In Conversation: Amish Mulmi on ‘All Roads Lead North’

IN CONVERSATION WITH AMISH MULMI

26 May 2022

9DASHLINE recently sat down with Amish Raj Mulmi to discuss his new book All Roads Lead North: China, Nepal and the Contest for the Himalayas. A fascinating read, the book examines the histories binding mountain communities together across the Sino-Nepali border and gives a new, complex, and compelling account of a small country caught between two neighbourhood giants.

Your book paints a picture of Nepal shifting its relationship from India to China. Would you agree with this representation, or is this merely a case of Nepalese hedging in between two hegemonic powers in the region?

AM: I’d argue Nepal has been successful in opening up a new avenue of bilateral ties that were not possible earlier due to Chinese limitations in the Himalayas. China, for all practical reasons, only became Nepal’s neighbour in 1950, the year it entered Tibet. Since then, Chinese diplomacy in the country has presented itself as being contrary to Indian presence and influence. While Nepali leaders had long sought China as a political and economic alternative to India that would balance out its influence, it is only in the 21st century, when Beijing embarked upon massive infrastructural and urbanisation campaigns in Tibet, that it could present itself as the alternative Nepali leaders had sought. The 2015 undeclared Indian ‘blockade’ provided the momentum for Nepali leaders to capitalise on China’s presence and accelerated the shift that we are currently witnessing.

How did the PRC's demarcation of its borders with Nepal in 1961 change the lives of people in the region?

AM: The demarcation of borders in the Himalayas — and the 1962 India-China war — both irrevocably shut down the trade that was the basis of the entire trans-Himalayan economy at the time, and led to economic deprivation among communities who depended on such trade. Before the Himalayan borders were demarcated, Tibet would depend on food imports from the lower Himalayas, while salt, wool and other goods made their way down from the Tibetan plateau. The securitisation of the Himalayas halted transhumant practices across the region that had sustained such trade, and ethnic and familial ties among communities living on both sides of the border broke down with the imposition of modern borders. Today, such communities cannot cross the border as easily as they did earlier. Documentation and security imperatives have made such exchanges a thing of the past.

China’s policy of non-interference in Nepal’s domestic affairs started changing in the mid-2000s. What role does Beijing play in Nepali politics today?

AM: The direct fraternal relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Nepali Communist parties has resulted in several exchanges and seminars, and also Nepali Communists deciding to train their cadres in ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. The arrival of a CCP delegation when the unified Nepal Communist Party was dissolved in December 2020 also signalled that the CCP remains greatly invested in Nepali politics today and prefers a unified Communist front in the country. However, because of Nepal’s democratic polity, a clear preference for a particular political party (or ideology) may not always find favour in the country.

Further, China’s comments on the US-led Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant — and US-Nepal bilateral ties — suggest that China is much more confident about its presence and influence in Nepal, even at the cost of Nepal’s ties with other countries. While China’s comments were not received pleasantly in Nepal, that China sees the MCC grant as another tool of American encirclement suggests the US-China global contest will have new ramifications in smaller countries like Nepal.

Historically, the Nepalese and Tibetans seem to have cross-pollinated culturally in various ways. How much interaction is there between Nepali and Tibetan nomadic pastorals of the Himalayas today and what would you say is the current Nepalese stance on Tibetan autonomous governance?

AM: There are very few nomadic pastorals in the current day to begin with on both sides of the Himalayas. As the Chinese state has expanded in Tibet, it has made several efforts to permanently settle the nomads, while on the Nepali side, the shutdown of the border has made such pastoralism unviable. Instead, what we are seeing today — or rather, before the pandemic shut down the Chinese borders — is Nepali citizens discovering new economic opportunities in Tibetan border towns and cities.

Nepalis were going to trade or work in such settlements under an agreement that allows residents of border districts to travel and work up to 30 km inside Tibet with the use of a border citizen’s card. But this contemporary scenario is still vastly different from earlier times when Nepali traders lived in Tibet for years at a stretch. Such opportunities have been restricted since China shut down its borders at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The official Nepali stance today remains the ‘One China’ policy, which affirms Tibet as an inalienable part of China.

Would you say that China has ‘soft power’ in Nepal? If so, in what ways?

AM: Yes, although the caveat is that such soft power was visible to a greater degree before the pandemic. The Chinese mission organised several trade fairs and cultural shows in the country, while its ambassador promoted tourism in Nepal and endeared herself to Nepalis by singing Nepali songs. Several Chinese language schools have been set up, while Chinese tourists — the second-highest in number after Indians — have reshaped Nepal’s tourism market. Similarly, there has been a rise in Chinese entrepreneurs in Nepal post-2008-09, when China began expanding in Nepal, and especially more so since 2013 when Xi Jinping introduced the ‘Neighbourhood Policy’.

China’s soft power influence in the country can also be seen by its success in convincing Nepal to align with it on its narrative on Everest, COVID-19 and Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. China’s aid projects inside Kathmandu and its post-2015 earthquake reconstruction projects have also created a positive image of the country in Nepal. However, while China embarked upon vaccine diplomacy during the pandemic and sent several million doses of its vaccines to Nepal, the prolonged shutdown of the land border points of Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani has created new anxieties among Nepalis who used such border crossings for trade.

What will Nepal’s relations with China resemble in five years? Will it be a continuation or change?

AM: Depending on how Nepali political affairs shape up, there can be both continuity and change. We’ve seen China expanding itself both politically and economically, so it’s certain that China is here to stay. Economic engagement can only increase from hereon, although a lot will depend on how China perceives Nepal both as a favoured investment destination as well as a country open to Chinese investment and BRI overtures, while also being open to Nepali concerns about over-land trade. One must remember that China’s investments in Nepal are less than what it has invested in other South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In addition, while Chinese tourists played an important role in the Nepal tourism market, the opening up of COVID-19 restrictions in China will ascertain when Chinese tourists can return to the country.

The political engagement will similarly expand, but a lot will depend on whether China can respond nimbly to Nepal’s domestic political turbulence and not be seen as taking sides within Nepali politics or influencing day-to-day political affairs. As with any democracy, the more China engages with Nepal, the more visible it will be, and thus open itself up to critiques. Similarly, the key challenge for Nepal will be to expand upon the current bilateral foundation by ensuring its interests are addressed.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Biography

Amish Raj Mulmi is the author of All Roads Lead North: China, Nepal and the Contest for the Himalayas. His writings have been published in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Al Jazeera, Hindustan Times, and Himal Southasian.