In Brief: Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan on India and the Indo-Pacific
In Brief: Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan on India and the Indo-Pacific
We were delighted to recently sit down with Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (Distinguished Fellow and Head of the Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation) for a wide-ranging discussion covering everything from great power rivalry and Artificial Intelligence to the issue of men-only panels.
9DL: Conventional wisdom suggests the future is set to be defined by the growing rivalry between the United States and China. In your view how will India feature in this emerging narrative?
RPR: India has long sought to avoid taking sides between the US and China, but in the post-Galwan world, India and the US are increasingly on the same page. The rise of China and its strategic consequences for the Indo-Pacific region and global stability are increasingly clear to both New Delhi and Washington. Neither country wants to see the Indo-Pacific dominated by anyone major power. For India, it would be particularly problematic if the region is dominated by a hostile neighbour.
The Modi government, without naming China, has suggested this view several times in recent weeks but couched it in terms of international norms or rules of behaviour. Since no other regional power has shown tendencies to dominate the Indo-Pacific strategic space, it is clear to observers who India is referring to.
While US-China competition has gained particular attention, Beijing’s assertiveness is not just an issue for Washington. China’s aggressive behaviour in the past few years, in the South and East China Sea seas, and more recently along the Sino-Indian border has led to a rethink among neighbouring states. Australia, Canada and Sweden have also been affected by Beijing’s ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ and demonstrates the need for democratic countries to come together and develop appropriate strategies to address the strategic challenges posed by China.
It is also a fact that a number of the countries that have been subjected to bullying behaviour by China have also borne the brunt of trade and economic coercion. Time and again, India has been directly challenged by China such that it leaves New Delhi with increasingly fewer options but to confront China. New Delhi, as well as other governments in the region, also recognise that no one country can deal with Beijing on its own. This has led to several mini-laterals taking shape in the region, which may be a more effective strategy.
There is also the issue of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, for which China is responsible for, that should bring countries like India and the US to work together. China’s role in the spread of the pandemic, the misinformation campaign that Beijing was engaged in, its efforts at shifting the blame instead of focusing on identifying the origin of the virus, efforts at creating a narrative using pandemic aid, provide a window of opportunity to call out China’s poor behaviour internationally.
The Communist Party’s missteps concerning the pandemic especially as it pertains to the functioning of multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) is another critical issue that brings together not just India and the US but a large number of Indo-Pacific countries who are calling for reforms of the institutions so that they are not hijacked by any one single country pursuing its narrow agenda. Reforms of these institutions also ensure they are allowed to carry out their work without undue, external interference.
9DL: The race for technological dominance and battles in cyberspace means the future has arrived. For India — where are the key areas for collaboration and competition with allies such as the United States and across Europe.
RPR: With the internet of things (IoT) and states’ abilities to gather more and more data, the next cyber battle will possibly be felt in the 5G and AI domains, where China has already managed to develop a sufficient edge over other countries.
Certain countries’ ability to use the internet to exercise social control or even political exploitation are some of the negative emerging facets of these new, emerging technologies. While the US continues to maintain the lead in sectors like AI, with about 40 per cent of the global market share according to some estimates, countries like China and Russia are catching up fast.
In terms of the ability to collect personal data, Beijing is possibly way ahead because China has a billion-plus population and therefore the quantity of data collected is that much higher, thus necessitating the need to develop AI. A second reason is the lack of democratic oversight allows the Chinese state enormous opportunities to gather data on its population without consent. This stands in sharp contrast to the United States where privacy laws are a reality, thereby dampening efforts to collect personal information.
How China puts to use the information it collects is one concern, but there are also growing concerns about how the People’s Liberation Army will use Artificial Intelligence in future military operations. The PLA’s ambitions to develop large, unmanned AI submarines in the 2020s is a case in point. This new, emergent technology could impact on the Indo-Pacific’s naval balance that currently sits in favour of the traditional maritime powers, specifically the US, Australia, Japan and India. These unmanned submarines could engage in reconnaissance, mine placement and other activities targeting the Quad.
