In Conversation with Walter F. Hatch
12 April 2024
9DASHLINE recently had the pleasure of speaking with Dr Walter F. Hatch about his latest book Ghosts in the Neighborhood: Why Japan Is Haunted by Its Past and Germany Is Not.
Using paired case studies (Germany-France and Japan-South Korea; Germany-Poland and Japan-China), the book argues that political cooperation — not discourse or economic exchange — best explains Germany’s relative success and Japan’s relative failure in achieving reconciliation with neighbours brutalised by each regional power in the past.
9DL: In your view, why has Germany successfully made amends with neighbours that it conquered and mistreated in the past, while Japan has failed to turn old enemies and victims into friends?
WH: Germany has been more successful than Japan primarily because it has demonstrated a credible commitment to political cooperation with previously mistreated neighbours. It has shown that it can be a trustworthy partner on regional projects for economic integration (now the European Union) and security (NATO). By contrast, Japan has been unwilling or, more accurately, unable to forge such critical ties in Asia. This is because its powerful patron, the US, traditionally has insisted on dominating a hub-and-spokes system of mostly bilateral alliances in Asia. We have seen the growth of some plurilateralism in the region recently, but Japan has not been a strong, independent leader in pursuing this trend. For example, the Japanese foreign minister has implored the US to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, saying it “should be at its centre”. My question: Why?
9DL: How do factors such as historical narratives, social norms, and cultural perceptions shape the reconciliation process between nations, particularly in the context of acknowledging and atoning for past atrocities?
WH: Although I have enjoyed Yinan He’s work on the role of historical narratives (“national mythmaking”) in fostering or inhibiting interstate reconciliation, my work finds little evidence that “soft” factors have much impact. Discourse, in particular, does not seem to move the needle. Germany, for example, managed to reconcile with France in the 1950s without ever uttering an apology. And relations between Japan and its most sceptical neighbours, China and South Korea, got worse — not better — in the 1990s and early 2000s, when Japanese leaders were issuing better (more specific and heartfelt) statements of contrition.
You also asked about norms and perceptions of one another. Some might argue that cultural exchange among Asians will generate goodwill over time. For example, perhaps youth throughout the region will grow closer as they share popular music: K-pop, J-pop, and C-pop. Sadly, though, such exchange does not always produce a positive result. In the 2000s, the “Korean wave” of cultural products, including TV dramas, led to a backlash not only in Japan but even in Taiwan. I acknowledge the influence of civil society in global affairs, but do not find that it has played the leading role in Germany’s reconciliation with European neighbours or that it has been the primary impediment for Japan in building better relations with Asian neighbours. Institutions are the key.
9DL: The late German historian Rudolf von Thadden said that Japan could not escape its bloody history because, unlike Europe, East Asia is not Christian and therefore lacks the requisite political and moral foundation for forgiveness. How persuasive do you find these types of cultural-religious explanations in explaining why Japan has not been able to free itself from the ghosts of its past?
WH: Not persuasive at all. To be honest, I was taken aback when Prof. von Thadden shared this perspective with me. It struck me as Orientalist, or perhaps even racist. It reminded me of the dichotomous thinking evident in Ruth Benedict’s “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword”. She was an anthropologist who never visited Japan yet developed a damning, early post-war analysis that identified Japan as an inferior “shame” culture compared to America’s superior “guilt” culture. This kind of analysis seems unhelpful. Japanese leaders have expressed genuine remorse for their nation’s earlier military aggression against China and the brutal colonisation of Korea. On a few occasions, these apologies have sounded far more genuine and heartfelt than any apologies issued by American leaders for US imperialism or military adventurism. I am thinking here, especially of Prime Minister Murayama’s powerful statement of contrition in August 1995.
Culture matters; it is an important variable that social scientists must always consider. But they should do so carefully, not in a ham-handed way that ends up essentialising what is usually a complex, diverse community of people.
9DL: How do you address the criticism that formal institutions may not capture the emotional and psychological dimensions of historical grievances? Can institutional frameworks truly replace the need for deep societal healing and mutual understanding between peoples?
WH: Emotions certainly play a role in international relations, but not in the same way they do in our daily lives. I think we err when we equate states, which focus on survival in a dangerous world, or even nations, which are not always unified, with individuals who can feel a range of emotions at any time.
Consider Vietnam, which was invaded by a powerful country hoping to block its project of national self-determination. The invading country also committed some terrible atrocities along the way, and it never apologised for its misbehaviour. Despite all this, the Vietnamese generally have a positive opinion of the United States (76 per cent view its former enemy favourably, according to Pew). This has a lot to do with deepening ties between the two states, which share concerns over Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea. They now enjoy a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes ongoing cooperation between the US Coast Guard and the Vietnam People’s Navy. I think national grievances are likely to dissipate over time, at least when states agree to cooperate deeply with each other.
9DL: Despite a high degree of regional integration, recent developments (e.g. discussion about reparations) demonstrate that differences between Germany and Poland have not been resolved. What can prevent regional organisations from simply and temporarily covering up “ghosts of the past”?
WH: Like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) repeatedly tried to win domestic support by stirring up national resentment over past mistreatment by a powerful neighbour. (Obviously, the CCP targeted Japan while PiS targeted Germany.) But, as my book notes, PiS was mostly unsuccessful in this effort. Public opinion surveys from the mid-2000s, after Germany ushered Poland into the EU and NATO, showed remarkable stability in Polish views toward their former nemesis. Despite frequent anti-German outbursts from nationalist leaders in Warsaw, Poles continued to identify Germany as a trusted partner, especially on economic matters.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was invited to Berlin in March this year to serve as a kind of mediator between German and French leaders, who had been tussling over arming Ukraine in its war with Russia. It is impossible to imagine Xi Jinping playing this kind of role in relations between Japan and any other country.
9DL: Going forward, what should Japan do to “overcome its past”? Could a third country or actor (convincingly) facilitate a process of reconciliation and rapprochement between China and Japan?
WH: Japan must take the initiative in forging closer, stronger ties with its neighbours. It must do what Germany has done in Europe by demonstrating that it can be a trustworthy, reliable partner on economic and security matters. For example, Tokyo could pursue a trade and investment pact with China and South Korea, making a durable commitment to share some technology and open some markets to imports from these two manufacturing giants. Currently, Northeast Asia is one of the few regions in the world with no formal plan for economic integration.
To do all this, however, Tokyo first must forge a new relationship with its military patron, the United States, which has restricted Japan’s ability to act independently in the region. Even South Korea, another military ally of the US, has been sceptical of Japan’s ability or willingness to act on its own. Yoon Suk-yeol, the conservative leader in Seoul, has risked his popularity by taking the initiative on recent measures to improve ties with Tokyo. Prime Minister Kishida has not engendered confidence by appearing more reluctant. Japan must become more proactive.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Dr Walter Hatch is Professor Emeritus of Government at Colby College in Maine, and is an affiliated researcher at Harvard’s Reischauer Institute and the University of Washington’s Jackson School. He has written numerous articles and four books, including “Ghosts in the Neighborhood: Why Japan is Haunted by its Past and Germany is Not” (University of Michigan Press, 2023). His current research explores the nature of bilateral alliances in East Asia, and (more specifically) the politics of U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea. Before becoming an academic, he spent 12 years in journalism, mostly with the Seattle Times.