtures for deeper defence and economic cooperation regardless of Modi’s rhetoric or India’s consumption of Russian oil. Asian nations will benefit as the US and China vie for influence — China through regional gatherings such as ASEAN and APEC, and America as it continues to pursue its economic ‘decoupling’ from China.

CHINA AND INDIA ENJOY DIPLOMATIC SPACE AS THE US’S FREEDOM OF ACTION FACES LIMITS

IVAN LIDAREV — ASIAN SECURITY EXPERT AND FORMER SOTIROV FELLOW AT LSE IDEAS

Both the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Gaza conflict have reduced Washington’s freedom of action in Asia without fundamentally changing its regional role. For China and India, the US response to both conflicts has presented challenges, opportunities, and risks.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has significantly influenced Washington’s position in the Indo-Pacific. It briefly became a defining issue for the US’s relations with Asian powers and initially increased the strategic linkages between Asia and Europe. This greatly complicated Beijing and New Delhi’s relations with Washington, as they pursued a careful balancing act between endangering their beneficial relations with Moscow and antagonising the West, with serious political and economic consequences.

The prolongation of the war, its domestic politics in the US, and the limits it imposes on Washington have reduced pressure on China and India and enhanced their previously reduced leverage on the preoccupied US. This has allowed Beijing to start rebuilding ties with Europe and Australia, and stabilise its embattled relationship with the US while reducing the risks posed by its partnership with Russia. Both Asian giants will likely wait for the US presidential election or a peace initiative to determine their future course on this issue.

The Gaza conflict has had a limited impact on the US position in Asia. For China and India, the US response to the conflict has offered some risks but many opportunities. The Asian giants must walk a tightrope between antagonising the US and Israel on the one hand and alienating the Middle East on the other. However, the conflict has helped India improve its relationship with Washington, strained by Khalistani-linked quarrels and its ties with Russia, by taking a relatively pro-Israeli position in the conflict. For Beijing, the war has offered opportunities to quietly undermine the US position in the region, improve its own image as part of a drive to increase influence in the Middle East and act as a restraining factor on Tehran’s behaviour thus gaining much-needed Chinese leverage on Washington. These Indian and Chinese responses are unlikely to change unless the Gaza conflict morphs into a wider US-Iran war.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/UK Government.