China’s attempts at bringing Artificial Intelligence into conventional military operations including the naval domain risks heightening the insecurities already present in the Indo-Pacific region, triggering a new wave of competition, potentially leading to a high tech arms race.
The US has already contracted Lockheed Martin and Boeing to begin work to develop Extra Large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (XLUUVs). The PLA is also known to be working to bring about AI into tank warfare. China plans to adopt some of its old Type 59 Soviet tanks to unmanned vehicles equipped with AI. While these capabilities may not be battle-fielded yet, China’s work in the domain could give it a battlefield advantage.
9DL: Closer to home, how do you view Pakistan's growing space programme in terms of its impact and the challenges it currently faces.
RPR: Pakistan’s space programme, as of today, is fairly limited. Even though it began its space programme before India’s, Islamabad has not made much headway for several reasons, including the absence of an independent science and technology establishment.
The state of Pakistan’s economy has also been an important factor in the slow development of its space programme. Nevertheless, there is recognition within Pakistan of the need to step up and focus on the space programme both for the increasing relevance to the day-to-day lives of its people and security and defence requirements, specifically in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Pakistan’s ambitions go beyond these to include a manned mission to space. Proponents of this argument feel this is an area where India has not fared well and Pakistan could take the lead, sending astronauts to space by 2022. This, however, is unlikely, considering the capacity of Pakistan’s economy and its huge debt burden. It is here that Pakistan is looking to gain from international partnerships, especially China.
Given the nature of their bilateral strategic partnership which operates with an eye on India, it is likely that the Pakistan-China space agenda could be accelerated in the coming years. The growing tension between India and China will propel Beijing to assist Islamabad in every strategic sector including space to bring about a change in the strategic balance in South Asia.
9DL: In terms of ties between India and Japan, they continue to deepen — but just how far can this relationship go?
RPR: The India-Japan strategic partnership remains strong despite occasional disappointments on both sides. Both Tokyo and New Delhi have shared concerns regarding China’s role in the Indo-Pacific and the region’s wider stability. Both India and Japan are facing military pressures from China – India along the land border on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Japan in the East China Sea. But both also remain concerned about the Chinese attempt to use trade vulnerabilities and its role in multilateral agencies, including the United Nations.
Distance also creates a problem – there is little likelihood that they can come to each other’s assistance to deal with the military pressure from China in the short to medium term. Thus, so far, their cooperation has remained primarily at the political level, even though both are trying hard to enhance each other’s capabilities through agreements such as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that is likely to be signed at the upcoming Modi-Abe virtual summit next month. Japan is also expected to send a liaison officer at the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). Both are of course members of the Quad, which is also an effort to increase their strategic coordination.
The two have also had disagreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) being the prominent one. Overall, the expectation is that despite these disagreements, the two can be expected to continue to work to increase their cooperation because both sides see a strong value in this.
9DL: How significant a defence partner is France for India, and beyond issues such as hardware where else can this support be felt?
RPR: India has had a close relationship with France for decades spanning multiple sectors. France has been a strong supporter of India’s space programme and has been generally much more understanding of India’s nuclear programme. France has also been an important source of weapons for India including the Mirage-2000 fighters and most recently the Rafale, which is just entering service with the Indian Air Force.
France has also supplied India with Scorpion class diesel submarines. Both countries being middle powers have felt the need to increase what India characterises as “strategic autonomy” and see these aspirations in each other sympathetically. More recently, France has also sympathised with India’s concern regarding China’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and it is stepping up its naval presence in and around its Pacific and Indian Ocean territories.
France and India have also signed an agreement that gives reciprocal access to each other’s naval bases, which India sees as valuable in expanding its footprint in the Indian Ocean. France has also been strongly supportive of India on issues such as India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership and the UN Security Council discussions on Jammu & Kashmir and supports India’s aspiration to be a permanent member in the UN Security Council.
