German submarines for India: An arsenal for democracies?
German submarines for India: An arsenal for democracies?
WRITTEN BY HENDRIK A. PASLIGH
10 August 2023
As the European arms industry scrambles to manage the needs of and lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany has sought to rekindle its defence-industrial cooperation with India. The two countries have a history of cooperation in regard to submarines, one of the areas declared by Berlin as “key technologies” for its domestic defence industry.
In June 2023, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) in Mumbai to compete for an Indian Navy tender concerning the construction of six submarines under the Project-75 (India) submarine acquisition (P75(I)) project. However, questions about India’s suitability as a partner for democratic countries remain, and so the deal is particularly significant because it lies at the intersection of multiple geopolitical dynamics.
Demands on the European arms industry
The first of these dynamics is the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine with weapons has placed demands on German and other European countries’ defence industries that they are — as of yet — unable to meet. US and European defence can produce an estimated 480,000 155mm artillery shells per year combined. At Ukraine’s current rate of 5,000 to 6,000 shells used per day, this means that a year’s worth of production covers the needs of just three months.
European defence industries are now charged with achieving healthy growth. They need to meet the demands of the moment while accounting for the long-term economic feasibility of increasing production capacity. The German defence company Rheinmetall, for example, is reporting quick growth but has argued that increasing production capacity requires governmental assurances, such as orders for ammunition.
As the European arms industry scrambles to manage the needs of and lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany has sought to rekindle its defence-industrial cooperation with India.
Certainly, Berlin’s Zeitenwende gained momentum in January 2023 when Boris Pistorius became the new minister of defence. Assuming his post in the midst of the Ukraine war, Pistorius has had to hit the ground running, being sworn in just one day before an important meeting of defence ministers in Ramstein, where the hotly contended delivery of main battle tanks to Ukraine was part of the agenda. Half a year later, in India, where the MoU between TKMS and MDL was signed, Pistorius declared his intention to deepen the strategic partnership between Berlin and New Delhi. For him, this includes elevating the Germany-India partnership to the level of Japan and Australia in terms of simplified rules for arms sales.
Demands on the Indian arms industry
This is where the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine meets another geopolitical dynamic — India’s border disputes with Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These three countries are nuclear powers, and together they comprise almost 40 per cent of the world’s population. Amid these tensions, from which multiple wars and repeated clashes have emerged, India has relied heavily on importing weapons from Russia. Even as SIPRI numbers report a decline, the share of Russian arms imported by India stands at 46 per cent from 2017 to 2021, down from 69 per cent between 2012 and 2016.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, this left New Delhi in a difficult position. India’s dependency on Moscow prevented the country from clearly opposing the war early on, generating frustration from its Western partners. Additionally, as an increasingly isolated Moscow is moving closer to Beijing, the strategic value of India’s partnership with Russia is decreasing and might even constitute vulnerability in case of renewed clashes between Indian and PRC forces. Therefore, reducing India’s reliance on Russian arms is now in the strategic interest of both New Delhi and Berlin.
Despite impressive progress in technological sectors such as IT and space, India has so far been unable to establish a domestic defence industry that meets the country’s expansive needs. On the one hand, land border disputes place demands on the army, but increased PRC activity in the Indian Ocean and the modernisation of Pakistan’s navy call for naval investment as well. Even within India’s navy, there is a debate about whether operational requirements justify the immense funds allocated to the country’s indigenous aircraft carrier programme, or whether the money would be better spent on additional submarines.
Meanwhile, uncrewed surface and underwater vehicles (USV/UUV) may offer an even more valuable alternative. Efforts to strengthen the Berlin-New Delhi partnership will require an astute awareness of these operational requirements and would likely benefit from the development of innovative technologies such as USV/UUV to meet these needs.
Deepening international partnerships
India has been unable to develop self-sufficiency regarding its indigenous aircraft carrier programme. Nonetheless, for the components of its carrier battle group — which includes submarines — India has access to advanced technology from several partner countries. Russia and Israel are the most important ones, followed in recent years by France and the US. Moreover, most of the recently procured or currently planned ships have been or will be built in India within frameworks of international cooperation. Interestingly, some of the rules associated with New Delhi’s ‘Make in India’ policy, including those related to technology transfer, had reportedly previously caused TKMS to withdraw from the P75(I) project.
The war against Ukraine has revealed the need for Western defence companies to develop surge capacity, meaning the ability to quickly expand production capacity in case of a war. However, developing and maintaining this ability would induce costs, as the tools and staff that are not required during peacetime would have to be continuously paid to prepare for events whose occurrence is uncertain.
A solution could be the cultivation of economies of scale by exporting to international markets or through coordinated procurement in Europe. India, in turn, wants diversification of partners, technology transfer, and the development of domestic industrial capacity. As Berlin sets out to deepen its partnership with New Delhi, these are the preconditions. However, there are opportunities as well; licensing the production of artillery shells in India could satisfy both New Delhi’s and Brussels’ needs as long as the partnership is stable enough to ensure the delivery of ammunition to Europe in times of need.
A reliable partner?
Berlin’s attempt to strengthen the partnership with New Delhi exemplifies the challenges that Western liberal democratic governments face today. As the world faces new geopolitical dynamics, Western governments seek out new partners, but in their quest to bolster a ‘rules-based international order’ they often find countries sliding into authoritarianism. India is often called ‘the world’s largest democracy’, a name that hides alarming developments currently underway in Indian politics. The Freedom House rating of India’s democracy has declined from 77 in 2014 to 66 — it is now categorised as only “partly free”.
Part of the Zeitenwende will be to sell a more assertive German foreign and security policy to the German electorate, and India under its current government may not be conducive to this objective. Moreover, providing weapons to an illiberal actor for the purpose of protecting liberal values — as the new German National Security Strategy purports — is self-defeating. Additionally, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s call for a feminist foreign policy sets new standards for the way in which Berlin interacts with the world, but India has a severe problem with gender-based violence and has been described “as one of the world’s most dangerous places for women”.
The solution should not be choosing between either ‘more arms sales’ or ‘no partnership at all’. Rather, a whole-of-government approach is needed to engage India comprehensively and materialise the deepened strategic partnership that Pistorius calls for. As a first step, this requires recognising that even seemingly innocuous international interactions may bolster authoritarian governments. This awareness must then inform the remodelling of strategies — e.g., by adopting a human rights-based approach. India is likely to continue to decouple from Russia, albeit slowly. This trend creates opportunities for Western actors such as Germany, France, and the US — all important partners of New Delhi — to combine defence industry cooperation with demands for democratic standards.
In the meantime, European NATO members should strengthen their defence industries through better cooperation and more intentional strategic planning. The Economist suggests that Western countries should streamline procurement processes, support investments in defence startups, establish a single market for defence that includes setting technical interoperability standards, and improve currently opaque supply chains. Overcoming protectionism within Europe to coordinate procurement and create economies of scale could reduce costs, as well as provide demand signals.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Hendrik A. Pasligh is a Research Analyst at London Politica and a Young Leader at the Pacific Forum. His research interests focus on the nexus of security and technology, particularly technology transfer, information operations, and space, with a regional focus on the Asia-Pacific. Image credit: Ministry of Defence of India/Wikimedia.