Evolution, not revolution, will define Yoon’s foreign policy

11 March 2022

South Korean voters have spoken. Following a bitter campaign, Yoon Suk-yeol of the opposition’s People Power Party has defeated Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DP) by less than 0.8 per cent points. This is the smallest gap in the history of South Korean elections, showing the division among voters along different lines primarily based on generational differences, but also, to an extent, based on regional differences and along gender in the under 20s group.

In fact, Yoon will have to find a way to govern together with a National Assembly controlled by the DP for at least two more years. In this context, how may South Korean foreign policy change once Yoon takes office in two months? In short, expect evolution rather than revolution in Seoul’s relations with North Korea and China and its stance towards the Indo-Pacific.

Yoon and the conservatives tackle North Korea

Starting with inter-Korean relations, Yoon has promised to take a tough stance against North Korea unless Pyongyang changes its behaviour. In theory, this marks a clear break with the Moon Jae-in government. In practice, however, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang essentially broke down after the failure of the Hanoi summit between former US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. In the meantime, Seoul has ramped up its military capabilities to deter Pyongyang and, more recently, joined in multilateral condemnations of North Korean missile and satellite tests. Yoon is likely to follow these policies, while also emphasising the need to continue to impose sanctions on Pyongyang and becoming more critical of North Korea’s human rights abuses.

We can expect Yoon to seek to boost security cooperation with the US — above all — Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe to contain China’s behaviour in the region.

Yet, Yoon has indicated that he would be willing to meet Kim if Pyongyang takes steps towards denuclearisation. While this marks a point of departure with Moon’s willingness to engage in talks without preconditions, ultimately one thing is clear: sustainable engagement between the two Koreas depends on Pyongyang rather than Seoul. Thus, the ball is in North Korea’s court. After all, every South Korean president has seen him or herself as the leader who could bring inter-Korean reconciliation. Yoon will be no different. It is South Korea’s long-term goal. More than a goal, it is a dream. The president-elect will not waste the opportunity to pursue it if possible at all.

The rise of anti-China attitudes

When it comes to China, Yoon — based on his own comments during the election campaign — is likely to be openly critical of what most South Koreans see as Beijing’s aggressiveness, join in with the United States and like-minded partners to deter Chinese behaviour, and continue to develop Seoul’s own military capabilities to send a clear message to Beijing. Take the open criticism away, and this is what Moon has been doing for years. Indeed, the current president’s “strategic ambiguity” approach towards Beijing was dropped a few years ago already. Today, South Korea is firmly in the US camp, as the joint statement between Moon and US President Biden issued following their May 2021 summit clearly showed. In fact, Beijing’s state-owned Global Times has criticised Seoul for siding with Washington. Even China openly acknowledges the shift in position from the Moon government.

Yoon, however, has shown a willingness to openly criticise Beijing that Moon has lacked. For example, he has called the COVID-19 virus the “Wuhan virus”, in line with other politicians worldwide who blame China for the pandemic. Plus, the president-elect has toyed with the idea of South Korea formally joining the Quad. The Moon government has quietly, but surely, joined Quad+ meetings and worked together with Quad members in areas such as vaccine distribution or redesigning tech supply chains. But Moon has refused to formally become part of the Quad, which he seems to believe is unnecessarily antagonistic towards China. Yoon could decide that this is in South Korea’s interests, and send a clear political message by joining this security dialogue. Having said that, it is very unlikely that Yoon will seek to completely overhaul relations with Beijing. China is Seoul’s largest trading partner, a potential partner to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program, and — let’s not forget — (South) Korea’s neighbour for centuries. Simply put, it does not make sense for Yoon to break all ties with Beijing. South Korean policymakers understand this.

Seoul’s role in the Indo-Pacific

As for Yoon’s approach toward the Indo-Pacific, we can expect Yoon to seek to boost security cooperation with the US — above all — Australia, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Europe to contain China’s behaviour in the region. The New Southern Policy is Moon’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, prioritising relations with Southeast Asia and India. The question is how much will Yoon be willing to build on one of Moon’s successes to boost ties with the region. Moon has been accused of focusing on economics and not enough on security when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In reality, however, the ROK Navy has joined joint exercises with other navies, increased arms sales and defence cooperation with countries in the region, and supported cybersecurity capacity-building in the region. These are activities that a Yoon government will continue.

Yet, Yoon may be more open about the need for South Korea to step up its security commitments to the region. After all, he is known for being vocal and has already suggested that Seoul needs to “step up” in its foreign and security policy. His government may also play up South Korean activities in the region, in contrast with the Moon government that has been quiet about them. And Yoon may clearly state that South Korea’s activities in the Indo-Pacific target Chinese behaviour, for he has not shied away from openly criticising Beijing during the election. Moon has refused to openly state this, even if that is the aim.

Ultimately, South Korea has an obvious interest in the Indo-Pacific: to support open sea lanes and the principle of freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea. It is the main route for South Korean exports to flow to Europe, and for oil and gas from the Middle East to reach South Korea. Yoon will do all he can to protect this interest, as Moon has been doing since taking office. All in all, South Korean foreign policy is driven by long-term interests including inter-Korean reconciliation, cooperation with the US and like-minded partners, and deterring potential threats — today, China. Moon understands this. Yoon does as well. The president-elect will leave his footprint in South Korea’s foreign policy. But we should not expect a complete break from the past. This is not the South Korean way.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Ramon Pacheco Pardo is Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance. He is the author of Shrimp to Whale: South Korea from the Forgotten War to K-Pop (Hurst, 2022). Image credit: Wikimedia.