As with most of India’s partners, distance makes it unlikely that France can directly help it but France’s political support, as well as its support in enhancing Indian capabilities, is deeply appreciated.
9DL: In light of recent developments, how do you see the China-Russia-India constellation developing in the coming years?
RPR: Russia remains a critical security partner for India. Over the last two decades as India became closer to the United States, New Delhi has also tried hard not to dilute its relations with Moscow. A vast quantity of military equipment comes from Russia, reportedly to the tune of 70 per cent.
More importantly, Russia has been willing to supply India with equipment like nuclear-powered submarines, a unique move, different from any other country. India has even been willing to risk American displeasure and sanctions to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia. The relationship with Moscow also faces significant challenges, especially concerning Russia’s increasingly close relations with China. Western pressure on Russia over issues such as Ukraine and information warfare has meant that Moscow depends more and more on Beijing for economic and diplomatic support, and this is potentially quite problematic for India.
Russia is also selling more advanced weapon platforms to China today which has more direct and national security implications for India, especially in South Asia. Su-35 fighter aircraft and advanced Kilo-class submarines are cases in point.
As the relationship moves forward, India hopes that Russia will join others in balancing China in the Indo-Pacific but this is potentially problematic because it conflicts with the perceptions of most other Indian partners. How India squares this will very much remain to be seen.
9DL: Looking outward, what do you see as India’s key challenges within the Indian Ocean space?
RPR: India has always seen the Indian Ocean as vital for its security. It objected to Soviet squadrons and British and American bases in these waters during the Cold War years even though New Delhi was not strong enough to do anything about it. China’s rise has made the problem a lot more acute. After all, Beijing’s growing presence in South Asia’s littorals is a much more direct threat than foreign navies were in the previous decades because China is India’s neighbour.
China’s efforts to penetrate the region with its Belt and Road initiative and the consequent debt burdens it imposes on small regional states is a serious vulnerability from an Indian perspective. It is compounded by the fact that India neither has the money to match China’s largesse nor has India demonstrated the organisational bureaucratic capacity to undertake such projects efficiently.
Though India has attempted to improve its performance, it still faces significant drawbacks. One solution that India is seeking is to cooperate with other countries such as Japan and the US to match China’s investment and capital spending in South Asia. India has also pointed out vigorously the dangers of China’s projects and that has received some traction and increased wariness among smaller countries about such projects.
India has also tried to be a good neighbour in times of trouble such as during natural disasters and the recent pandemic. Such emergency assistance is something that India has become quite adept at and it represents a significant advantage for India.
9DL: And finally — what advice do you have for the next generation of young female scholars, could lockdown prove to be a democratising factor in dealing with some of the more traditional challenges?
RPR: Though Indian women have entered some sectors such as engineering and medicine with greater ease than in other parts of the world, it is much more difficult for them to enter and become visible in International Relations and Security Studies.
There is a gradual improvement but its still a struggle and one of the things that has been noticed is that conference organisers largely prefer male panellists even when well-established female scholars are working and publishing in these areas, a phenomenon that has been characterised as ‘Manels’.
While this has always been the case, it has become much more visible because, under pandemic conditions, webinars have become so prominent and common. It is also quite incongruent considering the #MeToo movement and the visibility of issues related to gender discrimination in public life. This is particularly difficult for younger women scholars because they have both age and gender working against them.
The only solution as I see it is to point out and publicise this problem because change is likely to be gradual. We are also seeing a lot of push back when we point out the discriminatory nature of such practices. While there is going to be resistance to these efforts and it is going to be frustrating at times I am convinced that there are enough women and men who are willing to challenge these inequities and practices — so change will happen.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Distinguished Fellow and Head of the Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, joining ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), where she was an Assistant Director. She also served as a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth US-Asia Centre until December 2020. As the senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Image credit: World Economic Forum/Flickr.