Taiwan must be cautious in drawing lessons from the Israel-Hamas war
Taiwan must be cautious in drawing lessons from the Israel-Hamas war
WRITTEN BY DR MOR SOBOL
21 February 2024
On 7 October 2023, Israel witnessed the deadliest terror attack in its history when Hamas launched a brutal offensive, resulting in over 1,200 deaths, primarily of civilians. Approximately 240 people were taken hostage, and thousands more sustained injuries. The attack profoundly shook the Israeli public and drew strong condemnation from nations worldwide. Concurrently, the Israeli military conducted operations in the Gaza Strip, involving intense bombardment and ground invasion, resulting in the death of more than 20,000 Palestinians, a majority of whom were civilians. This prompted hundreds of thousands worldwide to take to the streets, advocating for the Palestinian cause, calling for a ceasefire and criticising Israel for causing significant civilian casualties in Gaza.
In Taiwan, although some have encouraged supporting the Palestinians in this conflict, the government, including President Tsai Ing-wen, has aligned itself with Israel as part of the 'like-minded' countries alliance. Moreover, on 12 October, Taiwan's Defence Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, announced the formation of a task force to ‘study’ the war in Gaza. Initially, one might contend that this task force may be able to extract more valuable lessons for Taiwan than the March 2022 working group established to study Ukrainian tactics against Russian forces, given the striking similarities between Taiwan and Israel. Still, caution is warranted in hastily drawing conclusions about the applicability of the Israeli experience to the Taiwanese context.
Israel as a role model for Taiwan
This is not the first time that Taipei has tried to gain insights from the Israeli experience. There are notable similarities between Israel and Taiwan, including their relatively small size in terms of both territory and population as well as their similar structure of export-oriented economies with advanced industries. Moreover, both nations confront significant security challenges from neighbouring countries and depend heavily on the American political and security umbrella.
Perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to recognise that Taiwan's tendency to react to unfolding events rather than proactively preparing for various scenarios may prove inadequate, and the country could find itself lagging when it comes to readiness.
Therefore, Israel has been viewed as a model for Taiwan in various areas, from the mobilisation of civil society to promoting innovation and strengthening its cybersecurity industries. In the last few years, amid escalating tensions between Taiwan and China, and the heightened geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, there has been a noticeable surge in interest from the Taiwanese side — both at official and ‘academic’ levels — in learning from the Israeli experience regarding security and defence.
Since the 7 October attack, there is a sense that Taiwan is keen to draw lessons from the Israeli-Hamas conflict. Experts in both Taiwanese and international media outlets are assessing the extent to which Taiwan can glean valuable insights from the most recent round of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Several common topics have been identified as crucial for Taiwan's preparations for a potential cross-Strait conflict.
First, the significance of intelligence features prominently. Despite possessing a formidable military and globally acclaimed intelligence agencies, Israel was caught off guard by Hamas' 7 October attack, underscoring the necessity of quality intelligence for Taiwan. This includes real-time information on imminent threats and a comprehensive understanding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) — its movements, activities, capabilities, and intentions.
Second, the imperative of swift and efficient mobilisation has become evident. Israel's successful mobilisation of around 350,000 reserve soldiers within 72 hours of the 7 October attack could offer lessons for Taiwan on how to mobilise a large reserve force efficiently. This involves the challenging task of physically mobilising individuals, providing necessary equipment, and ensuring adequate training. Finally, the tactic of saturation attacks, exemplified by Hamas launching thousands of missiles to overwhelm Israel's Iron Dome system, anticipates a potential challenge in the event of a Chinese military invasion. This reinforces the need for defending key assets, protecting strategic infrastructure, and ensuring the general population has quick access to air raid shelters.
Comparisons are a tricky thing
Nonetheless, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are substantial differences between the two cases. For one, China is not Hamas, and Taiwan is not Israel. Moreover, the type of threat Israel faces is quite different from Taiwan: while the former confronts an existential threat from states (Iran) and non-state actors (Hamas/Hezbollah), the latter faces the prospect of armed conflict with another state (China), potentially leading to regime change. Consequently, the nature of the relationship with the enemy also differs. For instance, while Israel is an occupying force and the Israeli and Palestinian populations are largely separated, the Taiwanese maintain strong economic, cultural, and even familial ties with the Chinese community across the Straits.
Another crucial distinction lies in the balance of power and military capabilities of the two countries. Israel is (allegedly) a nuclear power with a second-strike ability that holds a Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over its adversaries. This stands in stark contrast when comparing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the Taiwanese army, as China's military strength dwarfs Taiwan's in terms of personnel, naval capabilities, and airpower, posing a substantial imbalance in military power.
Moreover, while both countries implement conscription systems in their militaries, they differ significantly in various aspects. For instance, Israel's 32 months of military service is notably longer than Taiwan's one-year service (recently extended from four months). In Israel, military service is mandatory for both men and women, while in Taiwan, it is compulsory only for men. Another distinction lies in the fact that the Israeli army relies on both its standing army and reserve forces, whereas Taiwan predominantly depends on volunteer service members as its primary fighting force.
Furthermore, not only do the Taiwanese army and public lack any kind of exposure to conflict, but Taiwan's military service also remains a contentious topic, given the historical role the army played in Taiwan's pre-democracy era and the perceived value citizens attribute to military service. In contrast, the Israeli army and the public have weathered numerous bouts of violence. The extensive wartime experience, along with a national awareness instilled from a young age through education, have cultivated robust civil-military relations. This, in turn, has contributed to and reinforced the Israeli identity, fostering unity against external threats.
Comparison allowed, but proceed with care
It is not that Taiwanese attempts to draw lessons from the Israeli experience are a waste of time. Rather, to avoid useless (or even counterproductive) comparisons, it is vital to highlight the noted differences. The next step involves pinpointing specific policies, rather than wholesale adoption, that could be relevant to Taiwan. This process should entail a thorough examination of how these policies can be tailored to fit the Taiwanese context and capabilities.
Perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to recognise that Taiwan's tendency to react to unfolding events rather than proactively preparing for various scenarios may prove inadequate, and the country could find itself lagging when it comes to readiness. Consequently, Taiwanese policymakers and the public need to elevate their sense of urgency in understanding the imperative of actively addressing the Chinese threat, particularly as the pressure from China is anticipated to escalate (as evidenced by Nauru’s severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan) following the recent electoral victory of Lai Ching-te and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's presidential election.
Taiwan needs to engage in a candid discussion about the reasons and constraints that have hindered its ability to be in a significantly better position, as many external observers believe it should be given the level of the threat. Unfortunately, this may prove to be a formidable task, especially for President-elect Lai, who, in contrast to President Tsai, must confront an increasingly hostile China with a minority government.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Mor Sobol is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University. He received his PhD in Politics from the University of Edinburgh and worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica. His main research interests centre on European and Chinese foreign policy, and Israel-China/Taiwan-US relations. Image credit: Flickr/Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan).